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ABSTRACT

RIGHTS IN FLUX: THE RIGHTS OF AFGHAN WOMEN IN DIFFERENT ERAS

By
Kelly Drevitch
May 2010

Dissertation supervised by Pat Dunham, Ph.D.
Have the lives of Afghan women improved since the U.S. invasion of October of
2001? Historically, the George W. Bush Administration followed past foreign
governments, Afghan political parties, and Afghan regimes who also promised to
“liberate Afghan women” when making the case for war or violence. Using case study
methodology and feminist theory, the research compares the status of Afghan women in
three eras: before the Taliban (1973 to 1995), during the Taliban (1996 to October 2001),
and since the U.S. invasion (October 2001 to December 2009). By applying gender and
cultural essentialism, the research concludes that these theories offer historical
explanations for the little change in status and the continued oppression of Afghan
women.
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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the women of Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THESIS
1.1: Problem Definition and Background
―The Citizens of Afghanistan, whether man or woman, have equal rights and
duties before the law,‖ reads Article 22 of the Constitution of Afghanistan. Theoretically,
this statement would symbolize gender parity in Afghanistan‘s legal and social worlds.
Historically, this does not mark the first time that the Constitution of Afghanistan granted
women the same freedom as men. In fact, individuals referred to the 1964 Afghanistan
Constitution, under King Mohammad Zahir, as ―a model for all of the Muslim World‖
(Lederman 2002:48). In the 1964 Constitution, Article 25 afforded all Afghan people,
―without any discrimination or preference equal rights and obligations before the law.‖
Further, in the 1976 Constitution, under President Mohammad Daoud, Article 27 granted
―both women and men, without discrimination and privilege, equal rights and obligations
before the law.‖ Despite the symbolic equality written in these Constitutions, Afghan
women have experienced brutally oppressive and restrictive lives under these different
regimes.
Most writing and research about Afghanistan begins with a discussion of the past
three decades of conflict and war that have plagued the country. While this is true, it
does not always discuss that Afghan women were historically pawns and part of the
rationale for war by different internal and external regimes. In fact, in 2001, before the
official U.S. invasion of Afghanistan began, ―saving Afghan women‖ was one
justification touted by the George W. Bush Administration. According to the Bush
Administration, ―liberating women from the misogynistic rule of the Taliban‖ served as a
cornerstone of their policy goals (Human Rights Watch 2004). However, are Afghan
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women‘s lives improving since the U.S. invasion compared to under the Taliban and
before the Taliban? According to the 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report
(AHDR) 2007,1 violence against women has reached ―epidemic proportions‖ (Library of
Parliament 2008:2). In 2007, one in three Afghanistan women still experienced physical,
psychological, or sexual violence. Additionally, 87 percent of Afghan women still
cannot read, and every 30 minutes an Afghan woman dies during childbirth (Afghanistan
Online 2007). One must question the validity of the Constitution‘s empowering verbiage
and compare it to the lived reality of Afghanistan‘s women. Are Afghan women‘s lives
improving or are they once again pawns in war? This thesis will explore how and
whether women‘s lives have improved since the U.S. invasion compared to before the
Taliban and under the Taliban. This research will examine the history and status of
women in these eras as well as explore both U.S. policy and Western feminist
organizations‘ campaigns.
1.2: Rationale for Research and Contributions to Research
In 2008 and 2009, the media, politicians, and women‘s organizations increased
their critique and coverage of U.S. policy in Afghanistan compared to earlier years when
Afghanistan was the ―forgotten war‖ and the focus was the Iraq War. Often, the U.S.
media and U.S. politicians question U.S. policy in terms of American support for the war
or the number of American troops killed. Meanwhile feminist organizations, like The

1

The Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007 is based on data collected from the Centre for Policy
and Human Development. This quote is from page 2 of The Library of Parliament‘s InfoSeries.
Afghanistan: the status of women. January 2008. See bibliography.
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Feminist Majority Foundation2 (FMF) and other Western feminist organizations, focus on
―saving‖ Afghan women. For example, in March 2009, FMF (2009) publicized a new
campaign ―to help Afghan women and girls.‖
A significant amount of research on U.S. policy dealing with factors like the
military, narcotics, nation building, security and women‘s rights in Afghanistan exists. In
many cases, the research topics belong in separate spheres and operate in ―silos‖ rather
than in accordance with each other. According to Angela Y. Davis (2008:20), feminist
author and Professor at the University of California, feminist methodology forces one to
explore associations not necessarily visible and to connect items together that appear
separate. In this thesis, I attempt to show a holistic perspective by using feminist theory
in my examination of how governmental policies and feminist campaigns affect women‘s
policies, either directly or indirectly throughout history.
The research design is a case study that applies the theories of gender essentialism
and cultural essentialism to compare the lives of women in Afghanistan before the
Taliban, during the Taliban, and since the U.S. invasion. By evaluating relevant factors,
this paper‘s contribution will be an evaluation of the policy and campaign
implementation in comparison to the goals of ―liberating women‖ in Afghanistan.
1.3: Research Questions and Thesis Statement
In each of the three periods, the application of gender essentialism and cultural
essentialism will attempt to analyze the status of women and consider the following
research questions:

2

Founded in the late 1980‘s, the mission of the Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF) is to advance
women's equality, non-violence, economic development, and, most importantly, empowerment of women
and girls in all sectors of society (www.feminist.org).
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How have women‘s rights improved in Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion
compared to under the Taliban and before the Taliban?



If ―liberating‖ (or saving) Afghan women is important, why do some policies
negatively affect or overlook women?



How can the application of gender essentialism and cultural essentialism provide
insights into why policy decisions often negatively affect or overlook Afghan
women?



How can the application of gender essentialism and cultural essentialism provide
insights on the justification for war in the name of ―saving‖ Afghan women?

Thesis Statement: The thesis will apply the theories of gender essentialism and cultural
essentialism to analyze the status of Afghan women in the three periods: before the
Taliban, under the Taliban, and since the U.S. invasion. The goal is to see if these
theories can help to describe and explain the differences in status for Afghan women in
each of these eras.
1.4: Theoretical Framework
The rationale for feminist theory. According to Jennifer Ring (2006:10-12),
feminist theory allows individuals to theorize through a different ―lens‖ and potentially
arrive at varying historical and political perspectives otherwise concealed by a traditional
viewpoint. As earlier quoted by Angela Davis (2008:22), a feminist approach allows one
to explore associations not necessarily visible and to connect items together that appear
separate. The value of a feminist approach is more than just exploring these potential
associations; it also explores the contradictions that arise from the traditional approach
and the feminist approach.
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According to Patricia McFadden (2008:56), ―it has never been a secret that war is
the most powerful instinct of patriarchal state and individual power.‖ When digging
deeper into the historical context of war, the traditional approach risks not examining all
the connections. With a feminist approach, it is possible to bring in factors that otherwise
remain silent. Furthermore, the theoretical lens and application of the feminist
perspective can potentially provide insight and more specifics for the broader questions.
The theory of essentialism. The theoretical framework for this research focuses
on gender essentialism and cultural essentialism. Before applying these theories, it is
important to examine briefly the theory of essentialism. According to Diana Fuss (1989),
a feminist theorist and scholar, essentialism is
most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable
and fixed properties which define the ―whatness‖ of a given entity. . . . Importantly,
essentialism is typically defined in opposition to difference. . . .The opposition is a
helpful one in that it reminds us that a complex system of cultural, social, psychical, and
historical differences, and not a set of pre-existent human essences, position and
constitute the subject. However, the binary articulation of essentialism and difference can
also be restrictive, even obfuscating, in that it allows us to ignore or deny the differences
within essentialism. (P. xi-xii)

The theory of essentialism spans across several disciplines, including the social sciences,
feminist theory, biology, philosophy, anthropology, theology, education and psychology.
Regarding the feminist approach, feminist scholar Allison Jaggar (2005) writes that
essentialism has been ―central to the women‘s studies debate‖ and the critique of it
―widely accepted.‖ Many feminist scholars have applied essentialism to explain ―postcolonial feminism‖ and its effects on Third World women. In applying essentialism,
whether it is cultural or gender, the value is the opportunity to reveal biases (Jaggar
2005). When individuals continue to attribute certain characteristics as belonging to a
certain race, gender, or culture, they continue to stereotype or discriminate.

5

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1: Introduction to the Research Design
The research design is a case study applying the theories of gender essentialism
and cultural essentialism to compare the lives of women in Afghanistan before the
Taliban, during the Taliban, and since the U.S. invasion. The case study will be
descriptive and explanatory and will include both qualitative and quantitative research.
2.2: Rationale for the Case Study Method
According to Yin, there are three elements to consider when deciding the best
research strategy for a study. First, one needs to consider the form of the research
questions. Second, one needs to ask if the project requires the researcher to control any
behavioral elements. Third, the researcher needs to consider whether the study focuses
on contemporary events. Yin believes that case studies are ideal when the research
questions ask ―how or why‖ questions, require no control of behavioral events, and focus
on current events (2003:5-6). For this study, the research questions ask ―how‖ and ―why‖
questions pertaining to the theories and policies in the three case study eras. Last, this
study does not control any behaviors of the variables being investigated.
Moreover, case studies provide rich detail in ways that other methods like surveys
or experiments cannot provide. Since part of the focus is on contemporary events, the
research provides real-life context to a reader. In addition, case studies help to preserve
the holistic nature of what it is being studied (Yin 2003:1-2). Since this study focuses on
the application of two theories, the case study method potentially offers a deeper
understanding than other research strategies.
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2.3: Defining the Case Study Periods
The case study defines these three periods as:


Before the Taliban: This period includes the early 1970‘s, when student
movements started to cause civil unrest within Afghanistan, during the era of
Soviet domination, the civil war, and pre-Taliban control. The case study will
NOT include the earlier history of Afghan women and the time ranges from 1973
to 1995.



During the Taliban: This period includes the years the Taliban controlled
Afghanistan. This time ranges from 1996 to October 2001.



Since the U.S. Invasion: This period covers the U.S. rationale for the invasion of
Afghanistan, the immediate policy decisions made by the United States after the
invasion, and the situation afterwards, ranging from October 2001 to December
2009.

2.4: Methods for Data Gathering
This project utilizes both primary and secondary sources. As far as primary
sources, research includes first-hand research conducted by non-partisan public policy
institutions, human rights organizations, the United Nations and United Nations‘
programs and funds, non-governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, U.S.
government agencies, foreign policy think tanks, security research centers, and
international and domestic women‘s organizations. Much of the primary sources include
interviews/narratives collected from the above references. Women from Afghanistan
representing different ethnic groups, different political affiliations, different regions, and
different social class composites served as the primary participants in the interviews.
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Additionally, some of the research studies, for example the Human Rights Watch 2004
study, included interviews from non-governmental workers, journalists, United Nation‘s
workers, government officials, teachers, doctors, and international donors.
This project also utilizes secondary sources from additional government agency
reports, women‘s organizations, foundations, transcripts from U.S. Congressional
hearings, books written about Afghanistan, and articles in foreign and domestic
newspapers. Regarding the theoretical literature, scholarly articles and books written by
feminist theorists were utilized. There was no usage of surveys or any personal
communication with human subjects.
2.5: Units of Analysis
For the case study, policy that affects Afghan women in each of the three periods
represents the units of analysis. This distinction is important, as it helped to limit the data
collected. While policy differs in the three periods, each era includes factors that affect
women legally, socioeconomically, politically, including their safety and their access to
health care, education, and economic opportunities. For example, from 2001 to 2009,
policy decisions on nation building, narcotics, and aid distribution were evaluated in how
they affected Afghan women. In the other eras, nation building or aid distribution was
not a policy. However, it is important to evaluate these policies and their effect on
women in areas of security and their access to healthcare, education, and economic
opportunities. While this project examines the policy in all of Afghanistan (no
boundaries or limitations in certain provinces), there is a difference in how policies
affects rural and urban women in each of the three periods. The definition of the theories
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of gender essentialism and cultural essentialism remain constant in each era. Moreover,
these theories are used to analyze the status of Afghan women in each of these periods.
2.6: Validity and Reliability
To meet the tests of construct validity, the research includes multiple sources of
documents (primary and secondary nature) in the data collection segment. As described,
this includes past works of several realms e.g., governmental, non-governmental,
women‘s organizations, and public policy institutions. This is important, since although
an organization may be reputable, the use of a wide variety of sources avoids subjective
bias. The definition of the units of analysis remains relatively consistent for the three
periods.
Additionally, the use of research conducted by experts in the field also establishes
reliability and validity. For example, organizations like Human Rights Watch receive
rather universal credit for their reputation in defining human rights violations.
Conducting research in war-torn areas like Afghanistan includes setbacks in establishing
pure reliability and validity. For instance, one understands that it would be impossible to
standardize conditions in Afghanistan to ensure reliability.
2.7: Analysis of the Data
To analyze the data, the study includes quantitative statistics and qualitative
interviews (conducted by other sources) with women in each period. The theoretical
application looks for similar conclusions in each period and helps to understand questions
such as: 1) If ―liberating‖ (or saving) Afghan women is important, why do some policies
negatively affect or overlook women? 2) How can the application of gender essentialism
and cultural essentialism provide insights into why policy decisions often negatively
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affect or overlook Afghan women? 3) How can the application of gender essentialism
and cultural essentialism provide insights on the justification for war in the name of
―saving‖ Afghan women?
2.8: Conceptual Framework: Defining Women’s Status
The following chapters define and compare women‘s status in these periods by
using the following variables:


Economic (i.e. labor force participation)



Education (i.e. literacy rates, completion of schooling at the primary, secondary,
and college level)



Health-Related (i.e. life expectancy, reproductive health statistics, suicide rates,
mental health)



Legal (i.e. laws and policies that preclude or give legal rights, social rights,
political rights, or infringe on their access to health care, education, and economic
opportunities)



Political (political participation and political representation) (i.e. how many
women voted, how many women ran for office, and how many women are elected
officials)



Social (i.e. family policy, marriage policy, violence against women, domestic)

10

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1: Introduction: Origin and Definitions of Essentialism
Controversy over the theory of essentialism is not a new phenomenon. Rather the
controversy spans countless centuries, several disciplines,3 and various cultures. The
roots of essentialism in philosophy originated with Plato (428-348 BC) (DeLamater and
Hyde 1998). According to Plato, the occurrences in the natural world ―were simply
reflections of a finite number of fixed or unchanging forms‖4 (DeLamater and Hyde
1998). In Plato‘s definition of essence, constancy and discontinuity represented the
paramount properties, meaning the essence remained the same and was ―categorically
different from another essence‖ (DeLamater and Hyde 1998). Defined in Aristotelian
terms, essentialism is ―a belief in true essence, that which is most irreducible,
unchanging, and therefore, constitutive of a given person or thing‖ (Fuss 1989:2). John
DeLamater5 and Janet Shibley Hyde6 (1998) labeled Plato and Aristotle‘s definition of
essentialism as ―classical essentialism.‖
In contemporary discourse, the commonly accepted definition of essentialism
differs from the Plato and Aristotle definition. According to DeLamater and Hyde
(1998), modern essentialism is ―a belief that certain phenomena are natural, inevitable,
3

As mentioned earlier, these various disciplines include social sciences, feminist theory, biology,
philosophy, anthropology, theology, education, and psychology.
4

Plato referred to the natural occurrences as the ―eide.‖ During the Middle Ages, the philosophers
studying Thomism renamed the ―eide‖ to ―essences‖ (DeLamater and Hyde 1998).
5

John DeLamater, PhD., Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin Madison, served as the
Editor of the Journal of Sex Research from 1997-2008, and authored several scholarly journal articles and
books on gender, human sexuality, and social psychology.
6

Janet Shibley Hyde, PhD., Professor of Psychology and Women‘s Studies at the University of Wisconsin
Madison, authored several scholarly journal articles on the psychology of women, human sexuality, and
gender-role development.
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universal, and biologically determined.‖ While many criticize the theory of essentialism,
the question of innate differences or innate similarities in sex or in race still ignites ardent
debate, especially among feminist and race theorists.
Throughout history, essentialist attributes have been applied to gender, sex,7
sexual orientation, religion, race, culture, ethnicity, and other groups. In an essentialist
vision, these attributes remain unchanged and withstand any cultural, societal, or
historical influence. To an essentialist, ―. . . history is an unbroken continuum that
transports across cultures and time‖ (Fuss 1989:3). Furthermore, these perpetual
essentialist attributes are evident in modern day ―identity politics,‖ meaning the tendency
or concept of an individual formulating their political beliefs based on ―a sense of
personal identity‖ (i.e. being gay, being a female, being Hispanic, being Black, or being
Christian) (Fuss 1982:97). In society, essentialist traits create the dangers for
unconscious discrimination, continued oppression, and resistance to social change.
3.2: Introduction to Gender Essentialism and Cultural Essentialism
While gender essentialism assumes differences between women and men, cultural
essentialism assumes differences between cultures, especially between ―Western culture
and non-Western culture‖ or ―Western culture and particular ‗Other‘ cultures‖ (Narayan

7

It is important to distinguish the difference between gender and sex. According to the World Health
Organization (WHO), sexes refer to the biological and physiological characteristics that define women and
men (i.e. different genitals). Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, attitudes, attributes,
or activities socially assigned to women and men (i.e. masculine or feminine qualities). Sex and gender are
not interchangeable definitions. For more information, visit, WHO, ―What do we mean by sex and
gender?‖ http://www.who.int/gender/whatisgender/en/index.html.
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2000:82). Both gender and cultural essentialism share a number of parallels with each
other. As Uma Narayan,8 feminist scholar, (2000) said,
―essential differences‖ operate in a manner that helps construct the senses of gender
identity and of cultural identity that shape the self-understandings and subjectivities of
different groups of people who inhabit the discursive contexts. . . . Both often operate to
conceal their role in the production and reproduction of such ―differences,‖ presenting
these differences as something pre-given and prediscursively ―real‖ that the discourses of
difference merely describe rather than help construct and perpetuate. (P. 82)

Gender essentialism is a binary belief that biological differences exist between
women and men. These differences include the qualities, abilities, or locations of ―men‖
and ―women‖ (Narayan 2000:82). For example, a gender essentialist may define men as
strong, aggressive, violent, brave, and independent while women as weak, passive,
gentle, cowardly, or emotional (Ratliff 2004). Men are ―dominating,‖ while women are
―dominated‖ (Fuss 1982:46). Some feminist theorists argue that the essentialist depiction
of men as dominating women is often in the context of dominating women‘s bodies and
their sexuality (Fuss 1982:46).
Gender essentialism treats women as a monolithic category, where gender
supersedes any other group membership of a woman (i.e. race, religion, class).
Moreover, gender essentialism then reduces women (and men) to a constructed
―essence.‖ In this essentialist view, attributes that define women‘s (or men‘s) essence
then apply to ―all‖ women (or men).
Cultural essentialism assumes all persons in a culture share the same universal
attributes, morals, and or attitude. Historically, this form of essentialism has reduced
individuals to an ―essential‖ attribute of what it means to be Afghan, African, American,
8

Uma Narayan is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vassar College and author of several books and
scholarly articles, including Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism and
co-editor of Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives and Decentering the Center.
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Asian, or Middle Eastern, etc. For instance, in the historical context of colonization, this
―reduction‖ created hierarchal differences and separation between the colonizers and the
colonized, specifically in sex and race (Mohanty 1991:17). This cultural and gender
essentialist example characterized white men (the colonizers) as ―naturally born to rule,‖
while characterizing the colonized (both men and women) as ―childlike subjects‖
(Mohanty 1991:17). For the colonizers, the ―superiority‖ of ―Western values‖ like
equality, liberty, and freedom served as the rationale for colonization. However, during
the epoch of colonization, the West did not fully practice these ―values‖ within the
colonized countries or within their own borders through the participation of slavery and
the deprivation of certain freedoms to their own population, including women (Narayan
2000:83-84).
Conversely, nationalist movements within non-Western countries, especially in
the context of anti-colonial struggles, have also ―reduced‖ Western values to an
―essence,‖ making the label of ―Westernization‖ derogatory. For example, Narayan
(1997:404-409) described how nationalist Indian men and women believed in a
―dichotomy between the ‗material‘ West and the ‗spiritual‘ East.‖ In this example,
Indian women became an essence that protected against ―Westernization and its implied
pollution.‖ While the British charged ―Indian spiritualism‖ as proof of their inability to
self-rule, the Indian nationalists only welcomed this label as proof of their ―superiority‖
to the West. Thus, in an attempt to differentiate from ―Western culture,‖ colonized
nationalists built upon their non-Western essences as badges of cultural honor (Narayan
2000:84).
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In the post-colonial context, this ongoing dichotomy and use of cultural
essentialism has continued to create complexities, especially for women rights and human
rights. For example, some Third World feminists, like Narayan (1997:396), described
the criticism directed at them within their own cultures from those who consider their
views ―attacking their ‘Nonwestern culture‘ on the basis of ‗Western‘ values.‖ In many
cases, the questions of different cultural values and cultural traditions collide with the
questions of human rights, universalism, and cultural relativism. In fact, some nonWestern governments and leaders engage in cultural essentialism to defend violations of
human rights. To them, the concept of human rights serves as the newest form of
Western imperialism. As Michael Goodhart (2003) stated, cultural essentialism also
includes ―reducing the most important theoretical questions about human rights to the
core questions of whether such an ‗essential‘ connection exists between a given culture
and ‗universal‘ human rights doctrines.‖
3.3: Essentialism within Feminist Studies
For decades, the question of essentialism has served at the heart of debates within
feminist studies (Jaggar 2005). As Fuss (1982:2) outlined in Essentially Speaking,
feminist theorists have discovered assumptions derived from essentialist perspectives.
For example, Fuss (1982:2) discussed how the concept of ―pure or original femininity‖ as
being a biological essence rather than a social construction originated from essentialist
thought. Further, some feminists advocate that essentialism explicates ―universal female
oppression,‖ the belief that patriarchal dominance transcends all cultures (Fuss 1982:2).
Jaggar (2005) refers to this as global radical feminism, where there is a belief in a ―global
sisterhood.‖ Moreover, Fuss (1982:2) argued that essentialism surfaces the most strongly
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within feminism itself, describing women to feminism as the ―unity of its object of
inquiry even when it is at pains to demonstrate the differences with this admittedly
generalizing and imprecise category.‖ Often, many feminists struggle not to engage in
essentialism.
According to Jaggar (2005), global radical feminists argue that women as a group
are predisposed to a unique kind of oppression that is universal while post-colonial
feminists argue against this uniform oppression. Rather, post-colonial feminists theorize
that different factors of women‘s oppression exist worldwide, which includes the factors
of historical colonialism and neo-colonialism (Jaggar 2005). Post-colonial feminists
assert that essentialist assumptions about women‘s universal oppression fail to consider
the oppression created by women‘s class, ethnicity, race, age, or nationality (Jaggar
2005). The feminist critique of the ―universal woman‖ as ―white, middle-class,
heterosexual, and privileged in some capacity‖ is widely accepted among many theorists
(Jaggar 2005). Additionally, this critique extends to the generalizations of the ―universal
woman‘s problems‖ (Narayan 2000:80).
Due to this criticism, many feminists argue for the consideration of differences
among women to preclude essentialist generalizations that do not address the concerns of
many women, especially in the Third World perspective (Narayan 2000:81). However,
according to Narayan (2000:81), in attempts to avoid gender essentialism, feminists often
replace it with cultural essentialism. Cultural essentialism then treats women within one
culture as a monolithic group, reducing them to an ―essence‖ (i.e. all Afghan women, all
Muslim women, all Indian women, all Western women) (Narayan 2000:81).
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Narayan (2000:83) attributes inadequate knowledge of the relationship between
―cultural imperialism‖ and ―gender essentialism‖ as part of the reason why some Western
feminists engage in cultural essentialism. According to Narayan (2000):
The gender essentialism perpetuated by relatively privileged subjects, including Western
feminists, is understood to be a form of ―cultural imperialism,‖ whereby privileged
subjects tend to construct their ―cultural Others‖ in their own image, taking their
particular locations and problems to be those of ―All Women.‖ This account ignores the
degree to which cultural imperialism often proceeds by means of an ―insistence on
Difference,‖ by a projection of Imaginary ―differences‖ that constitute one‘s Others as
Other, rather than via an ―insistence on Sameness.‖ Failing to see that ―cultural
imperialism‖ can involve both sorts of problems, attempts to avoid the Scylla of
―Sameness‖ often result in moves that leave one foundering on the Charybdis of
―Difference.‖ (P. 83)

―Cultural imperialism‖ mimics the political and historical motive of ―the Western moral
and cultural superiority‖ given for colonialism (Narayan 2000:83). In this colonial
context, the notion of Western superiority and the colonized nationalist backlash against
the colonizers relied upon the ―insistence on Difference‖ between the two cultures
(Narayan 2000:83). According to Narayan (2000:83), a Western feminist must recognize
the historical ―insistence on Difference‖ to avoid cultural essentialism.
Western feminists and human rights organizations often hold a legitimate interest
and well-meaning concern regarding the exploitation of Third World women or certain
cultural practices within non-Western cultures (i.e. female genital mutilation9 (FGM),
honor killings,10 sati,11 etc.). However, the danger is when Western feminists portray
these issues in an essentialist illustration. Meaning, they treat the issues as emblematic of
9

Female gender mutilation (FGM), also called female genital cutting, refers to the deeply rooted tradition
of removing all or part of the female genitalia.
10

Honor killings refer to male family members murdering girls or women within their family for actual,
alleged, or perceived immoral behavior.
11

Sati, also spelled satī or suttee, is a Hindu practice whereby a widow immolates herself on the funeral
pyre of her husband. Source: www.dictionary.com.
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the ―culture as a whole‖ or by ―marginalizing all Third World women as
underprivileged‖ while simultaneously casting all Western women as privileged
(Narayan 2000:83-84). In her well-known article Under Western Eyes: Feminist
Scholarship and Colonial Discourses, Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991) discusses some
Western feminists‘ view of the ―average Third World woman‖ compared to Western
feminists themselves:
This average Third World woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine
gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being ―Third World‖ (read ignorant, poor,
uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.). . . . In contrast to
the (implicit) self-representation of Western women as educated, as modern, as having
control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions.
(P. 56)

To Narayan, if feminists reject essentialism regarding ―women,‖ then feminists must also
reject essentialism regarding ―nation or culture‖ (Nicholson 1997:321). Otherwise, it just
perpetuates the strength of essentialism of any sort to withstand time.
However, some theorists raise concerns that omitting any essentialist attributes to
women then ―pulls the theoretical rug from under feminist activism‖ (Jaggar 2005). In
fact, theorists have questioned ―if the risk of essence must be taken‖ (Fuss 1983:18). In
her famous essay, ―Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,‖ acclaimed
theorist, professor, and literary critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak introduced the term
―strategic essentialism.‖ In The Second Wave: Reader in Feminist Theory, Linda
Nicholson (1997:318) described strategic essentialism as ―an essentialism that does not
attribute any essence to womanhood in a real or ontological sense but which employs
positive ideas about being a ‗woman‘ for the sake of political action.‖ While often
misunderstood within feminist theory, ―strategic essentialism‖ provides feminists with a
―certain alibi to essentialism‖ (Nicholson 1997:318). To Spivak, strategic essentialism is
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a ―persistent critique, a continuous recognition of the dangers of that which is
unavoidably useful‖ (Nicholson 1997:318). Moreover, Spivak stressed that strategic
essentialism must be viewed as a ―strategy‖ and not as a ―theory‖ that allows a temporary
acceptance of essentialism about women to advance social action and ―the necessity of
building for differences‖ (Nicholson 1997:318).
3:4: Essentialism in the Context of Women and War
Historically, women have served as the metaphorical pawns in war and conflict
situations. Unfortunately, the case of ―saving Afghan women‖ is not new. As noted
earlier, Patricia McFadden said, ―it has never been a secret that war is the most powerful
instinct of patriarchal state and individual power‖ (McFadden 2008:56). In times of war,
gender essentialism exaggerates the different attributes and qualities assigned to women
and men. Gender essentialism would define men as aggressive and strong while women
would be non-aggressive, caring, helpless, weak, and passive. Additionally, gender
essentialism ―evolves into more distinct categories as the military conflict escalates‖ with
men as both the ―perpetrator and the protector‖ (Fluri 2008:143). As Zillah Eisenstein
(2008:34) said, ―Gender naturalizes war; and war is gendered. Masculinity and
femininity are set as normal oppositions. . . . The essentialist argument assigns these
categories in nature while masking the artificial gendering of wars.‖
Throughout the history of war, women have been illustrated as the ―beautiful
souls,‖ while men are the ―just warriors‖ (Elshtain 1987:3-13). In the context of war and
politics, Jean Beth Elshtain (1987:3-X) argued that ―women are represented as being
laced through and through with sexual and maternal imagery, including the residues of an
everlasting and often intimate combat and cooperation with men in war and peace.‖
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For instance, while men represent the ―just warriors,‖ women represent the peaceful noncombatants that need to be saved (Elshtain 1987:3-13). Society expects a woman‘s role
in war to be peaceful or nurturing, like a ―pacifist protestor‖ (peaceful) or a ―militant
mother‖ (nurturing) (Elshtain 1987:3). While certainly, peaceful and nurturing represent
positive attributes, assigning them as solely ―women‘s traits‖ further exaggerates
women‘s roles as only mothers and their bodies as outlets for reproduction. As Elshtain
(1987:3-13) simply stated regarding the roles of women and men in war, ―Men are lifetakers, while women are life-givers.‖
People often justify that in war, collateral damage is the trade-off for the ―just
cause.‖ Often, the collateral damage represents women who were the ―just cause.‖ In
war, women often receive the brunt of the violence. Even in modern warfare, it is
estimated that women and children comprise 80 percent of the casualties and that 70
percent of the casualties in any conflict are non-combatants (Mohanty, Pratt, and Riley
2008:9; United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007b). Inevitably, the
consequences of war extend far beyond collateral damage. Historically, rape has served
as a silent ―weapon of war,‖ where women‘s bodies become a part of the battlefield
(United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007b). For example, in the 1994
Rwanda genocide, up to half a million women were raped and in the Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina War, at least 60,000 women were reportedly raped (United Nation‘s
Development Fund for Women 2007b). Eistenstein (2008) described rape as part of the
―gendered war‖:
Rape articulates the violence encoded in gender; in wartime, it reinscribes the continuity
of gender inscription of woman as victim rather than actor. Yet enemies, male or female,
are also feminized in the process. . . . Men are demasculinized by the rape of their
daughters or wives. Everyone is shamed in this process. (P. 37)

20

According to the United Nation's Development Fund for Women (2006), ―Wartime
sexual violence has been one of history's greatest silences.‖
Women also experience the realities of war like loss of loved ones, loss of
residence, and loss of their life, as they knew it (Mohanty et al. 2008:9). In addition,
women unequally suffer from the economic hardships of war, like unemployment and
lack of educational opportunities. For example, after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iraqi
women experienced disproportional rates of unemployment compared to Iraqi men. Prior
to the invasion, 72 percent of salaried Iraqi women were public employees. After the
invasion, many of them endured job loss as the ministries were dissolved and men
received preference for the few job openings (Chew 2008:76). According to Huibin
Chew (2008:77), Iraqi women have followed an unsettling trend studied by feminist‘s
scholars regarding women in conflict nations. Since 2003, poverty has increased
amongst Iraqi women as has the number of women engaging in prostitution.
Women after the conflict. While women often serve as the rationale for war, they
often are deemed secondary once the war is over. According to the RAND
Corporation12, the primary goal for a post-conflict nation is inevitably security. With
that, research by RAND indicates that often the attempts to avoid violence surpass
everything else and disagreements sometimes arise between those who serve as the nation
building policymakers and those who serve as advocates for women (Bernard et al.
2007:11).

12

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution with a mission to improve policy and decision-making through
research and analysis. The RAND Corporation is headquartered in Santa Monica, California with national and
international offices.
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While those in charge of nation building may agree on the objective of women in
an ―equitable, democratic, and egalitarian society‖ free of human rights violations, they
often view women‘s rights as a secondary goal (Bernard et al. 2007:11). For example,
consider the Iraq War. In an article in Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Swanee Hunt stated
that after the initial ―shock and awe‖ attack in 2003, she questioned a Pentagon colonel
regarding recruiting Iraqi women as leaders along with Iraqi men. According to Hunt, he
responded, ―Ambassador Hunt, we‘ll address women‘s issues after we get the place
secure‖ (Bernard et al. 2007:4). Often, rather than including women as part of the
security plan in the nation-building process, policymakers view women as a potential
danger that can jeopardize the entire process. In a country with a democratic objective, it
is difficult to reach that goal without both genders. Democracy without women cannot
happen. Reports also indicate that when the focus is stability without the consideration of
women, women then experience ―an extension of violence‖ (Cohen 2006:266). Without
being part of the process, women often also experience the same political repression and
the country maintains the same patriarchal power structure.
Women in developing nations often face domestic violence and rape. The
confusion between formal laws and customary laws serves as an obstacle in
understanding their rights, whether it be regarding violence or property rights. Moreover,
in developing nations, abused women often accept both their inferior status and the
patriarchal structure (Cohen 2006:261). For instance in 2003, a study by United Nations
Development Fund for Women, revealed that two-thirds of women surveyed in Morocco
and Algeria believed that domestic violence could be justified at times (Cohen 2006:
261). Additionally, some consider a woman ―dishonoring‖ their family if she is raped.
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In some Muslim countries, honor killings still exist when a woman ―dishonors‖ the
family. Furthermore, some countries may even legally justify an ―honor-killing.‖
Pakistan and Jordan both have laws that allow honor killings in certain circumstances
(Cohen 2006:261).
Understanding this context is important and indicates that women in post-conflict
developing nations often suffer physical and sexual attacks and economical,
psychological, and health problems. Additionally, it shows that, unfortunately, the trend
of not involving women in nation building negatively affects them and the country. Next,
this opens the questions of how and why women often serve as the rationale for war
while experiencing the biggest burdens of war.
3:5 Saving Women is Not a New Concept
Historically, the rhetoric made by men ―to save women‖ has continued for
centuries in both domestic and international contexts. To many societies, women are the
―emblems of cultural integrity‖ (Jaggar 2000:1). According to Seyla Benhabib, ―Women
and their bodies are the symbolic-cultural site upon which human societies inscript their
moral order‖ (Jaggar 2005). This essentialist notion of preserving a woman‘s purity has
included controlling her dress, marriage, sexuality, rights, and role in society. For
example, in American history, anti-suffragists equated their movement as a way to
preserve a ―woman‘s condition of purity.‖ In a speech against suffrage, one antisuffragist said,
Man assumed the direction of government and war, woman of the domestic and
family affairs and the care and training of the child. . . . It has been so from the
beginning . . . and it will continue to be so to the end, because it is in conformity to
nature and its laws, and is sustained and confirmed by the experience and reason of
six thousand years. . . . The domestic altar is a sacred flame where woman is the high
and officiating priestess. . . . To keep her in that condition of purity, it is necessary
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that she should be separated from the exercise of suffrage and from all those stern and
contaminating and demoralizing duties that devolves upon the hardier sex—man.
(Elshtain 1987:5)
Through a theoretical lens, essentialism provides an explanation for the continued
oppression of women who reside in war-torn, developing nations. Using this lens, Third
World women become a figurative ping-pong ball shuffled between cultural essentialism
and gender essentialism utilized by both the West and within their own patriarchal
countries. Meaning, while the West criticizes certain cultural practices and the denial of
women‘s rights within Third World countries, the Third World countries epitomize
women as the symbol of ―cultural preservation‖ (Narayan 2000:83).
From a historical perspective, the Bush administration‘s mission ―to liberate
Afghan women‖ follows a long-line of wars waged in the name of ―saving women.‖
During the colonial period, the British engaged in ―saving women‖ rhetoric as the
rationale for colonizing in both India and Egypt, while the French touted ―women rights‖
for their occupation in Algeria (Abu-Lughod 2002). Within feminist discourse, much
influential literature exists on the history of ―saving women‖ by feminist scholars like
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Leila Ahmed, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Lila AbuLughod, Uma Narayan, and many others.
In her article, ―Can the Subaltern Speak,‖ Spivak (1988) created the well-known
term of ―white men saving brown women from brown men‖ regarding the British
justifying their mission ―to save brown women‖ from the ―uncivilized‖ practice of sati.
Likewise, British Victorian feminists also believed that Indian women needed to be
―saved‖ and rallied against this ―uncivilized‖ practice. Conversely, nationalist Indian
men also considered their political role as ―crucially connected to improving the status of
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Indian women‖ (Narayan 1997:403). In ―Contesting Cultures: ‗Westernization,‘ Respect
for Cultures and Third World Feminists,‖ Narayan (1997) described this colonial
dichotomy between Victorian feminists and Indian nationalists men:
In the colonial context, ―Indian women appeared to them (Victorian feminists) to be the
natural and logical ‗white woman‘s burden.‘‖ Indian nationalist men similarly saw their
political role as crucially connected to ―improving the status of Indian women‖. . . . Both
Victorian feminists and Indian nationalist men constructed ―the Indian woman‖ as a site
upon which to ground their own demands for political liberation and agency, giving them
both an Other to ―speak for‖ in a context where ―speaking for‖ was ―one of the
prerequisites of political subjectivity.‖13 (P. 403)

In the context of cultural essentialism, the Victorian feminists and the British defined
―sati‖ as essential ―Indian culture.‖ However, while some Indian women practiced sati, it
generally was limited only to small numbers of Hindu Indian women, not all Indian
women (Narayan 1997:405). In the context of gender essentialism, the male Indian
nationalists defined their role as saving Indian women and improving their status.
Leila Ahmed famously depicted another classic example of ―saving women‖
rhetoric as a rationale for colonialism. In her prominent Women and Gender in Islam:
Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, Ahmed (1992) discussed Lord Cromer, a British
consul general in Egypt at the beginning of the twentieth century. To Lord Cromer, the
veil was ―uncivilized‖ and represented the unjust seclusion and oppression of Egyptian
women imposed by Islam. However, he simultaneously opposed women‘s suffrage in
Britain (Ahmed 1992). This example shows again the utilization of both gender and
cultural essentialism. To Lord Cromer, it was not the question of whether women should
have rights; it was the question of the most ―civilized‖ way to deprive women of their
rights.
13

In this section, Narayan references Antoinette Burton‘s Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian
Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915.
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The use of ―saving women‖ rhetoric represents a continuum of history repeating
itself. Thus, one can draw parallels from these examples to the current subject of ―saving
Afghan women.‖ First, like the example of Indian women, some Western feminists and
some American conservatives agree on the need to ―save Afghan women,‖ much like
British feminists and colonizers agreed sati was ―uncivilized.‖ Second, similar to
Nationalist Indian men, some Afghan men have historically positioned themselves
politically to protect and save Afghan women. Third, to many Western policymakers and
feminists, the burqa14 has emerged as the symbol of cultural oppression of Muslim
women and the concept of unveiling as the sign of their liberation. This example
resonates much like Lord Cromer‘s view of the veil as culturally uncivilized.
While to the West the veil symbolizes cultural oppression, Ahmed (1992) argued
that since the twentieth century, the veil to Muslim societies, symbolizes their tradition
and resistance to the West. Through a theoretical lens, this example highlights the
omnipresence of gender essentialism and the perpetual pushback of cultural essentialism
between Western countries and non-Western countries. From a gender essentialist
perspective, the veil represents ―women‘s sexual freedom,‖ reducing women to their
sexuality and ability to ―uncover.‖ Kelly Oliver (2007) discussed this in her Women as
Weapons of War: Iraq, Sex, and the Media. Regarding veiling (Oliver 2007), she said:
women‘s freedom is reduced to women‘s sexual freedom, which in turn is reduced to the
freedom to reveal their bodies in public. Whether women‘s right to bare arms merely
makes them more sexually available to men or allows them to celebrate their own bodies,
their agency is circumscribed by social forces that discipline even as they liberate. The
modern woman is the subject of the free market. Hers is the freedom to shop. (P. 51)

14

Burqa is a head to toe covering for women made of mesh cloth so that women can see or breathe through
the covering. Sometimes, individuals will use the word chador or chaddari, which is a veil that is
culturally specific and variable among different Islamic countries.
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Some Muslims cast the depiction of un-veiling as a sign of ―evil‖ Westernization and
sexual promiscuity. Hence, in this view, a woman wearing a veil symbolizes ―traditional
and authentic values‖ (Oliver 2007:51). For instance, since the inception of the Iraq War,
there has been a movement to ―re-veil‖ Iraqi women, potentially as a response against the
U.S. occupation (Oliver 2007:51). In this example, some Iraqi men position re-veiling
Iraqi women as ―saving‖ their culture from Westernization.
3.6: Conclusion of the Literature Review
Historically, gender and cultural essentialism show how women are the
continuous pawns in conflicts and post-conflicts. Thus, the case of ―saving‖ Afghan
women is not unique in this aspect. However, gender essentialism does provide potential
explanations for why this historical tradition of ―saving women‖ has continued for
centuries. In this case study, cultural essentialism also provides potential insight for the
decades of struggle Afghan women have endured in improving their status. These
theories are relevant to this case study as they historically have offered richer insight
otherwise unseen. Historically, gender and cultural essentialism provide theoretical
understanding of how this perpetual utilization negatively affects women.
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL OVERVIEW OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE
THREE ERAS
4.1: The Historical Imbalance Between Afghan Culture and Women’s Rights
Afghanistan is a traditional country with deep patriarchal roots and a tribal-based
family structure. In Afghanistan, family is at the heart of the society. Oftentimes, the
balance of tradition, family, and Islam has collided with ―women‘s rights.‖ In Afghan
society, some view women as ―half of men,‖ which is a common phrase within the
country (Brodsky 2004:37). In the tribal-based family structure, society deems women as
the ―receptacle of honor‖ (Ahmed-Gosh 2003:3). Much of this cultural role originated
from the Pashtunwali code, which is an ancient ethnic custom and a tribal code of the
Pashtuns.15 According to Women for Women International16 (2009), Pashtunwali code
is the ―absolute duty of men to protect the respectability of women and the integrity of
the homeland.‖ Throughout history, the preservation of women‘s honor through tribal
laws often superseded any constitutional law or progressive reform that would have
benefited Afghan women. Most Afghans place their primary values as community and
group identity. Often, women view their identity as central to their family‘s identity and
not in separate individual spheres. To rural women, the value of ―individual identity‖ is a
foreign concept (Rostami-Povey 2007:17).
Historically, Afghan monarchs and politicians, warlords, and foreign powers have
used Afghan women as ―political pawns.‖ Even as early as the 1920‘s, there have been
15

Throughout history and in modern times, the Pashtuns represented the largest ethnic group in
Afghanistan and dominated much of the political leadership. President Hamid Karzai is of Pashtun
descent.
16

Women for Women International is a nonprofit 501 (c) (3) organization with a mission of helping
women of war torn countries rebuild their lives. www.womenforwomen.org
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attempts to create equality for Afghan women. In addition, there is a deep divide
between rural Afghanistan and urban Afghanistan. Urban women often experienced
reform while in the rural areas patriarchal tradition precluded any changes. Even in
modern times, there is a clear cultural divide between rural Afghanistan and urban
Afghanistan. In 2008, 75 percent of the population resided in rural areas. Historically,
most political, civil, and social gains experienced by women occurred in Kabul or other
urban settings, not the rural areas. As stated in the Parliamentary Information, ―the
reality of a nomad woman is different from that of a village woman, and both are
different from an urban university graduate woman‖ (Library of Parliament 2008:2).
Many Western governments and organizations categorize women‘s rights in
Afghanistan as either ―before the Taliban‖ or ―after the Taliban.‖ It is important to
realize that oppression did not start with the Taliban, and oftentimes, oppression was a
partial result of the patriarchal and tribal-based family structure. This patriarchal family
structure does not mean that all Afghan men are oppressive or ―women-haters.‖ On the
contrary, many Afghan men and women believe that the oppression of women, especially
in education, violates Islam. Some Afghan men believe that in Islam, ―. . . men and
women have the right to knowledge, that it is their duty as human beings to educate and
to be educated‖ (Daoud 2002:104). According to Anne Brodsky (2004), author of With
all our Strength: The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, many
Afghan men understand the negative consequences of women‘s oppression in society. In
fact, many Afghan women view Afghan men as part of the solution, not part of the
problem. It is also important to realize that while women‘s equality never existed in
Afghanistan, progressive reforms and attempts were made at different times.
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Nevertheless, even prior to the Soviet Invasion and the three decades of war, Afghan
women had one of the lowest social statuses in the world. For example, Physicians for
Human Rights (1998) stated that historically, over 80 percent of women in Afghanistan
were illiterate. Thus, even in the best of times, only 20 percent of Afghan women could
read.
4.2: Brief Historical Review of the Afghan Political Environments in the Three Eras:
The Early Twentieth Century Background
While Afghanistan has historically struggled with balancing Islam and women‘s
rights, the early twentieth century actually included rather progressive movements
towards democracy and modernization. In fact, at one time, people considered
Afghanistan as a model of progress and reform in Muslim states (Khan 2008:163). From
1919 to 1929, King Amanullah ruled Afghanistan. After the country won independence
from the British, progressive reform started to take place. In 1920, Afghan women
received the right to vote. Additional reforms included the opening of schools for girls,
an increase in the minimum age to marry, and the elimination of the bridal dowry. With
these modern changes also came opposition from the conservative Islam clerics and rural
tribes. This political unrest ultimately forced King Amanullah into exile in 1929. The
next King favored the conservatives and overturned many modernizations, including
revoking women‘s right to vote (Brodsky 2004:35).
From 1933 to 1973, under the rule of King Mohammad Zahir, Afghanistan‘s
political environment experienced relatively progressive reforms and notably, a period of
civil stability. By 1964, women again received the right to vote and the right to enter into
politics. Further, Afghanistan made other advancements including the banning of child
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marriage, changes in laws regarding polygamy, and the opening of girls‘ schools (Human
Rights Watch 2004). In the 1960s, women were encouraged to ―unveil.‖ In fact, at
several points in Afghan history, the wives and daughters of Afghan diplomats and
leaders chose not to wear veils when traveling abroad (Brodsky 2004:35).
4.3: The End of Political Stability and the Pre-Taliban Political Environment
While the political environment remained relatively stable for 40 years in
Afghanistan, 1973 started the beginning of political turmoil and enduring civil unrest. In
1973, Mohammad Daoud17 overthrew King Mohammad Zahir, eliminating the monarchy
system and declaring himself President of Afghanistan. While Daoud originally united
with the People‘s Democratic Party of Afghanistan18 (PDPA), a Marxist political group,
in ousting King Mohammad Zahir he attempted to disassociate himself with both the
PDPA and the Soviet Union government once in power.
From 1973 to 1978, the political environment continued to support reforms in
Afghanistan. While Kabul started to modernize, the rural areas remained unchanged and
still ―backwards‖ (Qazi 2009). Politically, Daoud changed the government structure
from aristocratic to bureaucratic. Additionally, Daoud depended heavily on military and
economic aid from both the Soviet Union and the United States (Rostami-Povey
2007:10). While Daoud pledged to democratize Afghanistan, he actually executed more

17

Mohammed Daoud served as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan under King Mohammad Zahir and
was also his cousin. The overthrow was a bloodless coup and many historians believed that King
Mohammad Zahir had prior knowledge of the coup.
18

Founded in 1965 by Nur Mohammed Taraki, Babrak Karmal and others, People‘s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) was a Marxist political group in Afghanistan. In 1966, the group split into two
factions, Taraki‘s Khalq (literally ―people‖) branch and Karmal‘s Parcham (literally ―banner‖) branch.
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control over the country, including the press, limited political activity to just one political
party, and made it an ―autocratic, centralized, and repressive regime‖ (Brodsky 2004:49).
In this same period, the Afghan student movement exploded with different
political groups (e.g., socialist groups, Marxist and Maoist organizations, right-wing
Islamic extremists, and pro-democracy groups) (Brodsky 2004:42). While each group
protested in order to shift Afghanistan into their definition of a better society, the visions
between the groups, especially right and left, conflicted with each other. As the student
movements began, so did violent conflicts against each other. The right-wing Islamic
groups fought against modernization and secularism while the other groups protested
issues like workers‘ wages or the lack of jobs (Brodsky 2004:42).
Urban Afghan women often participated in these movements through
involvement in leftist or pro-democracy organizations. However, while many of the
leftist groups believed women‘s rights to be instrumental for societal change, women‘s
rights were never the priority. Conversely, women essentially ―had no place or worth‖
within the right-wing groups (Brodsky 2004:55-57). As no group focused exclusively on
women‘s rights, Meena,19 a 20-year old activist, founded the Revolutionary Association
of the Women of Afghanistan20 (RAWA) in 1977. RAWA‘s mission was to aid and to
empower women as well as to create a free and secular democratic society for all
Afghans (Brodsky 2004:55-57).
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Brodsky mentioned throughout the book that last names are not common in Afghanistan and the use of
them is relatively new. Further, Meena often changed her name for security reasons and her own safety.
Thus, to refer to Meena as just Meena is common. However, for Western media requests, Meena had a
surname of Keshwar Kamal. A right-wing conservative group assassinated Meena on February 4, 1987.
20

RAWA, which still operates today, is the oldest political/social organization of Afghan women struggling
for peace, freedom, democracy and women's rights in Afghanistan (www.rawa.org).
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In 1978, loyalists of the PDPA supported by the Soviet Union led a military coup
against Daoud, assassinating him. From 1978 to 1979, the PDPA then controlled the
country, also promising democracy, reform, and freedom. Yet, even within this political
group, disagreements and fighting occurred between the Khalq and Parcham branches21
(Brodsky 2004:50). While the group continued with modernizations to Afghanistan, they
executed the changes with violence and killed ―scores of innocent people‖ (Qazi 2009).
In 1979, the Soviet Union formally invaded Afghanistan and for the next 10
years, much of Afghan society suffered from the war violence. The Soviet regime and
the Mujahideen22 committed human rights atrocities against the Afghan population
(Human Rights Watch 2005). In addition to the brutal violence and torture against
political adversaries, the Soviet regime suppressed academic freedom through the
indoctrination of Soviet and Marxist studies, suppressed civil liberties, considered anyone
with American ties as a potential CIA threat, trained spies in the workforce and schools,
and repressed the individual (Helsinki Watch 1984). Furthermore, Human Rights Watch
estimates that during the 1980s, Afghanistan received more light weapons than other
country and has more landmines than any other country (Human Rights Watch 2005;
Hartman 2002). It is estimated that 1.9 million Afghans, both fighters and civilians, died
in the 10-year conflict with the Soviet Union (Brodsky 2004:52). Starting in 1980, the
United States continuously funded factions of the Mujahideen, with the intention of
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Khalq and Parcham were both different factions in the PDPA. Much of the resentment and fighting dealt
with the difference in ideology. Khalq believed strongly in Marxist/Leninist theory while Parcham believed
in a gradual change to socialism.
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Mujahideen in Arabic literally means ―holy warriors‖ (plural term of mujahid). During the Soviet
invasion, Mujahideen referred to the various Soviet-resistance groups in Afghanistan. After the Soviet
departure, some groups started to refer to the Mujahideen as the jehadis.
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making the Soviet Union fail (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006). Moreover, the CIA provided
training to the Mujahideen, helping to create ―some of the deadliest urban guerilla
warriors in the world‖ (Hartman 2002). In fact, President Ronald Reagan, depicted the
Mujahideen forces as the ―as the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers of the United
States‖ (Jaggar 2005).
Under control of the Soviets, rural and urban Afghanistan experienced different
political environments. For example, in rural areas, uneducated and armed Mujahideen
predominately fought against the Soviets and experienced most of the ―all out war.‖ In
the urban areas, educated independent groups executed protests, delivery of political
propaganda, assassinations, and guerilla bombs against the Soviets and Pro-Soviet
supporters (Brodksy 2004:62). Additionally, the urban Afghans also experienced
―political oppression, governmental violence, and police state tactics‖ as Kabul marked
one of the only areas where Soviet forces and supporters retained control (Brodsky
2004:63). While some Mujahideen fought for patriotic reasons, others fought to gain
fundamentalist control and used Sharia Law23 against those who failed to obey (Brodsky
2004:59). Many in the Soviet resistance groups had no abilities to govern, only in how to
fight and those who emerged as rural leaders and warlords often represented the ―the
most fundamental, brutal, and anti-democratic‖ leaders, especially against Afghan
women (Brodsky 2004:60).
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, President Najibullah, the Soviet-backed
leader, took power in Afghanistan and the country emerged into a civil war. After three
years of the civil war, seven factions of the Mujahideen overthrew Najibullah in April

23

Islamic religious law.
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1992. Due to the division between the seven groups, the civil war continued and none of
the groups could successfully stabilize a central government (Amnesty International
1995). The resistance groups included the Taliban. During this time, these different
groups committed ―gross violations and massacres‖ against all Afghan people, but
especially against women (Qazi 2009).
4.4: The Taliban Political Environment
After years of civil war, the Taliban24 emerged as the leaders of Afghanistan in
1996. Some Afghans believed that the Taliban would bring stability to the war-torn
region. However, in their strict interpretation of Islam, the Taliban committed human
rights violations against all Afghans, but especially against Afghan women, who received
the brunt of discrimination in the Taliban‘s edicts. Many of the Taliban leaders observed
Wahhabism, an orthodox form of Sunni Islam, which they used to justify their human
rights violations, oppress women, and to ban television, laughter, kite flying for children,
as well to jail men whose beards were too short. To maintain laws against what the
Taliban defined as un-Islamic behavior, the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice (DPVPV), the Taliban‘s religious police, used force and violence.
The international community grew extremely critical of the Taliban and their countless
human rights violations. Despite the fact the that the Taliban controlled over 90 percent
of the country, only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the
Taliban as a legitimate government (Bruno 2009).
4.5: The Post-Taliban Political Environment
In October, 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan and dismantled the

24

Taliban literally means ―students‖ or ―students of Islam.‖ Plural version of Talib.
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Taliban. Since 2001, the political environment of Afghanistan has changed dramatically;
however, the country remains war-torn and violent. In 2001, the United States aligned
with the Northern Alliance, a group of warlords with similar undemocratic and
fundamentalist views as the Taliban.

In the beginning of the post-Taliban era, the

Northern Alliance warlords held control over Afghanistan. In December 2001, militia
forces, like the Northern Alliance, exiled leaders like former King Mohammad Zahir and
others signed the Bonn Agreement25 against the Taliban.

Additionally, the Bonn

Agreement planned the steps in the Afghan political process, such as the June 2002
Emergency Loya Jirga.26 In this meeting, the groups chose the two-year transnational
government, including naming Hamid Karzai as the interim President (Human Rights
Watch 2004).
In 2004, Afghanistan adopted their new constitution and emerged as an Islamic
Republic. The wording of the Afghanistan Constitution offers new rights to all Afghans,
regardless of gender and ethnicity.

In addition, the constitution guarantees Afghan

women representation through quotas. Conversely, the same guarantee does not exist for
the several different ethnicities in Afghanistan. In 2004, Afghanistan held its first free
democratic election, where one woman ran for President and Afghanistan formally
elected Hamid Karzai as President.

25

On December 5, 2001, several Afghan political groups and anti-Taliban forces signed the Bonn
Agreement. The Bonn Agreement served as an interim guide and timetable for Afghanistan‘ political
process. Women participated in the June 2002 meeting. The Human Rights Watch. 2004. ―Between Hope
and Fear: Intimidation and Attacks Against Women in Public Life in Afghanistan‖ discussed women‘s
participation in the Emergency Loya Jirgas through interviews. See bibliography.
26
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Despite the signs of democracy, the Karzai administration lacks central control.
Because of this, corruption is rampant and many in the West and within Afghanistan refer
to Hamid Karzai as ―the mayor of Kabul‖ (Adeneney 2008:554). In August 2009,
Afghanistan held its second Presidential election. While many Western countries,
including the United States, called the election a success, one Afghan woman politician,
Malalai Joya, said the ―election changes nothing‖ as warlords and fundamentalists largely
control the country. Joya also stated that she fears for her life, and to be safe, she must
hide (Joya 2009). Amid speculations of fraud, President Karzai agreed to a run-off
election on November 7, 2009, between himself and his main challenger, Abdullah
Abdullah. However, in early November 2009, Abdullah Abdullah withdrew himself
from the race, giving Hamid Karzai another term as the President of Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER 5: STATUS OF AFGHAN WOMEN IN THE PRE-TALIBAN ERA (19731995):
5.1: Introduction to the Pre-Taliban Era
In 1973 in Kabul, one historian described the cultural atmosphere for urban
women as one with ―Western capitalist cultural influence.‖ The historian described the
typical urban Afghan girl as:
experiencing a new freedom in living and in new ways of dressing. Instead of
dressing in the ways her mother did at her age, an educated Afghan girl slips
quickly into exactly the kind of costume worn by her counterpart in London,
Paris, or New York. Instead of plaiting her hair, she bobs it in European fashion,
pulls on some fine nylon stockings, pushes her feet into moccasins, and dabs her
smiling lips with bright red lipstick. (Emadi 2002:22)
At this time, many referred to Kabul as the ―Islamic Paris‖ as it shared both European
and Asian influences (Daoud 2002:103). In 1972, Afghanistan hosted their first and only
Miss Afghanistan Pageant, which focused on ―intellect and poise but not beauty or
swimsuits.‖27 To many Afghan women, this represented a step towards modernization.
In Kabul, modern nightclubs and prestigious hotels opened. Often, these same hotels
hosted fashion shows for women that featured Western-style dress. In the ―Nixon
Market‖ of Kabul and other cities, women could purchase mini-skirts or sleeveless
dresses in shopping centers. In the early 1970s, fashion represented one of the greatest
―Westernization trends‖ in urban Afghanistan.
However, while the rural areas never experienced this ―trend,‖ it still ignited
opposition by rural clerics and conservatives who protested against the ―Marxist
influence‖ and ―Western immorality‖ (Emadi 2002:22-24). Zohra Yusuf Daoud, Miss
27

In the 1972 Miss Afghanistan, there was no swimsuit competition or emphasis on appearance in the
pageant. The winner, Zohra Yusuf Daoud, described the pageant as a sign of Afghanistan ―joining the
global community.‖
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Afghanistan 1972, traveled throughout cities to advocate for the growing literacy
programs for women. During her trip, she met poverty-stricken and illiterate women.
Further, she visited jails full of women who had run way from forced marriages.
Regarding her travel throughout the country and the status of women, she said:
Although all women had the right to vote, not all women were allowed to exercise this
right. Although theoretically women had the choice not to wear the veil, not all women
were permitted to make that choice. Although theoretically all Afghan women had a
chance of an education, not all women could seize that opportunity. Islam wasn‘t
keeping these women from moving forward; the traditionalists and cultures were
women‘s greatest obstacles in their quests for equality. (Rostami-Povey 2007:12)

Hafizullah Emadi classified Afghan women at this time as either revolutionaries
or liberals. In making this distinction, he points out that each group viewed ―women‘s
emancipation‖ differently. While the revolutionaries believed that women‘s
emancipation completely changed the current system, including its ideology, politics, and
culture, the liberals viewed it as superficial changes in accepting certain Western cultural
behaviors of dress and appearance (2002:24). It is important to recognize the style of
dress worn by some Afghan women in this era since often many Westerners associate
Afghan women as historically wearing only burqas. In the 1960‘s and the 1970s, urban
Afghan women walked without a burqa as it was not compulsory (Rostami-Povey
2007:11). In fact, only in 1992 did the Mujahideen parties issue a compulsory order
forcing women to wear the hijab28 (Kumar and Stabile 2005).
From 1973 to 1995, each regime in power engaged in rhetoric about either
―emancipating Afghan women‖ or ―protecting Afghan women.‖ Both the Daoud
Administration and the PDPA regime promised policy aimed to improve the status of
28

Hijab literally translates into ―modest clothing‖ for both men and women. It is often culturally specific
among different Islamic countries. In 1992, the hijab referred to a full body black garment with veil on the
head.
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Afghan women. While Daoud implemented policies in the name of women‘s freedom,
he failed to offer any women positions in his cabinet. Consequently, liberal groups and
members of Women‘s Democratic Organization of Afghanistan29 (WDOA) attacked the
Daoud administration for not improving women‘s status effectively. However, often
these same groups failed to make real connections on a grassroots level to women,
especially in rural areas (Emadi 2002:99). In 1978, the PDPA overthrew Daoud in a
military coup in the Saur (April) Revolution.30 One of their primary political objectives
was the ―emancipation of women.‖ The PDPA also proclaimed equality for women and
men in social, economic, civil, political, and cultural worlds (Emadi 2002:100).
Under the Communist regime, the Soviets viewed women as oppressed by Islamic
customs and argued that their invasion would ―emancipate women‖ from the patriarchal
culture. While fighting the Soviets and during the civil war, the Mujahideen used the
―language of jihad as protecting the purity of Afghan women and Islamic values‖
(Coleman 2004:2). According to the Physicians for Human Rights (1998), after 1992
women became even more oppressed than before. However, under each regime in the
Pre-Taliban era, improving the status of Afghan women represented either a secondary or
a rhetorical goal.
5.2: Women’s Status in the Constitution
According to the 1964, 1976, 1987, and the 1990 Constitutions, Afghan women
were equal to Afghan men. However, Afghan society, especially in the rural areas, often
abided by patriarchal customs and informal, tribal laws. In the 1964 Constitution, Article
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The women‘s arm of the PDPA, founded in the mid 1960s.

30

The Saur Revolution is named for the Afghan calendar month (April) when the military coup took place.
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25 stated, ―All Afghan people without any discrimination or preference have equal rights
and obligations before the law.‖ While Article 25 did not specifically use the word
―women‖ in the 1964 Constitution, scholars have noted that the use of ―All Afghan
people‖ implied both women and men and was a progressive statement for that time. The
1964 Constitution also marked the beginning of a democratic Afghanistan, rather than an
aristocratic society. For the first time, the Afghan political system included a new
democratic process through an elected parliament, in which women could participate
through voting and running for parliament. In fact, the Advisory Committee for the 1964
Constitution included two women. The Constitution also stated that the Queen could rule
as a ―regent‖ in place of an absent King and stated that, ―although Islam was the sacred
religion of Afghanistan, the secular legal systems would take precedence over Sharia
Law‖ (Vorgetts 2002:95).
The 1976 Constitution declared Afghanistan to be a republic. Additionally, the
language of the Constitution used ―women and men‖ rather than ―all people.‖ In fact,
Article 27 specifically granted ―both women and men, without discrimination and
privilege, equal rights and obligations before the law.‖ Two women, Alia Hafeez and
Fatima Kayfi, of 41-person committee, worked to formulate the 1976 Constitution.
Under the communist regimes, both the 1987 and 1990 Constitutions granted men
and women equal rights. In both Constitutions, Afghanistan remained a communist
republic. In the 1987 Constitution, Article 28 stated:
Citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan, both men and women, have equal rights
and duties before the law, irrespective of their national, racial, linguistic, tribal,
educational and social status, religious creed, political conviction, occupation,
wealth, and residence. Designation of any illegal privilege or discrimination
against rights and duties of citizens are [sic] forbidden. (Nawabi 2003:20)
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Additionally, Article 33 stated, ―The citizenship of the Republic of Afghanistan is equal
and uniform to all citizens‖ (Nawabi 2003:20). In the 1990 Constitution, both Articles
28 and 33 remained the same, granting equality to both men and women.
Prior to the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideen disregarded the Constitution.
Once the Mujahideen gained control, they abolished the Constitution and created the
Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) (Amnesty International 1995). While the country still
lacked a central authority, leaders of seven opposing factions divided positions within the
fragmented Afghan government. Eventually the various factions created the Northern
Alliance, who further eroded the rights of Afghan women with their misogynistic policies
(Kumar and Stabile 2005). These battling factions dismantled much of the judicial
system, creating a system of complete lawlessness and no justice for the multitude of
abuses against women (Human Rights Watch 2003). In some parts of the country,
warlords created courts, where Islamic clergy, provincial shuras,31 or the warlords
themselves, acted as the judges (Amnesty International 1995). In 1994, the Supreme
Court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan implemented an ―Ordinance on Women‘s
Veil.‖ Under this new ordinance, the Supreme Court required Afghan women to wear
full body veils and stay in their homes to protect them from ―sedition‖ (Human Rights
Watch 2003).
5.3: Violence Against Women
Universally, there is no standard definition of what constitutes gender-based
violence. According to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
against Women, gender-based violence is ―any act that results in, or is likely to result in,
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Afghan council of elders.
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physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such
act, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private
life‖32 (United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2006). Moreover, The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women33
(CEDAW) defines gender-based violence as violence "directed against a woman because
she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately" (United Nation‘s Development
Fund for Women 2006). CEDAW classifies gender-based violence into three categories
of physical violence, sexual violence, and emotional/psychological violence (United
Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2006). In the pre-Taliban era, women
experienced all three classifications of violence in tragic measures. As discussed earlier,
historically in war, women often receive the brunt of the violence, and, even in modern
warfare, it is estimated that women and children comprise 80 percent of the casualties
(Mohanty et al. 2008:9).
During the years of the Soviet invasion, the Soviet-controlled government
committed serious human right violations against all Afghans. In rural areas, where the
bulk of the fighting took place, the Soviet fighters would torture women for information
against the resistance groups. In the urban areas, women who peacefully protested
against communism risked incarceration, torture, and even execution (Helsinki Watch
1984). The Afghan branch of the KGB34 infiltrated Afghan classrooms, women‘s
32
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The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is an
international agreement adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly. CEDAW includes a preamble and
30 articles that define what constitutes discrimination against women and offers recommendations to end
discrimination. CEDAW is sometimes referred to as an international bill of rights for women.
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meetings, and youth organizations to listen and search for opposition to their ideology.
Due to government opposition, RAWA members often were the target of searches by the
police, and many RAWA members served time in jail or they were forced into hiding
(Brodksy 2004:67). Male jail guards, employed by the communist government, would
sexually molest jailed women, often in front of the male prisoners (Helsinki Watch
1984). The WDOA, the only women‘s organization that supported the Soviet invasion,
never condemned the human rights violations (Maley 1996).
After the Soviet withdrawal, the lawlessness and the civil war created an even
more violent, brutal, and dangerous environment for women, especially in the rural areas.
According to Amnesty International (1995), during this time women were ―spoils of war,
being raped by armed guards or sold into prostitution.‖ For some women, the violence
was so unbearable they chose to commit suicide rather than endure it (Amnesty
International 1995). The opposing factions would use women as weapons against their
rivals by raping, threatening, or killing their daughters or wives (Amnesty International
1995). Some armed guards would attack the homes of civilians and create a torture
center in their home. In this torture center, guards would physically assault, torture with
extreme cold or heat temperatures, and deprive prisoners of food and water. The armed
guards would rape and sexually assault women and children (Amnesty International
1995). Other armed guards would force women into marriage with violence, and if the
male family leaders attempted to protect their wife or daughter, the armed guards would
kill the woman in front of her family. Some reports stated that if the woman gave into
the demand, the family still never would see the woman again (Hardy 2001).
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To the leaders of the armed factions, rape was an effective tool to defeat
populations, reduce resistance, and to reward soldiers (Amnesty International 1995).
Women and children, especially in the rural areas, lived in fear of rape, violence,
kidnappings, or forced marriages without any laws or judicial authority to protect them.
During this time, there are no data to confirm the vast number of rapes and the degree of
violence perpetrated by the Mujahideen. In fact, many sources believe that the period of
the civil war was more violent for women than under the Taliban due to the extreme
numbers of murders and rapes by the Mujahideen (Rostami-Povey 2007:26).
Under the Mujahideen, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, declared a fatwa35 to kill
any women who worked for humanitarian organizations (Kumar and Stabile 2004).
Likewise, the Mujahideen government started to restrict the mobility of women to attend
school or work through force and intimidation (Amnesty International 1999).
Specifically, they threatened professional women employed in education and welfare
sectors. However, the Mujahideen lacked organization and did not consistently enforce
their laws, especially in the urban areas. Therefore, while the Mujahideen issued various
declarations against women in the workforce and schools, many urban women
maintained their public life (Amnesty International 1999).
5.4: Women’s Status in Education
The 1964 Constitution granted free education for all Afghans from primary school
to university level. While urban women started to make small gains in education and in
the labor force, the lives of rural women were largely unaffected by any changes. On a
whole, much of the Afghan population ignored the new educational opportunities, even
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Islam decree or Islam order.
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when the Afghan government made education compulsory. Due to gradual capitalist
development and minor industrialization, the education system slowly grew, although
with resistance and violence. In the early 1970s, followers of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar36
threw acid on the faces of unveiled girl students (Hartman 2002).
By the early 1970‘s, 111 co-educational schools existed in Afghanistan. In
Kabul, there were 51 co-educational schools, 7 girls‘ middle schools, and 5 girls‘ high
schools. Outside of Kabul, there were 36 middle schools in 19 provinces and 11 girls‘
high schools in 10 provinces. From the early 1970‘s until 1992, school enrollment slowly
increased (Emadi 2002:73). In Kabul, 42 percent of women completed a formal
education (Brodsky 2002:37). However, nationally in 1975, only 8 percent of girls
attended primary school, compared to 44 percent of boys. Moreover, only 2 percent of
girls attended secondary schools compared to 13 percent of boys (Moghadam 2002).
Additionally, in 1975, in comparing the total enrollment of students in primary school
and secondary school, girls comprised just 15 percent of the total primary school student
enrollment and 11 percent of the total secondary school student enrollment (Emadi
2002:53). However, these percentages accounted only for enrollment in school, not the
completion of school.
Oftentimes, rural girls simply lacked access to high schools and universities as
most of the institutions were located in the capital of a province. In 1978, girls could
access just 13.1 percent of the schools (EFA 200). Additionally, in rural areas, it was not
traditional for families to allow their daughters to live without their parents until
36
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the United States‘ most wanted terrorist list.
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marriage. This made it difficult for a rural girl to attend beyond primary school.
Additionally, a family‘s economic situation affected a girl‘s education for two primary
reasons. First, many families could not afford to send all of their children to school.
With minimal resources, most families would choose to send their sons over their
daughters. A family dealing with poverty deemed educating their daughters as
―unimportant in their struggle for survival‖ (Emadi 2002:74). Second, children of lowincome families often contributed to the family‘s overall income by working in whatever
employment was available to them or assisting with the domestic duties (Emadi
2002:74).
From 1973 to 1978, the Daoud regime attempted to create social and development
programs for women. For example, the Ministry of Education implemented literacy
programs for women while the newly constructed Women‘s Coordinating Committee
―promoted the cause of women and encouraged their participation in public affairs‖
(Emadi 2002:98-99). To advance women‘s status, the groups organized educational
programs on subjects like family affairs and issues on Radio Afghanistan. At this time,
the government controlled all media outlets, including Radio Afghanistan (Emadi
2002:99).
According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), in 1975 women comprised 100 percent of the pre-primary
school teachers, 18 percent of the primary school teachers, 13.4 percent of the secondary
school teachers, 6.5 percent of the two-year and technical schools‘ faculty, and 5.6
percent of the universities‘ faculty (Emadi 2002:79). According to Emadi (2002:74-75),
social discrimination of women in the workforce was part of the reason for the low
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percentage of female teachers. Additionally, women could teach only at girls‘ schools,
which gave them fewer opportunities since more boys‘ schools existed (Emadi 2002:75).
Under the PDPA, many teachers and college faculty were suspended or incarcerated if
they did not agree with the politics of the PDPA. Political repressions led to educators
leaving Afghanistan. The PDPA replaced prior education staff with party-members or
party supporters to teach in the schools (Emadi 2002:75). For example, members of the
Khalq Organization of Afghanistan Women (KOAW)37 served as teachers.
The PDPA also implemented massive literacy programs for women. In an
attempt to use women for their socialist societal goals, the PDPA started literacy classes
and night schools that often focused on Marxist political indoctrination. Often the
curriculum would criticize the traditional and cultural models as ―backwards,‖ which
created further backlash from rural conservatives against the literacy programs. To
combat resistance from Afghans, the state mandated men to send their daughters and
wives to literacy centers through force and violence. Male teachers, employed by the
PDPA, often sexually abused their female students without any retribution by the
government (Emadi 2002:102).
By 1979, the PDPA claimed their literacy programs provided basic education for
over 18,000 Afghan women. Yet, according to Education for All (EFA) (2009), the adult
literacy rate for females was just 5 percent in 1979. UNESCO estimated that in 1979,
88.2 percent of urban women over the age of 25 had no schooling while 99.2 percent of
the same aged rural women had no schooling (Emadi 2002:52). By the late 1970‘s, urban
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faction.
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attitudes started to shift slowly and more women were accepted in educational
institutions. In some studies, women started to outnumber male students in Kabul
(Physicians for Human Rights 1998). Conversely, men also started at this same time to
join resistance groups, which allowed women more opportunities in school and in the
labor force.
Under the Soviet control, war disrupted the education system and resulted in the
closing of several educational institutions. In 1983, the Afghan Foreign Minister told the
United Nations "that 50 percent of schools in Afghanistan were destroyed" (EFA 2000).
However, the communist government utilized education as the groundwork to earn
support for their ―long-term social, economic, and political reform‖ (EFA 2000). The
government sent over 50,000 Afghans of every age to the Soviet Union for education and
training (EFA 2000).
According to the World Bank in 1980, only 12 percent of girls attended primary
school while 54 percent of boys attended primary school (Amiri, Hunt, and Sova 2004).
Throughout the country, illiteracy remained high, despite the goals of the Soviet regime
to eradicate illiteracy. In fact, 95 percent of the women were illiterate in 1980 (EFA
2000). Five year later, in 1985, only 8 percent of Afghan women were literate compared
to 39 percent of males and only 11 percent of females attended primary school
(Moghadam 1992).
Many Afghans viewed the Soviet‘s education policy as too fast, especially in rural
areas, for a population not ready for fundamental societal change (Vorgetts 2002:96).
One former member of the WDOA, Fahima Vorgetts (2002), stated,
My colleagues and I were especially disturbed by their (Soviet-controlled
communist government approach) to education. Teachers were sent to rural areas
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where there were high rates of illiteracy, especially among women. They often
arranged classes in peoples‘ homes and the local authorities forced women and
daughters to attend. Many Afghans saw these trends as a threat to their family life
and identity. Education became associated with humiliation, foreign domination,
and everything that was un-Islamic and anti-Islamic. (P. 96)
To fight against the un-Islamic education system, the Mujahideen fighters often engaged
in attacks against co-educational schools and girls‘ schools (Hartman 2002). For
example, in 1980, anti-Soviet fighters violently bombed a school South of Kabul and then
forced students to watch while resistance troops cut off the teacher‘s head (Hartman
2002). However, the Mujahideen and other Soviet-resistance groups were not the only
groups attacking female students. In 1980, a group of female students organized a
peaceful protest against the Soviet invasion. Rather than allowing the peaceful protest,
the regime troops shot at the group, killing a number of them, including the leader of the
demonstration (Maley 1996).
In the 1980s, historians estimated that approximately 444,000 female students
attended school and 11,000 female teachers taught in schools (Amiri et al. 2004). Prior to
the Taliban, Afghan women comprised 70 percent of the country‘s teachers (Human
Rights 2004). By 1989, 65 percent of the students attending Kabul University were
female (Amiri et al. 2004). Additionally, small numbers of women students started to
break the gender boundaries in their field of study. For example, construction
represented one area where Muslim society generally shut out women. Yet, some women
not only entered the faculty of construction, they received financial aid through the
department and the Democratic Youth Organization to study construction (Moghadam
2002). By 1990, the literacy rate for women had improved to an estimated 14 percent,
with still the overwhelming majority of women not being able to read (U.S. Department
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of Commerce 1993). Approximately 19 percent of Afghan women attended school in
1990 and the girl‘s enrollment culminated at 214,561, which was 34.1 percent of the total
enrollment (EFA 2000). In addition, girls had access to 20 percent of the schools, which
showed an improvement in availability. However, access to school was still
disproportionate to the population. The northern region, where 27 percent of the
population lived, housed 36 percent of the country‘s primary schools (EFA 2000).
After the Soviet withdrawal and under the Mujahideen, education enrollment
declined for both male and female, but especially for women. By 1993, girls‘ access
tumultuously decreased to 13.2 percent, as the civil war and Mujahideen forced the
closure of girls‘ schools. In some areas, the various factions prohibited women from
attending school and working outside the home. By 1993, this resulted in girls‘
attendance dropping to 11 percent and female teachers comprising only 12.6 percent of
the teaching force, compared to the 70 percent it reached in the Soviet period (EFA 2000;
Human Rights Watch 2004). In some cases, the Mujahideen used violence to prohibit
women‘s education. For instance, in a Peshawar Refugee Camp, a town located on the
border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the forces shot at a girls‘ school (Kumar and Stabile
2005).
While an urban and rural divide existed under the Soviet occupation, it was even
more prominent after the Mujahideen gained control. Prior to the Soviet withdrawal, in
1988, the educational institutions in Peshawar discriminated against girls and women.
For example, boys had access to 486 primary schools, 161 middle schools, and 4 high
schools, while for girls only 76 primary schools, 2 middle schools, and no high schools
existed (Moghadam 2002). In 1990, urban women still had access to education,
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including Kabul University. Conversely, in rural areas like Peshawar, women had access
only to schools instructed by mullahs. In addition, mullahs allowed girls to study only in
religious schools, but just until the age of nine (Rashid 1990). For urban women, mullahs
or religion did not preclude their education. The ongoing war and consequences of the
war, like lack of electricity, precluded their education (Rashid 1990).
5.5: Women’s Status in the Labor Force
As early as the 1940‘s, urban women held positions in education, health, and
government (Amiri et al. 2004). Especially after 1964, since the Constitution opened the
doors for education and professional careers to women. Women in limited numbers held
positions as doctors, engineers, flight attendants, radio announcers, and TV journalists.
Like education, these new changes were limited mostly to the urban and elite women, not
rural women. Similarly, like education, the gradual capitalistic development and
industrialization in the early 1970s, helped to create more employment for women in the
industrial and manufacturing sectors (Emadi 2002:79). While the number of women in
the manufacturing sectors increased, it was still low in proportion to the population.
Furthermore, many of the employers in manufacturing viewed women‘s labor as ―cheap‖
and often cited their goal as including women in the socioeconomic development of
Afghanistan, while exploiting them (Emadi 2002:79). In 1976, women dominated
industries like carpet weaving, rug weaving, and embroidery. In fact, women comprised
92.4 percent of the carpet weaving, 91.5 percent of rug weaving, and 99.4 percent of
embroidery (Emadi 2002:79-80). Due to tradition, many women could not work in
positions that required overnight travel as husbands and fathers would prohibit it (Emadi
2002:79).
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By the early 1970s, 42 percent of women worked outside their homes (Brodsky
2002:37). In 1976, women comprised a small percentage of health professionals.
Nationally, there were 150 female physicians, 572 female nurses, and 400 midwives
(Emadi 2002: 79-82). A few urban women, generally from middle and upper class
families, also held prestigious positions within law schools and the legal profession. For
instance, in the early 1970s, two female professors taught at Kabul University, one
female judge sat on the High Central Court, and seven women held positions on the lower
statutory tribunals (Emadi 2002:87). Additionally, women started to enter law
enforcement agencies (Emadi 2002:87). While these women made significant gains, they
represented a very small urban minority of professional women.
Besides social discrimination that existed against women in the workforce, many
women were not educated to perform in these occupations. In the private sector, men
earned higher salaries than women earned, partially because of their higher educational
achievement. In government positions, men and women received similar salaries, but
these positions did not offer women any advancement. Women‘s lack of education and
discrimination often led to lower-paying jobs with no upward mobility. Moreover, many
women did not wear a veil, as it would interfere with their work (Emadi 2002:79-80).
Under the PDPA and the Soviets, women experienced more employment
opportunities. First, as more men joined the Mujahideen and resistance groups, more
manufacturing and industrial positions opened up to women. Second, more urban women
had greater access to public space through education, which led to more employment
opportunities. However, the government created some positions for women in an attempt
to win their support. For example, the communist regime even controlled portions of the
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entertainment industry and recruited women to take part in this sector. Then, the PDPA
recruited women singers who would record music written by the communist
establishment (Emadi 2002:103).
According to Valentine Moghadam (2002), feminist scholar, activist, and writer,
who spent time in Afghanistan during this era, women served in the military, security and
intelligence areas, and in the Defense Ministry. By 1990, women comprised 34 percent
of the formal labor force (Amiri et al. 2004). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, women
constituted 70 percent of the country‘s teachers, 50 percent of the civil servants, and 40
percent of the doctors (Human Rights Watch 2004). As with education, the labor force
gains occurred mostly in the urban areas. When the Mujahideen took control, they issued
several orders forbidding women in the public space. However, in the urban areas,
especially Kabul, some women continued to work. In urban Afghanistan, women often
worked in places without segregation and utilized non-segregated transportation.
Conversely, in the rural areas, non-related women and men could not work side by side,
if women were even allowed to work. In places like Peshawar, mullahs forbade all
women from the public space (Rashid 1990).
5.6: Women’s Status in Political Representation
As early as 1964, as the result of the Constitution, Afghan women entered politics
in small numbers. In 1964, King Mohammad Zahir named two women to his cabinet. In
1965, four women, members of the DOAW Party, were elected to the country‘s first
Parliament (Lederman 2002:48-49). From 1965 to 1972, women comprised 9 percent of
the Cabinet, 1.8 percent of the Representatives, and 2.6 percent of the Senate (Emadi
2002:85). Most women who ran for office came from Kabul or another urban area.
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Additionally, Emadi (2002:85) named the following requirements for a woman to run for
political office: a ruling class background, wealth, and an association with a politicaleconomic organization.
In the early 1970‘s, elites and urban women, like wives of bureaucratic and
government officials, used their newfound right to vote in rather large numbers. Most
women voters resided in Kabul, while in rural areas, politics and participation in public
affairs represented an area ―exclusively male‖ (Emadi 2002:86). Moreover, if rural
leaders encouraged women to vote, it was often to help the local leader win his election.
While there were few examples of women leaders in rural areas, generally, it was
considered a male domain.
After Daoud took control, he failed to offer any women positions in his cabinet.
However, his administration did include 54 women in the Presidential Secretariat, 91 in
the Office of the Ministry of State, and 3 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Emadi
2002:98). Many of these positions did represent junior-level positions within the
government. Under the Daoud Administration, seven women held positions at the
Ministry of Defense and eight women held positions at the Ministry of the Interior.
In the 1977 elections, four women were elected to political office, comprising
1.82 percent of the representatives. In 1977, women also comprised 15 percent of the
Loya Jirga (Amiri et al. 2004). In addition, leaders like Babrak Karmal,38 appointed
more women to key governmental positions. Some women saw this as a façade to
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When the Soviet Union formally invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal as
President of Afghanistan. He served from 1979 to 1986 under the era of the Communist Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan. In 1986, he was replaced by Dr. Mohammad Najibullah.
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attempt to gain more support from Afghan women for communism. By the late 1980‘s,
women held various positions within areas of the government, except the Council of
Ministers. By 1989, seven women were elected to the National Parliament. Women also
held leadership positions within the Central Committee of the PDPA (Moghadam 2002).
However, rural women often could not relate to the urban women who held these offices.
Politically, most women who served in governmental roles were members of the WDOA
or showed sympathy to the communist vision. At this time, women‘s participation still
represented one of the lowest worldwide in the political process (Amiri et al. 2004).
5.7: Women’s Status in Marriage and Family Policy
Historically, in the patriarchal culture of Afghanistan, marriage represents an area
considered as part of the public world and therefore, a decision deliberated and negotiated
by a male family member. Despite the early attempts in the nineteenth century to abolish
arranged marriages and bridal dowries as well increase the minimum age for marriage,
most of the country largely ignored these reforms. In fact, fundamentalists and clerics
often fought against any reform. From a patriarchal perspective, marriage and bride price
represent an economic exchange between households, a segment of property relations,
and a way to gain social status (Moghadam 2002). In Afghanistan culture, forced or
voluntary marriage, often serves as a way to build political alliances or gain financial
wealth. In some regions, families exchange cows, bull, sheep, goats, or furniture in an
exchange for the bride (Emadi 2002:39). Forced marriages also serve as settlement of
family feuds. For example, a family will give a young woman as compensation for their
crime to the victim‘s family (United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2006).
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In 1977, the Daoud administration launched a civil code regarding relations
between women and men. First, this code enacted the minimum age to marry for women
as 16 and for men as 18. Second, it gave both men and women the freedom of choice in
deciding their marriage partner. Third, it changed the law in divorce, which still gave
men an exclusive right to choose divorce while limiting the reasons women could use to
file for divorce. Under this code, women could file for divorce only if her husband had
contracted an incurable disease, had declined to support her financially, was incarcerated
for over five years, or had hidden another marriage from his wife (Emadi 2002:97-98).
Next, the government created a family court that would resolve issues in Kabul,
Herat, Kandahar, and Qunduz provinces. Daoud also selected a woman, Soraya Parwiz, a
graduate of Kabul University, to be in charge of the family courts. The PDPA regime
attempted to gain support from women by enacting decrees focused on marriage reform.
Decree 7 aimed to change ―fundamentally the institution of marriage‖ (Moghadam 2002)
and contained six articles regarding marriage habits and wedding ceremonies. First, it
outlawed men marrying women in exchange for money or commodities at the time of the
marriage. Second, it placed restrictions on the mahr,39 the payment given to the bride‘s
family, to 300 afghani (AFA)40 (Emadi 2002:100). Third, it outlawed forced marriages
and instead required that both parties needed to provide consent (Emadi 2002: 100). This
also extended to widows, who often were forced to marry male relatives of deceased
husbands (Moghadam 2002). This article also stated that families could not stop the
marriage and prolong the engagement to accumulate ―engagement expenses‖ (Emadi
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Mahr is the marriage dowry given to the bride from the groom and the groom‘s family.

40

Afghani is the currency of Afghanistan. In 1978, 300 afghani (AFA) equaled approximately six USD.

57

2002:100). Fourth, it no longer encouraged the groom and his family in giving obligatory
gifts to the bride and bride‘s family at religious holidays or the New Year. Fifth, it
reinforced the previous law of the minimum marrying age of 16 for women and 18 for
men. Last, it enforced punishment for violators that included jail time of six months to
three years and the seizure of any items illegally obtained such as money or commodities
(Emadi 2002:100-101).
However, the decree did not address any punishment against domestic abuse. Nor
did it address polygamy or divorce laws. Women still could file for divorce under limited
circumstances and men could still marry up to four wives (Emadi 2002:101).
Furthermore, many top officials still forced their daughters into marriage and ignored the
decree. While nothing in law involved Islam, many conservatives labeled the law ―antiIslamic‖ (Emadi 2002:101). Even if Decree 7 had granted women exclusive rights to
seek divorce, divorce was not a real option for most Afghan women. First, in Afghan
society, divorce is viewed as a ―social stigma‖ and by divorcing her husband; a woman
would ―dishonor‖ her family (Emadi 2002:98). Second, divorce affected child custody
laws. If a woman did seek a divorce, she could then maintain custody of her children
only for limited time. The law limited custody for a son until the age of seven and for a
daughter until the age of nine, with a potential extension of another two years if the court
believed it was the ―child‘s best interest‖ (Emadi 2002:98). Moreover, if a woman chose
to remarry or the court deemed her behavior as ―inappropriate,‖ she could lose all rights
to custody. Last, a husband often completely economically supported his wife and it
would be difficult for a woman to support herself financially (Emadi 2002:98).
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In addition to Decree 7, the PDPA passed Decree 6 and Decree 8. Decree 6
focused on eliminating land mortgages while Decree 7 focused on laws regarding
―confiscation and redistribution of land‖ (Moghadam 2002). The PDPA promised these
new decrees would free ―hardworking peasants from the bonds of oppressors and money
lenders, ending the sales of girls for goods . . . as no one would be entitled to sell any girl
or women in the country‖ (Moghadam 1992). Decree 6 and Decree 7 created even more
resentment from the traditional rural community and the fundamentalists. Many feared
that the combination of the marriage reform and literacy classes would create a situation
where women would not submit to the male patriarchal structure (Moghadam 1992).
These fears led to the widespread opposition and organization against the new
government by tribal leaders and Islamist leaders.
5.8: Women’s Status in Health
Historically, the gender discrimination against Afghan women has adversely
impacted their health status. Prior to the Soviet Invasion, Afghan women maintained one
of the lowest social statuses in health (Ask 1998). In many provinces, health centers
were solely located in the capitals, making access difficult for rural women (Emadi
2002:47). Often, husbands would not consider healthcare important for their wives and
thus, women were ill without access or permission to visit doctors. Prior to the Taliban,
many conservative families would not allow females to see male healthcare professionals.
As noted, these same conservatives did not view education as important for women
either, which led to the lack of female doctors. Even in emergencies, the male family
member would serve as the liaison between the male doctor and his wife or daughter.
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This meant that doctors would need to diagnose and prescribe treatments without ever
meeting their female patients (Emadi 2002:47).
In 1975, according to World Bank figures, women had a life expectancy of just
37-years old, the total fertility rate was eight children per woman, and the infant mortality
rate was 135 deaths per 1000 births (Moghadam 2002). Oftentimes, high levels of infant
mortality go hand in hand with a lower age of life expectancy (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1993). By 1979, women had a life expectancy of 40, a slight increase, while
men had a life expectancy of 42. In this period, Afghanistan represented one of the few
countries where men had a higher life expectancy than women (Ask 1998). By 1979, the
fertility rate also decreased to an average of 6.9 children per woman (Emadi 2002:47). In
contrast, the fertility rate differed in rural and urban areas. In urban areas, the fertility
rate was lower at 5.8 children per woman while in rural areas the fertility was higher at
7.3 children per woman (Emadi 2002:48). In this same year, women between the ages of
20 to 30 often had the highest fertility rates, with a short time in between each birth.
Patriarchal tradition, lack of education, and economic dependence on children to
contribute to a family‘s income served as reasons for such a high fertility rate for women.
Even if a woman attended some primary school, subjects on health or nutrition were
often not part of the curriculum. In addition, the frequency of children also affected a
woman‘s ability to work and to attend school. Many poor rural families lacked access to
appropriate nutrition for their children and themselves. Often, infant mortality was even
higher in rural areas than urban areas. According to Moghadam (2002), who cites
Veronica Doubleday, who resided in Herat from 1972 to 1977, Afghan women‘s
complaints centered around two issues: sickness and restrictions on mobility. While

60

women complained about backaches, low energy, headaches, and other symptoms,
husbands would not allow their wives to seek medical care (Moghadam 2002). The
combination of restrictions on mobility, the lack of nutrition, the lack of education, and
the lack of medical care contributed to the high rates of both infant mortality and low life
expectancy of women (Emadi 2002:48).
In the late 1960s, the Afghan Family Guidance Association (AFGA), a nongovernmental, non-profit, and non-political organization was established (Emadi
2002:93). This group believed that the high fertility rates served as the ―prime cause of
women‘s suffering (Emadi 2002:93). By 1973, the AFGA established six clinics in
Kabul and thirteen branches throughout the rest of the country. In the clinics, the AFGA
aimed to educate women on family planning, the use of contraceptives, and even
abortion. Since their mission conflicted with much opposition, they promoted their
clinics through only grass-roots efforts and never in a public campaign. For example,
women would visit other women by going door-to-door and educating women on family
planning (Emadi 2002:93). Even in the late 1960s to early 1970s, Planned Parenthood
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also operated in
Afghanistan, funding family planning clinics. Interestingly, the Soviet regime forced
their closure in 1979 and regarded them as ―objects of imperialism‖ (Brodsky 2004:26).
Despite the efforts of these groups on family planning and contraceptives, many
Afghan women, especially in rural areas, did not use contraceptives. First, even if a
woman wanted to use contraceptives, her father or husband would not allow it. Second,
many women could not afford nor knew how to use contraceptives (Emadi 2002:93).
Conversely, urban women were more likely to use contraceptives over rural women.
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Besides having more access to family planning clinics, urban women also had more
education and understanding regarding contraceptives.
To improve the status of women‘s health, the Daoud Administration did enact
legislation intended to help women and children. Under the new legislation, a husband
could receive tax exemptions for his wife, first five children, and his unemployed parents.
The intent was that families could then afford family health plans (Emadi 2002:99).
However, no data was secured to understand if this legislation brought any improvements
to Afghan women.
According to the Physicians for Human Rights (1998), in 1992, when the
Mujahideen took control, a range of organizations and facilities still provided healthcare
services for women. For instance, one physician stated that that in Kabul, 32 maternal
and child health clinics (MCH) operated that provided free care healthcare to women. A
female head nurse interviewed by the Physicians for Human Rights (1998) stated that:
my hospital did not have the new and modern technology, but we had the
necessary medical tools and equipment. We had qualified female and male
doctors. There was no segregation of health care providers and patients. Female
nurses took care of male patients and male doctors treated female patients.
Despite the war, by 1992, men still outlived women. The sex ratio favored men
with 106 men to every 100 women (U.S. Department of Commerce 1992). Further, the
life expectancy of women was only 43 years old and the fertility rate barely lowered to an
average of 6.4 children per woman (U.S. Department of Commerce 1992). Additionally,
in 1992, Afghanistan still had one of the highest rates of infant mortality, 156 deaths per
1000 births (U.S. Department of Commerce 1992).
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CHAPTER 6: STATUS OF AFGHAN WOMEN IN THE TALIBAN ERA (1996October 2001):
6.1: Introduction to the Taliban Era
In 1981, Meena, RAWA‘s founder, traveled throughout Europe to create
awareness of women‘s rights in Afghanistan, and of the RAWA organization. In a taped
interview, Meena stated that the ―anti-Soviet forces would win . . . but the ultimate cost
would be to the country because the most heavily funded of these forces were
fundamentalist, antidemocratic, and anti-women,‖ (Brodsky 2004:32-33). Meena
predicted this outcome 11 years prior to when the Mujahideen controlled Afghanistan and
fifteen years before the Taliban took control of the country. As early as 1994, Taliban
commanded parts of Afghanistan. The promise of ―restoring peace,‖ coupled with giving
financial rewards and other incentives to opposition leaders, allowed the Taliban to gain
support from the Afghan people.
On September 28, 1996, the Taliban seized control of Kabul. Immediately, on
Radio Sharia (previously named Radio Afghanistan), the Taliban broadcast their new
proclamations by the Commander of the Faithful, Mullah Mohammad Omar, regarding
women. Their initial edicts stated that women must leave the public space of work and
be outside only when ―absolutely necessary‖ (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). In
defense of their regressive policies, the Taliban issued the following statement: ―the fact
of the matter is that no other country has given women the rights we have given them.
We have given women the rights that God and his Messenger have instructed, that is to
stay in their homes and to gain religious instruction in seclusion‖ (Emadi 126).
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In their religious interpretation, the Taliban claimed their policies as protecting
women rather than as oppressing women. According to the Physicians for Human Rights
(1998), the Taliban‘s primary policy goal was ―to place women back under the
responsibility of their male family members.‖ To reach this goal, the Taliban instantly
issued the following four edicts. First, they forced to women to wear the burqa, second,
they forced women to leave the workplace, third, they forced women to leave the
education system, and fourth, they would not allow women to be in public without a
mahram41 (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). The Taliban used their attacks and
repression on women to influence two different audiences. First, they wanted to appeal
to their followers and other Islamic fundamentalists. Second, they capitalized on the
attacks to scare and intimidate the civilian population into restoring ―moral conduct in the
cities‖ and creating uniformity (Physicians for Human Rights 1998).
As one activist said, ―Everything that constitutes human rights, but life itself, had
been swept away from Afghan women by the Taliban‖ (U.S. Department of State 2001).
The Taliban‘s edicts critically affected every part of women‘s lives, even further
lowering their economic, education, health-related, legal, political and social status.
According to the Physicians for Human Rights (1998), no other country has ever
―deliberately deprived half of its population under its control of jobs, schooling, mobility,
and healthcare.‖ All regressive edicts by the Taliban led to an even more deteriorated
status of Afghan women, significantly affecting every part of a woman‘s public and
private existence. The edicts violated essentially every basic and fundamental human
right like the right to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, the right to work,
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Mahram means close male relative.
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the right to education, and the right to health care. It is important to realize that each
edict consequently affected an Afghan woman as a whole, not just part of her life. For
example, the edicts on mobility and education affected a women‘s access to healthcare.
Alternatively, if a woman chose to make rugs or carpets in her home, the edicts on
mobility precluded her from selling her products, which affected her economic wellbeing. Each edict was connected to another consequence, creating an ultimate
deprivation of liberty.
When a woman disobeyed an edict, the Taliban‘s religious force inflicted
beatings, assault, rape, imprisonment, and even death. In fact, most Afghan women
interviewed by the Human Rights Watch, either received or witnessed the brutality, thus
acknowledging this as a common norm in their lives under the Taliban (Human Rights
Watch 2001). Regarding the treatment of women and edicts enforced by the Taliban,
RAWA (2009) stated the following:
The Taliban treated women worse than they treated animals. In fact, even as
Taliban declared the keeping of caged birds and animals illegal, they imprisoned
Afghan women within the four walls of their own houses. Women had no
importance in the Taliban‘s eyes unless the women occupied or produced
children, satisfied a male‘s sexual needs or attended to the drudgery of daily
housework.42
6.2: Rural and Urban Divide in the Taliban Era
Since urban women often comprised the groups of educated and professional
women, the new edicts instantly affected their lives. For instance, the closure of Kabul
University affected urban women more than anyone, as they represented the majority of
students who attended (Hardy 2001). In urban areas, it created more poverty by forcing
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previously employed women to beg or turn to prostitution. Additionally, most of the
protests and demonstrations organized by women against the Taliban occurred in Kabul,
Herat, or another urban area. For example, in Herat, over 150 women protested the
closures of public baths to women, insisting for their reopening. Of the 120 women, the
Taliban arrested 20 (Ask 1998). Moreover, the Taliban enforced their edicts much more
strictly in the urban areas than in the rural areas. Oftentimes, the Taliban specifically
targeted professional women, who vastly resided in Kabul or other urban areas (Human
Rights 2001).
In the rural areas, however, Taliban rule did not significantly change the lives of
some women as many of them already lived in purdah.43 Since tradition and custom
precluded these rural women to public life, the edicts and proclamations affected them
less. Of course, the restrictions affected all women, including poor women or rich
women, educated women or uneducated women, rural women or urban women. While
the Taliban brought some level of stability to Afghanistan, it halted any lasting social,
economic, or political progress and negatively affected all members of society, including
boys and men (Amnesty International 1998). For example, many boys could not attend
school due to the shortage of teachers with the Taliban‘s ban of women in the workforce.
6.3: Women’s Status in the Constitution
Under the Taliban, no Constitution, no rule of law, or independent judiciary
existed in Afghanistan. In 1997, the Taliban changed the name of the country to the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and named Mullah Omar as the Supreme Head of State.
Thus, Mullah Omar and the Supreme Council in Kandahar issued all official decrees and
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Literally, ―curtain.‖ Purdah refers to the practice of preventing women from being seen by men through
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66

proclamations. According to the Taliban, their rule of government would be ―neither
parliamentary nor presidential, but Islamic‖ (Physicians for Human Rights 1998).
Rather than independent courts, municipal and provincial leaders interpreted law
through the Taliban‘s analysis of Sharia and traditional tribal law (Physicians for Human
Rights 1998). Additionally, Afghan women possessed no legal options to crimes against
them. First, a court considered a woman‘s testimony as half a man‘s testimony. Second,
a woman had no access to appeal to the court directly; rather a male in her immediate
family needed to intervene on her behalf (RAWA 2005). While Afghan society did not
always recognize the law in the Pre-Taliban era, women still possessed rights and status.
In the Taliban era, women had absolutely no rights nor legal status.
6.4: Edicts Against Education
One of the first edicts ordered by the Taliban was the prohibition of women‘s
education. By January 1997, the Taliban closed 63 schools, preventing 103,000 girls and
148,000 boys from attending school and 11,200 teachers from working. Of these
teachers, nearly 70 percent were women44 (Rashid 2001:108). This edict completely
forbade women from studying at schools, universities or any other educational institution.
Through outside aid from humanitarian groups like the United Nations or other
non-governmental organizations, hundreds of privately funded girls‘ schools were created
in private homes. In many cases, these schools focused on teaching women skills like
sewing or weaving. According to the Physicians for Human Rights (1998), the schools
taught thousands of women these skills, which often women used to contribute to the
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family‘s overall income. Other schools operated to teach women basic literacy skills like
reading and writing. In June 1998, the Taliban closed all home-based schools and
vocational training programs in Kabul, as the Head of the DPVPV (Taliban‘s religious
police) charged these schools with disseminating anti-Taliban propaganda (Amnesty
International 1998). In some cases, women refused to close the home school and
attempted to operate in secrecy. If caught by the Taliban, the DPVPV would publicly
punish the woman through beatings, torture, incarceration, and even death (Humans
Right 2001). For example, in early 2001, the Taliban shot a woman in her head in front
of her 40 girl students when she defied them and kept her home school open.
According to the Taliban, the ban on education was only temporary and ―in
principle their movement was not against education and employment for women‖
(Physicians for Human Rights 1998). In fact, the Taliban provided a myriad of reasons
for not allowing education as well as employment for women. For example, they claimed
that when they gained full control of Afghanistan or when the country was peaceful and
secure, schools for girls would reopen. The Taliban insisted that if they allowed
education for women, Taliban supporters would protest in other parts of the country
(Physicians for Human Rights 1998). Additionally, the Taliban cited the shortage of
funds to build segregated schools as another reason for the ban (Amnesty International
1998). As the UN Special Rapporteur explained, these reasons collided with what the
Taliban touted as their two biggest accomplishments, restoring security and protecting
women (Physicians for Human Rights 1998).
To outside critics, especially in the Islamic world, the education edict arguably
served as one of the most controversial since other Islamic countries allowed women‘s
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access to education. In fact, countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia criticized the Taliban‘s
interpretation of Islam as rationale for denying education to women (Hardy 2001).
Eventually, the Taliban changed the policy to allow girl‘s education up to the age of eight
but restricted the education to only religious studies (Physicians for Human Rights 1998).
Similarly, other critics argued with the Taliban that the ban on education affected the
entire economic and social development of Afghanistan. Being that females held 70
percent of teaching positions, the educational and employment ban for women
consequently affected boy‘s access to education, as this created a shortage of teachers and
deprived a generation of basic education.
In a December 1998 report, UNICEF stated that Afghanistan‘s educational system
was in ―a state of total collapse‖ (Rashid 2001:108). At that point, just one out of ten
girls attended school, while one out of three boys attended school (Rashid 2001:108). By
2000, the World Bank estimated that the enrollment of boys in school was just 3 percent
while for girls it was near zero (Amiri et al 2004). Further, Amnesty International (1998)
reported that the literacy rate decreased to as low as 4 percent for women during the
Taliban era.
6.5: Edicts Against Mobility
The Taliban‘s edicts against women‘s mobility centered on their belief that
―women should not be seen or heard because they drove men away from the proscribed
Islamic path and into wild temptation‖ (Rashid 2002). The Taliban forbade women from
even standing outside on their balconies in their homes and forced women to paint each
window in their home black, so men could not see women from the outside (RAWA
2009a). If a woman traveled without a mahram, the religious police would publicly beat
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and humiliate the woman on the street. In addition, if a woman attempted to escape
Afghanistan with an unrelated male, the Taliban would charge the woman with adultery
and punish her though a public execution of stoning or flogging (Physicians for Human
Rights 1998). According to RAWA (2009a), throughout the Taliban era, they issued
other repressive edicts that even further prohibited women‘s mobility. These edicts
included: a ban on women dealing with male shopkeepers, a ban on women laughing, a
ban on talking or shaking hands with unrelated males, a ban on riding a taxi without a
mahram, a ban on public gatherings unless the Taliban required attendance, a ban on
riding bicycles or motorcycles, even with a mahram, a ban for women publicly
celebrating any occasions, like Eids or any other recreational purpose, a ban on women
washing clothes next to rivers or in a public place, and a ban on female baths. These
authoritarian edicts on mobility affected all facets of an Afghan woman‘s status,
including her access to healthcare, her hygiene, her economic, social, mental, and
physical well-being, and the welfare of her children.
Even prior to the Taliban, widowed women experienced immense difficulty in
supporting themselves and their children. According to Brodsky (2004:136), for Afghan
women, ―to be without a man is nothing.‖ Even aside from the Taliban influence, most
women were uneducated and considered by society as ―half of a man.‖ Children without
a father, even when their mother was alive, were considered orphans (Brodksy
2004:136). Under the Taliban, life for Afghan widows became even more difficult,
especially if their deceased husband‘s family did not offer financial assistance. For
example, the restrictions on mobility were even more burdensome for widowed women.
This restriction on mobility precluded women from picking up any food or humanitarian
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assistance without a mahram, making it almost impossible for widows. Additionally,
according to Physicians for Human Rights (1998), approximately 6 percent of their
respondents in their study ever received any humanitarian assistance. By 1998, the
Physicians for Human Rights (1998) estimated that in Kabul alone, there were more than
30,000 widows.
The Taliban‘s edict on the burqa also restricted women‘s mobility for physical
and economical reasons. First, the edict banished any part of a women‘s body from
visibility in public, with the exception of their eyes, limiting their physical mobility. In
addition, women received beatings if they revealed their hands, their ankles, or lifted their
veil simply to see. Second, in addition to the physical and psychological stigma, the
compulsory burqa also generated an economic burden for many women, as they could not
afford to purchase a burqa. With this, women in neighborhoods would often share,
forcing them to wait before they could depart from their homes (U.S. Department of State
2001).
In the West, many assume that the Taliban ―invented‖ the burqa. Historically, the
burqa originated from the Pashtun culture, outside the realms of Islam (Hardy 2001).
According to Lila Abu-Lughod (2002), the burqa represented one of many types of head
or body coverings to symbolize a woman‘s respectability and modesty. Besides
Afghanistan, women throughout the subcontinent and Southwest Asia have also worn the
burqa or similar coverings (Abu-Lughod 2002). Nevertheless, prior to the Taliban and
even during the Mujahideen, only some rural Afghan women chose to wear the burqa.
Conversely, in the cities, most women that chose to wear a veil wore something similar to
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the Iranian type of chador45 (Hardy 2001). To urban women, the burqa was a foreign
concept (Hardy 2001). Although the burqa created problems for Afghan women‘s
mobility, health, and economical well-being, it was not one of their main problems
compared to the other oppressive edicts (Brodsky 2004:101). In fact, in some cases, the
burqa allowed women‘s groups, like RAWA, opportunities to expose the Taliban by
concealing their identity and by hiding items in the burqa, like cameras, which the
Taliban forbade in the country.
For instance, in 1999, RAWA members risked their lives by secretly taping the
chilling public execution of Zarmeena,46 a mother of seven, charged with the murder of
her husband (Brodksy 2003:13). Members of RAWA transported the video camera by
hiding it in their burqa. This video marked one of the only public records of the public
executions conducted by the Taliban. While RAWA shared the horrific video with
Western media, but only after September 11, 2001, did networks like CNN, BBC, and
ABC air the footage of the execution.
Besides the burqa, the Taliban controlled and issued other edicts regarding
Afghan women‘s appearance and dress. The Taliban prohibited women from wearing
makeup, including nail polish, any bright colored clothing, as the Taliban believed that it
was ―sexually attracting,‖ flared leg pants, even underneath the burqa, white shoes or
white socks as it was the same color of the Taliban flag, and high heels or any shoes that
45

According to Jacky Hardy, an Iranian type of chador is a scarf that covers the hair but leaves the face in
full view except for the forehead and can be altered to cover the face, if necessary. Dictionary.com defined
the chador as ―the traditional garment of Muslim and Hindu women, consisting of a long, usually black or
drab-colored cloth or veil that envelops the body from head to foot and covers all or part of the face.‖
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As mentioned early, author Anne Brodsky stated in Afghanistan that last names are not common and the
use of them is relatively new in Afghanistan. At the time of Zarmeena‘s execution, she was referred to as
only Zarmeena.
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clicked or made noise, as the Taliban believed that a man must not hear a woman‘s
footsteps (RAWA 2009a). Additionally, like any other perceived violation, the DPVPV
would punish the perceived wrongdoer with physical whippings, often with leather
batons reinforced with metal studs (Human Rights 2001). For example, if a woman wore
nail polish, the Taliban would cut her fingers off as a punishment. Women also received
whippings, beatings, and verbal abuse for wearing the wrong clothing or for exposing
their ankles (RAWA 2009a).
6.6: Edicts Against Employment and Healthcare
By 1999, the United Nations stated that socioeconomic and health conditions of
Afghanistan were one of the worst in the world (Amnesty International 1999). As
mentioned, the Taliban forbade women from working outside the home, with the
exception granted to some female physicians and nurses. However, the Taliban
prohibited traveling midwives from working and closed projects established for widow
healthcare (Amnesty International 1998). The Taliban also enforced an edict that
prohibited doctors from giving medical care to women without a male relative escort
(Physician for Human Rights 2009). These two edicts made it extremely difficult for
widows to receive healthcare. Moreover, the Taliban banned women from examinations
by a male doctor, including in medical emergencies. The edict also created immense
complexity for a woman doctor or nurse to practice medicine. Additionally, since the
Taliban restricted education for women and closed Kabul University, it precluded new
students, especially women, from learning medicine, worsening the shortage of medical
professionals.

73

In January, 1997, the Taliban introduced a new policy of segregated hospitals. In
September, 1997, the Taliban started to administer this new policy strictly. At this time,
the Ministry of Health ordered all but one hospital in Kabul to refuse treatment to
women. The single facility for women, Rabia Balkhi, lacked clean water, surgical
equipment, X-ray machines, suction, and oxygen (Physicians for Human Rights 1998).
Additionally, while half a million women resided in Kabul, this hospital contained just 35
beds (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). Even worse, the new policy restricted all
women health professionals, including physicians, doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, from
working in Kabul‘s hospitals (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). After backlash from
the international community and discussions with the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), the Taliban reversed parts of the policy. In November, 1997, the Taliban
allowed women access to additional hospitals and authorized some women health
professionals to practice again (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). However, by May,
1998, the Taliban allotted 70 percent of the available hospital beds to males only
(Physicians for Human Rights 1998). In the Physicians for Human Rights 1998 study, 53
percent of women participants acknowledged situations in which they were seriously ill
and unable to seek healthcare.
While the Taliban granted permission for female healthcare professionals to work,
the religious police still harassed and intimidated the women healthcare practitioners
(Physicians for Human Rights 1998). The result meant that less female healthcare
providers practiced medicine as the Taliban threatened them with violence, intimidation,
and even death. In an interview by the Physicians for Human Rights (1998), one Afghan
female physician explained the difficulty she experienced each day in traveling to work,
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I now restrict my actions quite a bit, despite the fact that I am working in a clinic
and leave the house every day. I am always worried about getting arrested or
beaten. Working outside the house, even though we have permission from the
Ministry of Health, is still a big risk. The Taliban are very unpredictable. One day
the religious police may stop me on the street and ask where I am going. At that
point, the fact that I have ―permission‖ may mean nothing to him; he can beat me
or harass me or arrest me at his whim. Every day, I leave my house I pray that I
might get back home safely at the end of the day. Another woman physician
indicated that the Taliban threatened, ―to hang her‖ if she and her husband failed
to close their medical clinic.
While many of Afghan‘s professionals already left the country due to the wars
and two decades of violence, an increasing number of doctors fled during the Taliban era.
Many doctors cited insufficient pay as forcing them to leave Afghanistan. One
pediatrician reported that some doctors who worked in public clinics earned the
equivalent of five USD per month (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). Besides the
shortage of trained medical professionals, many facilities lacked medical supplies, water,
electricity, blood banks, medical tools, gloves, proper sterilization, and basic medicine.
In fact, much of the population lacked access to clean water. In 2000, only 17 percent of
the rural population had access to clean water compared to 38 percent of the urban
population (Rasekh et al. 1998). Additionally, the Physicians for Human Rights (1998)
reported that patients needed to purchase their own medical supplies, like IV fluids or
syringes for injections. For many Afghan patients, this was not an option.
To ensure their edicts were followed, many Taliban forces infiltrated medical
facilities. For female doctors and nurses, the Taliban guards or the religious police would
physically assault them for not being covered properly. This made it even more difficult
for female physicians to treat their patients. In the cases where male physicians would
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treat women, they often would examine a woman patient only with her burqa on or would
diagnose through the male relative explaining the symptoms.
Considering the high fertility rate in Afghanistan, these edicts drastically affected
pregnant women. In 2001, an estimated 45 women died each day from pregnancy related
causes (Human Rights 2001). In 1998, approximately 10 percent of Afghan women
received any kind of prenatal or maternal care while less than 6 percent of women had
deliveries by trained professionals (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). One female
nurse told the Physicians for Human Rights (1998) that ―it was very difficult for pregnant
women since male doctors are prohibited from seeing pregnant women and performing
delivery. A lot of pregnant women died at home and in hospital and clinics.‖
Before the Taliban, Afghanistan had one of the highest maternal mortality rates in
the world. In 2001, Afghanistan still had one of the highest maternal mortality rates in
the world (1600 deaths per 100,000 births). Moreover, the infant mortality rate was 152
deaths in every 1000 births and life expectancy for a woman was 44 (Rasekh et al. 1998).
In the 1998 study by Physicians for Human Rights, the women respondents consistently
discussed high levels of poor health and a decline in their health since the Taliban took
control. In fact, 66 percent of the respondents reported a decline in her health status in
the first two years of Taliban control and 87 percent reported a decrease in their access to
healthcare (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). In 1998, 97 percent of respondents
showed symptoms of major depression (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). According
to the World Health Organization, 65 percent of Afghan women expressed suicide
ideation and suicide attempts among Afghan women ranked higher than most countries in
the world (Rasekh et al. 1998).
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For professional Afghan women outside the healthcare field, working under the
Taliban was very difficult, especially in the cities. While the Taliban permitted women to
work in their homes, the Taliban limited their access to sell their items without an
accompaniment of male relative. By 1998, 74 percent of Afghan women were
unemployed (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). Approximately 40,000 women,
comprising professional women, bakers, and domestic workers, forcibly lost their jobs
(Gallagher 2004). Due to this, many women turned to begging and even prostitution to
make an income.
According to Brodsky, in Afghanistan prostitution is viewed far beyond the
disrespect associated in Western society. The Afghan and Islamic society views it with
an incredibly negative connotation (2004:283). In August, 1999, RAWA issued
preliminary research that showed hundreds of women, especially young widows, selling
their bodies for an income since economic opportunities and income generated from
begging declined (RAWA 1999). In 1999, RAWA estimated that 25 to 30 active brothels
existed. For security reasons, the brothels changed locations and residences every few
months. While the punishment for prostitution was execution by public stoning,
interviewed prostitutes named members of the Taliban as their clients (Brodsky
2004:283).
6.7: Violence by the Taliban
According to Human Rights Watch (2001), the Taliban guards abducted, raped,
and forced marriage with violence upon many women. However, it is important to
consider that rape is a ―significantly underreported‖ crime on a global scale (United
Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007a). In particular, rape in Afghan culture is
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more than ―underreported,‖ it is viewed as ―shameful‖ for both the victim and the family.
Given that, Human Rights Watch did not corroborate individual cases or provide
statistics for the number of these violent sexual acts. According to their 2001 report,
fears and rumors regarding these acts were rampant. While most of the violence was
directed towards women, the Taliban jailed, tortured, and killed thousands of men as well
(Physicians for Human Rights 1998). The Taliban beat and imprisoned men for their
beard length, political views, or ethnicity.
In the Taliban era, every Friday marked the day of public punishments against
perceived criminals in the Kabul Sports Stadium (Physicians for Human Rights 1998).
On these days, the Taliban forced mandatory attendance of the population to watch public
executions by ―floggings, shootings, hangings, beheadings, and amputations‖ or other
cruel and unusual punishment (Physicians for Human Rights 1998). For example, under
Taliban law, if a person allegedly committed adultery, the Taliban stoned them to death.
If a person stole, the Taliban amputated their limbs. No Afghan was immune to the terror
imposed by the Taliban. The Taliban forced women, children, and men into the Kabul
Stadium, and prior to the executions the Taliban would preach about Sharia law. At these
executions, ordinary Afghans would sell food or drinks while beggars, mostly women,
would ask for money (Brodsky 2004:18).
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CHAPTER 7: STATUS OF AFGHAN WOMEN SINCE THE U.S. INVASION
(October 2001-December 2009)
7.1: Introduction to Women’s Status Since the U.S. Invasion
On November 17, 2001, just five weeks after the start of the U.S. and NATO
military intervention in Afghanistan, First Lady Laura Bush47 delivered the weekly
Presidential Radio Address. In the speech, she stated,
and the people of Afghanistan, especially women, are rejoicing. Afghan women
know, through hard experience, what the rest of the world is discovering. . . .
Because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no
longer imprisoned in their homes. They can listen to music and teach their
daughters without fear of punishment. Yet the terrorists who helped rule that
country now plot and plan in many countries. And they must be stopped. The
fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.
(American Presidency Project 2001)
The United States defeated the Taliban in three months and formed a coalition with the
Northern Alliance to complete this mission. The United States‘ key warlord allies shared
parallel beliefs with the Taliban regarding women. The U.S. policy of overlooking the
warlords‘ fundamentalist stance on women conflicted with one of its paramount
objectives for invading Afghanistan. To many Afghan women, the promise of freedom
or liberation seemed unlikely under the change in leadership from the Taliban to the antiwomen and anti-democratic Northern Alliance. As Zoya stated in her book, Zoya’s
Story: an Afghan Woman’s Struggle for Freedom, ―No one was sorry to see the Taliban
defeated, but neither did they rejoice when the Northern Alliance [mainly Mujahideens]
took over. They too had blood on their hands‖ (Zoya 2002:226).
By 2006, Kabul showed superficial images of progress and development with a
new five-star hotel, coffee bars, and a shopping center that sold Apple iPods, mobile
47

This marked the first time in U.S. history that a First Lady delivered the entire weekly Radio Presidential
Address.
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phones, and flat screen televisions. Yet the only individuals that utilized these new
developments included Western and Japanese contractors and a few advantaged Afghan
citizens (Rostami-Povey 2007:44). For many Afghans, electricity is still a hopeful
promise. In the city, electricity is so unreliable and intermittent that both businesses and
homes also utilize small generators. In 2007, 53 percent of the population lived in
poverty (Rostami-Povey 2007:43). In the urban areas, 61 percent of individuals could
access clean water and in the rural areas, a mere 31 percent of Afghans could access
clean water. Furthermore, there is no sewage system, which means sewage just runs on
the streets. A septic tank is considered a privilege, as only wealthy Afghans own them
(Mitchell 2004).
In a 2009 survey completed by Women for Women International,48 security
marked the largest concern for women in Afghanistan followed by economics.
According to the survey, 66.2 percent of women respondents named security as the first
problem that needs to be addressed by the central government (Women for Women
2009). While lack of security certainly affects all Afghans, it significantly impacts
women. In fact, some women have reported that they have even less access to the public
sphere than when the Taliban controlled the country (Coleman 2004). The
fundamentalist members in the Afghan government certainly factor in women‘s access to
the public sphere.
The narcotics trade in Afghanistan represents another critical factor as it threatens
the democracy, the stability, and security of the shaken country. In fact, the UN, the
United States, and NATO believe that the narcotics trade serves as ―the gravest threat to
48

Women for Women International is a 501 (c) (3) non-profit organization headquartered in Washington,
DC.
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the security of the Afghanistan‖ (Human Rights Watch 2006). The drug trade also
creates more corruption within the already weak central government.
Since the invasion of 2001, record-breaking harvests continuously have flourished
to exceedingly high levels (United Nations 2007). In 2009, Afghanistan produced 92
percent of the world‘s opium (United Nations Office on Drug and Crime 2009). Due to a
fragile economy that relies on foreign aid, many Afghans look to poppy cultivation as
their only choice for economic survival. In fact, 61 percent of poppy farmers named ―the
high sale price‖ as their reason for cultivating poppy, despite the government ban (United
Nations Office on Drug and Crime 2009). According to Barnett Rubin, an expert on
Afghanistan, ―the livelihoods of the people of this impoverished, devastated country are
more dependent on illegal narcotics than any other country in the world,‖ (Human Rights
2006).
However, most of the narcotics money does not benefit ordinary Afghan farmers.
In fact, 80 percent of the opium trade revenue funds drug traffickers, corrupt government
officials, the Taliban, and even Al Qaeda (United Nations 2007). The opium drug trade
not only provides the Taliban with finances, it arguably serves as the primary reason for
their resurgence. By 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) estimated that the
Taliban controlled 72 percent of the country (Bruno 2009). Not surprisingly, the
provinces with the highest levels of poppy production, mostly in the southern and western
part of Afghanistan, also possess the highest levels of security incidents (United Nation
2007). In fact, some of these areas lack any soldier or coalition presence, which fortifies
the Taliban and even, creates parallel Taliban states (Rubin 2007). The combination of
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the Taliban resurgence and fundamentalists in power adversely affects the goal of
improving women‘s rights and women‘s status.
Despite the rhetoric of liberating Afghan women, the past eight years of war has
not instantly improved the status of women. In fact, one analyst stated, ―. . . the
deteriorating security situation has severely negatively affected women‘s ability to enjoy
the rights and opportunities promised to them by the international community‖ (Library
of Parliament 2008). Moreover, the higher the presence of the Taliban increases the
already dangerous situation for women. Without security, women‘s rights organizations
and development projects cannot operate safely. In many cases, Taliban attacks or
threats resulted in the closures of schools, offices, health facilities, and development
projects.
According to the 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report, Afghanistan had
the second to lowest Gender Development Index (GDI) (CPHD 2007). The GDI, a
United Nations indicator of status, measures the inequalities between men and women in
categories of a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. In
2007, the GDI for Afghanistan was .310, with Niger as the only country behind
Afghanistan. According to the report, this GDI score showed the immense barriers that
preclude Afghan women from education, employment, and healthcare. However, the
report also acknowledged that the GDI fails to show all the inequalities regarding human
rights violations, political representation, violence, and lack of access to justice (CPHD
2007).
Despite the dangerous security issue and the tremendous hurdles women face,
there is a small window of optimism. According to The 2009 Asia Foundation Survey of
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Afghan People,49 when asked about the direction of Afghanistan, 42 percent of
respondents stated that Afghanistan ―is moving in the right direction.‖ On the contrary,
29 percent of respondents stated that Afghanistan ―is moving in the wrong direction‖
(Asia Foundation 2009). This represents a slight increase since 2008, where 38 percent
responded the country was moving in the right direction. Additionally, Women for
Women International (2009) also reported that women respondents in their survey ―felt
optimistic‖ regarding their future.
7.2: Rural and Urban Divide Since 2001
Historically, as documented, a deep rural and urban divide has existed in
Afghanistan. For many women in Afghanistan, the deep patriarchal nature and tribal
powers have precluded any attempts to access the public sphere in the rural areas.
Regarding the urban and rural divide since 2001, Edna Mitchell (2004), an education
specialist in Kabul, stated the following:
Using Kabul, the capital, as the prime example, the disparity between the attitudes and
lifestyles in the dense but far from modern city, and that of the lives of children and
families dispersed through the 33 provinces of mountainous Afghanistan is almost as
wide a gap as that between the 17th and 20th centuries. In 2004, many in rural
Afghanistan view Kabul and other urban areas with ―suspicion‖ and as places for
―potential cultural and moral degradation.‖

Rural Afghanistan leaders project themselves as the moral fiber of the country and
contest modernization attempts to improve women‘s status as un-Islamic. Provincial
leaders believe these values are not Afghan values, but instead the values of foreigners.
Additionally, many rural leaders also view Kabul as the ―center of a weak government‖
(Mitchell 2004).

49

Headquartered in San Francisco, the Asia Foundation is a non-profit committed to the development of
the Asian-Pacific region. The Asia Foundation has been conducting this survey since 2004.
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Thus far, most improvements in women‘s status have affected urban women more
than rural women. For example, regarding the health of Afghan women, one rural
respondent in the Women for Women International (2009) report stated the following,
―Keeping healthy is so important and vital, but unfortunately lack of hospitals in rural
areas, no potable water, pollution, dust on the road and streets and having no control on
markets threatens the health of every Afghan.‖
According to the RAND Corporation, 75 percent of the population resides in the
rural areas (Godges 2007). However, other reports show even higher percentages of
Afghans residing in rural areas.50 Besides the deep patriarchal structure and tribal based
laws that preclude improvements for women, the increasing Taliban resurgence also
affects women‘s status. In these rural areas, the Taliban capitalize by waging
informational campaigns that include threatening leaflets, storing weapon caches outside
villages, and publicly hanging leaders who cooperate with U.S. or Afghanistan
government (Godges 2007). According to Seth Jones, political scientist at the RAND
Corporation, ―. . . .the cities are held by the military forces. But, there is deep penetration
of the Taliban in rural areas,‖ (Godges 2007).
7.3: Women’s Status in the Constitution
Many world leaders and institutions praised the 2004 Afghanistan Constitution.
For example, then-U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, labeled the new constitution as a
―historic achievement,‖ while then-U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad,
called it ―one of the most enlightened constitutions in the Islamic world,‖ (Shah 2005).
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For example, in Transition within Tradition: Women’s Participation in Restoring Afghanistan, Rina
Amiri, Swanee Hunt, and Jennifer Sova estimated that 85 percent of the population resided in rural areas
while 15 percent resided in urban areas.
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Likewise, Human Rights Watch wrote that the constitution ―. . . included significant
provisions, notably women‘s rights‖ (Shah 2005).
Article 22 legally embraces gender parity by stating that ―the citizens of
Afghanistan, whether man or woman, have equal rights and duties before the law.‖
Naming women specifically aimed to protect their legal status. Furthermore, Article 44
aimed to reduce the literacy disparity between women and men by declaring, ―the state
shall devise and implement effective programs for balancing and promoting of education
for women, improving of education of nomads and elimination of illiteracy in the
country.‖ Subsequently, the constitution guarantees a certain percentage of women
elected in the lower house and upper house of the Afghanistan parliament. The
constitution also attempts to abolish traditional customs that often precluded women‘s
rights in Article 54. In this article, the constitution says, ―The state adopts necessary
measures to ensure physical and psychological well being of family, especially of child
and mother, upbringing of children and the elimination of traditions contrary to the
principles of sacred religion of Islam.‖ For example, this might include the mistaken
interpretation of Islam that precludes women and girls from an education, forced early
marriages and dowries, health practices, or the most severe example of honor killings
(Shah 2005). Additionally, the Afghan Constitution also established the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission, which serves as the supervisor for watching
human rights and abolishing the discrimination again women. Moreover, Afghanistan
has agreed to several international human rights instruments like the CEDAW (Library of
Parliament 2008:5).
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Conversely, other parts of the Constitution, specifically Article 3, concerned some
feminist and human‘s rights organizations. Article 3 states, ―In Afghanistan, no law can
be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.‖ The constitution
also grants the Supreme Court51 as the ultimate authority on this interpretation. For
example, while Human Rights Watch praised certain provisions, it questioned how
conservative groups could interpret Islam in ways that would violate human rights.
Others suggested this potentially could lead to a religious interpretation that would justify
discrimination against women, according to Sharia Law (Library of Parliament 2008:3).
This ambiguity between Article 3 and Article 22 led to both global and Afghan
backlash when the Afghan parliament passed the 2009 Shia Personal Status Law.
According to the Human Rights Watch, the Shia Personal Status Law regulates marriage,
divorce, and the inheritance for Afghanistan‘s Shia population (Human Rights Watch
2009). This law imposes ―Taliban-like‖ restrictions on women. These restrictions
include: 1) asking permission to leave the house, except on urgent business, 2) a duty ―to
make herself up‖ or ―dress up‖ for her husband when demanded, and 3) a duty not to
refuse sex when her husband wants it (Human Rights Watch 2009).
In Afghanistan, the Shia Muslim52 population comprises 20 percent of the
Muslims compared to the 80 percent that are Sunni Muslim (Adeney 2008:538).
According to the Minority Rights Group International (2009), the Shia Personal Status
Law was potentially legislated to ―protect the rights of a religious minority community‖
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No Afghan women sit on the Supreme Court.
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In Afghanistan, 99 percent of the population is Muslim. As documented, 80 percent of the Muslim
population is Sunni compared to the 20 percent of the Shia. Additionally, while Shia is the minority
Muslim religion, they often are the minority ethnicity as well. Generally, Hazaras, a historically oppressed
ethnicity in Afghanistan, comprise the Shia population.
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even though it simultaneously infringes on the rights of Shia women. This law signifies
that even though Article 22 grants women and men freedom, women still experience
discrimination, even within the boundaries of the Afghanistan Constitution.
Besides the uncertainty between the interpretation of Islam and its effect on
Article 22, other confusion exists between formal laws and customary laws. In many
cases, customary laws hinder women, especially uneducated and rural women, in
understanding their rights, especially regarding violence or property. In Afghanistan, like
in many developing nations, abused women often accept both their inferior status and the
patriarchal structure (Cohen 2006:261). For example in 2003, a study by UNIFEM
revealed that two-thirds of women surveyed in Morocco and Algeria believed that
domestic violence could be justified at times (Cohen 2006:261).
7.4: Women’s Status in Education
After the fall of the Taliban, the United States and the international community
named education as one of the paramount objectives in Afghanistan. To even countries
that sympathized with the Taliban, the deprivation of education was seen as a violation of
human rights. Since 2001, Afghanistan has improved their educational system for girls
and women through international assistance in creating infrastructure and by simply
granting the right for them to gain an education again. However, many obstacles exist
within the education system, especially for girls and women. In fact, the 2009 Asia
Foundation Survey of Afghan People labeled education and illiteracy as one of the
biggest problems still facing Afghan women. As the Human Rights Watch (2006)
reported, ―the situation is far from what it could or should have been, particularly for
girls.‖
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By the end of 2001, just two months after the U.S. invasion, 774,000 children
attended school. In 2002, 1.5 million of the estimated 4.4 million school-aged children
returned to the classrooms (Chatterjee 2002). By 2004, 4 million girls attended school,
although mostly in Kabul, not in the rural areas (Human Rights Watch 2004). By 2005,
the Ministry of Education projected that 5.2 million children attended school and were
officially registered in primary, middle, or high school (Human Rights 2006).
Additionally, another 4,000 to 5,000 girls and women attended vocational, Islamic, or
teacher‘s education programs (Human rights Watch 2006). By 2007, an estimated 43
percent of girls attended school (Coleman & Charney 2007). In 2009, RAWA estimated
that of the 6 million students that attend public schools, females comprised 34 percent
(RAWA 2009a).
Yet, in 2004, most primary school-aged girls did not attend primary school and a
mere 5 percent of girls attended secondary school, compared to the 20 percent of boys
(Human Rights Watch 2006). From 2004 to 2005, girls comprised just 20 percent of the
total enrollment in primary and secondary schools (Human Rights Watch 2006). By
2007, there was one girl student for every two boy students at the primary level (United
Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007a). Additionally, in 2007, boys were twice
as likely to finish primary school as girls (United Nation‘s Development Fund for
Women 2007a).
Even with the creation of new schools, there is a still in a disparity in access
between urban and rural areas. In fact, one-third of districts still have no girls‘ schools
and the majority of Afghan girls do not attend school at all (Human Rights Watch 2006).
For example, in cities like Kabul, Herat, or Mazur, girls are almost equal in attendance to
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boys. Conversely, in rural provinces, like Zabul, 55 percent of boys attend compared to 1
percent of girls (Coleman 2004). However, this era still represents the highest enrollment
of children, especially for girls, in school than any other era in Afghanistan (Human
Rights Watch 2006).
Security serves as the primary obstacle for education for all Afghans, but
especially for girls and women. According to the Human Rights Watch, two significant
security concerns affect the education system. First, the insurgents, including the Taliban
and other opposition groups, have threatened or attacked teachers, students, and schools,
forcing the schools‘ closures. Second, these same groups have also attacked Afghan
government officials and NGO aid workers. These problems coupled with the lack of
government control not only force school closures through threats or destruction, but also
preclude the opening and creation of new schools. Additionally, this dangerous situation
also creates fear for students, particularly girls and women, to attend any open schools
and forces them to drop out (Human Rights Watch 2006).
In 2006, President Hamid Karzai acknowledged the dangerous impact of the
insecurity on school attendance. On International Women‘s Day, he stated that, ―From
fear of terrorism, from threats of the enemies of Afghanistan, today as we speak, some
100,000 Afghan children who went to school last year, and the year before last, do not go
to school,‖ (Human Rights Watch 2006). One Afghan mother of two spoke with Human
Rights about how the danger and threatening tactics forced her community of Kandahar
City to stop sending their daughters to school,
During Ramadan [late 2005], the girls were still going to school. There was a
letter posted on the community‘s mosque saying that ―men who are working with
NGOs and girls going to school need to be careful about their safety. If we put
acid on their faces or they are murdered, then the blame will be on the parents.‖. .
89

. . After that, we were scared and talked about it, but we decided to let them keep
going anyway. But after Eid, a second letter was posted on the street near to there,
and the community decided that it was not worth the risk[and stopped all girls
over age ten from going to school]. . . . My daughters are afraid and they are
telling us ―we‘ll get killed and be lying on the streets and you won‘t even know.
(Human Rights Watch 2006)
Besides night letters or threats, some members of the Taliban and opposition
groups have violently attacked teachers, in front of their students or their families. In one
horrific incident in Zabul Province, a rural area, armed opposition forces decapitated the
headmaster of a school in his home in front of his children (Human Rights Watch 2006).
In the Southern regions, 35 percent of the schools closed due to suicide bombings and
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) attacks (Rubin 2007). From January 2005 to May
2006, the Human Rights Watch reported 204 attacks on Afghan students, teachers, and
schools53 (2006). In some neighborhoods, the community closed all the schools for
safety reasons.
Security is not the sole obstacle for girls and women to attend schools. Besides
the disparity of access in rural areas, there is a disparity in access to available girls‘
schools. While boys have access to 86 percent of schools, girls have access to 49 percent
of schools (Human Rights Watch 2006). Of these schools, UNIFEM reported that in
2007 a mere 19 percent of schools were designated as girls‘ schools. While many
schools claim to be ―co-educational,‖ they will not grant access to girls. Further, many
parents will not send their daughters to co-educational schools. Even within Kabul, the
struggle to balance Afghan traditional culture with educational advancement exists, as
some parents believe it is unsuitable for girl students to attend the same school as male
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Due to the security concerns and difficulty in conducting research, the Human Rights Watch stressed this
underestimates the correct numbers.
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students (Library of Parliament 2008). Moreover, to increase the number of Afghan girls
attending school, the system would not only require more girls‘ schools, but more female
teachers. In many cases, families forbid their daughter to learn from male teachers
(Library of Parliament 2008).
While some primary schools allow co-education until grade three, secondary
education must be separate for boys and girls (Human Rights Watch 2006). In many
instances, girls in grades eight or higher have no access to secondary schools. By 2007,
there was one female student to every five to six male students at the secondary level
(United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007a). In fact, certain provinces have
no girls‘ secondary schools (Human Rights Watch 2009). This means that the small
percentage of girls who attend school stop their education by grade eight or lower. This
lack of education among girls translates to a profound negative impact on the future of
Afghan women and their participation in the political, economic, and social segments of
Afghan society. As one women leader stated, ―This young generation can be trained well
but what about older girls? They will remain illiterate. An illiterate woman cannot be a
teacher. How can she train the next generation?‖ (Human Rights Watch 2006). Another
factor to consider, especially among girls who would attend secondary school, is the
young age of marriage and the high fertility rate. Oftentimes, girls marry at very young
ages. In 2007, UNIFEM reported that 57 percent of girls were married before the legal
marriage age of 16. Additionally, pregnancy often stops women from pursuing an
education.
Cultural resistance, poverty, and the shortage of teachers also play a huge role.
The lack of security directly contributes to each of these obstacles. For example, in 2004
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to 2005, women comprised 28 percent of the teachers. In 2007, UNIFEM estimated that
women still comprised only one quarter of all the teachers in Afghanistan. However, the
majority of female teachers taught in Kabul. Besides the low salary for teachers,
qualified women cannot travel nor live in some rural areas due to the lack of security,
resulting in no female teachers for rural girls (Human Rights Watch 2006). Like in the
pre-Taliban era, many times low-income families simply cannot afford to send both sons
and daughters to school. In these cases, families choose to send their sons over their
daughter. These families cannot afford transportation to ensure security for their
daughters and they expect their sons to earn future higher earnings than their daughters
(Human Rights Watch 2006).
While the international community promised funding for girls‘ education, it
oftentimes is inadequate and does not meet the needs. For example, from 2004 to 2006,
the USAID funded $100 million USD to girls‘ education. However, most of funding was
allocated directly to the construction of the infrastructure and significantly underfunded
the budget for teacher training and salaries (Coleman 2004). Additionally, the funding
often never included any strategies to address rural education or alternative education
(Coleman 2004).
Different reports show conflicting numbers on Afghan women‘s literacy levels
since 2001. In 2001, an UN Gender Advisor estimated the literacy level for women was
at just 4 percent (Amiri et al. 2004). By 2004, UNESCO reported a higher literacy level
for women at 20 percent. Conversely, Isobel Coleman noted in her study that many
individuals disputed that number as too high (Coleman 2004). From 2002 to 2007,
UNICEF (2009) reported the literacy level for women aged 15 through 24 at 18 percent.
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Human Rights Watch stated that in 2006, 86 percent of women could still not read or
write, meaning that a mere 14 percent of women were literate. In the 2007 Afghanistan
Human Development Report, the Centre for Policy and Human Development (CPHD)
estimated that just 12.6 percent of women were literate compared to 32.5 percent of men.
In comparing this data to neighboring countries, the report stated that the female
to male literacy ratio was 0.4, which was lower than both Pakistan (0.6) and Iran (0.8)
(CPHD 2007). Additionally, it reported that the overall adult literacy average decreased
from 28.7 percent in 2003 to 23.5 percent in 2005 (CPHD 2007). However, also in 2007,
both UNIFEM and the Gender Entrepreneurship Markets (GEM) projected women‘s
literacy levels at even higher percentages. While UNIFEM estimated women‘s literacy
levels at 15.8 percent compared to men‘s literacy levels at 31 percent (2007), GEM
estimated women‘s literacy level at 18 percent compared to men‘s literacy level at 50
percent (2007). In 2009, an UNESCO press release stated that four out of every five
women cannot read or write (Sadiqi 2009). Last, according to RAWA (2009), UNESCO
reported the literacy level at 18 percent for women in 2009.
Nevertheless, all the reports indicate that Afghanistan has one of the lowest
literacy rates in the world, especially for women. Without an improvement in education
and literacy, it is difficult to improve other factors in a women‘s status. Indeed, it is
universally accepted that increasing girls and women‘s access to education not only
improves their literacy but advances their health and economic growth. For instance,
Human Rights Watch (2006) reported that increasing girls‘ education by one year would
result in a 5 percent to 10 percent reduction in infant mortality. Thus, while the status of
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women in education shows signs of progress, it still is far behind, which consequently
affects all other factors of women‘s status.
7.5: Women’s Status in the Labor Force
Security barriers, low literacy levels, low education attainment, and societal
norms drastically affect women‘s participation in the labor force. Without an education,
many women do not possess the needed skills to contribute in the broader economy,
especially in professional positions and in leadership roles. In many areas, especially the
rural provinces, the same security issues that prevent women from attending school,
preclude their participation in the workforce. This equates to women to working inside in
their home, rather than in the public sphere. Additionally, while there is no legal or
formal restriction on mobility, women in rural areas still are ―culturally constrained‖
from working outside the home (CPHD 2007). In fact, according to the 2009 Women for
Women International Survey, 55 percent of male respondents believed that women
should not work outside of their home. Last, the high fertility rate and constant
pregnancy often prevent women from entering the workforce.
In 2007, Afghanistan‘s female labor force participation ranked at the bottom in
the South Asian region, at just 35.8 percent (GEM 2007). While some urban educated
women have returned to their careers as teachers, doctors, judges, and lawyers, most
women, especially those in rural localities, work at home in informal sectors like
agriculture, livestock management, and as caregivers (CPHD 2007). In Afghanistan, 80
percent to 90 percent of the total economic activity happens within the informal sectors
(CPHD 2007). In 2007, women comprised 65 percent of the agricultural workers in
Afghanistan (GEM 2007). According to the CPHD (2007), while these at-home positions
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generate income, they are not remunerated. In their 2009 Survey, Women for Women
International reported that women respondents griped about the shortage of job
opportunities. By 2007, some studies showed that one in every seven women had a job,
representing 14 percent of the female population (Charney & Coleman 2007). In
comparing women‘s literacy level to the percentage in the labor force, there is a parallel.
The educated minority of women who comprise the formal economy generally are
employed in the education and health sectors (GEM 2007). Yet, in these positions, men
overwhelmingly dominate women. For example, 40 percent of basic health facilities
report a shortage in female staff. Analogous to education, the inadequate number of
females in the health field restricts many women from seeking healthcare. Meanwhile, in
positions that are traditionally male dominated, women‘s participation is severely limited.
For example, women comprise less than 1 percent of the police or military forces. In
2007, women represented just 0.6 percent of the Afghan National Army. Of the 43,000
Afghan military members, only 259 were women. Likewise, in 2007, only 233 women
were police in Afghanistan (United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007a).
While many cultural barriers exist regarding women-owned businesses, by 2005
women comprised 11 percent of business owners in Afghanistan. Women often owned
businesses in the agricultural, handi-craft, and service sectors. Still the minority, some
women own shops or businesses like bakeries, beauty parlors, tailoring shops, or jewelrymaking stores (GEM 2007). Interestingly, women comprise the majority of microfinance loan recipients. In fact, 85 percent of micro-finance recipients are women (GEM
2007). These loans are vital to Afghan women as they often lack in their ability to access
land, equipment, and materials (GEM 2007).
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Like many countries, Afghanistan has huge disparity between female and male
incomes. In 2007, UNIFEM reported that women earned just 50 percent to 60 percent of
the male wage (2007). In 2009, Women for Women International stated that women
were likely to earn just one-third of what their male counterparts earned. Additionally, it
was estimated that just in Kabul over 50,000 war widows support an average of six
dependents in their families (Women for Women International 2009).
7.6: Women’s Status in Political Participation and in the Justice Sector
In December 2001, women took part in the Bonn Agreement, which signified the
start of Afghanistan‘s new political process. However, women delegates said they
received intimidation and threats from criminals and warlords regarding their
involvement. The women delegates blamed the warlords‘ participation for undermining
additional changes to improve women‘s status. Likewise, women delegates received
nominal time to voice their opinions and even reported their microphones being cut off,
while powerful warlords received endless time to speak (Human Rights Watch 2004). In
the December 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga, Malalai Joya, the youngest parliamentarian
ever elected in Afghanistan, was verbally attacked and threatened after she challenged the
warlord‘s dominance (Coleman 2004). Even an alleged moderate, Sebaghatulla
Mojaheddi, the Chairman of Constitutional Loya Jirga, said to Joya that ―women in
Islamic law are only worth half of men and should know their place,‖ (Coleman 2004).
As mentioned, the Afghanistan Constitution grants 25 percent of the lower-house
seats and 17 percent of the upper-house seats to women. In 2004, more than 300 female
candidates actually ran for office, including a female Presidential candidate. Due to the
constitutional quotas, women representatives must comprise at least 24 percent (or 84
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members of 351) of the National Assembly. Women exceeded the quota requirement by
3 percent and in 2007 comprised 27 percent of the National Assembly (United Nation‘s
Development Fund for Women 2007a). In January 2005, one woman was elected as the
first governor of a province (Amnesty International 2005). Moreover, the electoral law
mandates that women must comprise 25 percent of the provincial council candidates. In
August 2009, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) reported that women held 28 percent of the provincial council seats nationwide
(SIGAR 2009).
Despite these successes, many female Parliamentarians indicated that men still
maintained the power, especially the warlords. Many of the male politicians, specifically
the warlords, do not support women. For example, in May 2006, the National Assembly
suspended Malalai Joya for voicing her opposition to the warlords in the Afghan
government (Library of Parliament 2008). Additionally, most rural areas still are not
open to women in the political sphere. In 2007, only one female minister held a cabinet
position, which was the Minister of Women‘s Affairs. In 2009, women comprised just
22 percent of government employees and a mere 9 percent were in a decision-making
role (Women for Women International 2009).
In the 2004 election, 10.5 million women registered to vote and women
represented 43 percent of the total voters, although mainly in the urban areas. For
instance, in the Pashtun and rural provinces of Helmand and Oruzgan, women comprised
just 2 percent and 7 percent of the respective electorate (Library of Parliament 2008).
Besides security and threats, the Library of Parliament (2008) stated that women‘s ―lack
of citizenship education‖ served as one of the many barriers in women‘s voting
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participation. Further, the conservative and patriarchal culture precluded many women
from voting. According to UNIFEM, 87 percent of Afghans, comprising both men and
women, indicated that women require men‘s‘ permission to vote. Only 35 percent of
women believed that women did not need a male relative‘s permission (United Nation‘s
Development Fund for Women 2007a). In 2004, 18 percent of men stated they would not
permit their wives to vote (United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007a).
In the August 2009 elections, women‘s turnout dropped to 38.7 percent of
electorate, largely due to the horrific security issues (SIGAR 2009). According to
SIGAR, while security was a huge problem for the entire population, it was even a bigger
issue for women (SIGAR 2009). Additionally, two women, Shahla Ata and Dr. Frozan
Fana, ran for President of Afghanistan in the 2009 Election, compared to one women
candidate in 2004. However, both women stated ―they feared for their lives and suffered
abuse‖ (SIGAR 2009). Approximately 32,199 Afghans casted their votes for one of the
two women candidates, and jointly they received just 0.7 percent of the total votes
(SIGAR 2009). Women also comprised 10 percent of the provincial council candidates,
which was an overall increase since 2004. However, Afghan women candidates truly
risked their lives in running for office, as one female candidate was assassinated, two
female candidates were kidnapped, and one female candidate was the target of a failed
assassination attempt (SIGAR 2009). Female politicians and candidates are in so much
danger that some female parliamentarians indicated that unless security improves, they
would not be able to run in the 2010 National Assembly Elections54 (SIGAR 2009). As
one former woman National Assembly candidate said,
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The 2010 National Assembly Elections are scheduled for May 22, 2010.
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Security is different for men and women. Men candidates have put their pictures
everywhere in the bazaar. Women candidates can‘t do that, because they are
afraid. Somebody might come during the night and kill them. Anything can
happen. Warlords are ruling. They can do anything they want. Commanders have
lots of guns. (Human Rights Watch 2005)
While statistically women voters, women candidates, and women elected officials
comprise greater numbers than ever before, security, cultural constraints, and structural
barriers preclude them from an even larger political participation. Even in 2009, eight
years after the U.S. invasion, women still are systemically excluded from the political
process. In addition, women are largely absent from the judicial arena as well. In 2007,
of 1,547 judges in Afghanistan, only 62 were women (roughly, 4 percent). In the law
profession, only 6.1 percent of lawyers were female. Similarly, not one female member
sits on the Supreme Court Council. Without women working in the justice system,
women often cannot seek recourse for their grievances.
7.7: Violence Since 2001
Despite the symbolic legal gains the constitution affords women, Afghan women
face serious challenges in protection and justice, especially against violence. While
women endured multitudes of human rights abuses, including rapes and beatings under
the Taliban and the Mujahideen, women still face of a life of systemic sexual,
psychological, and physical violence. In fact, the 2007 Afghanistan Human Development
Report stated, ―violence against women in Afghanistan has reached ‗epidemic
proportions‘‖ (CPHD 2007). Regarding the lives of women, Malalai Joya, Afghan
female politician said,
We do not have human rights now in most provinces. It is as easy to kill a woman
in my country as it is to kill a bird. In some big cities like Kabul, some women
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have access to jobs and education, but in most of the country, the situation for
women is hell. Rape, kidnapping and domestic violence are increasing. These
fundamentalists during the so-called free elections made a misogynist law against
Shia women in Afghanistan. . . . All these crimes are happening under the name
of democracy. (Hedges 2009)
According to a study by Womankind Worldwide, a United Kingdom non-profit,
80 percent of Afghan women were affected by domestic violence (Women for Women
International 2009). In 2007, Afghanistan Online reported that one in three women
endured physical, psychological, or sexual violence (2007). From March 2007 to March
2008, there was an increase of reported domestic violence by 40 percent (RAWA 2008).
According to Amnesty International (2005), brothers, husbands, and fathers often commit
violence against their female relatives. In fact, 92 percent of the time the victim knows
the perpetrator (Women for Women International 2009). Suraya Subhrang, a
commissioner on the rights of women at the Afghan Independent Human Rights
Commission (AIHRC), stated that, ―Our findings clearly indicate that despite over six
years of international rhetoric about Afghan women‘s emancipation and development, a
real and tangible change has not touched the lives of millions of women in this country‖
(RAWA 2008).
Nevertheless, even these startlingly high numbers most likely do not reflect the
actual amount of violent incidences. Between the universal trend in under-reporting
domestic violence and the deep social stigma Afghan women face, most domestic
violence cases are unreported (United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2006). In
addition, Afghan women not only face severe limitations in seeking justice through the
law, but often the police or law officials are corrupt, leaving women with no redress. In
some cases, the police may actually also abuse women (CPHD 2007). In fact, only an
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exceedingly minimal amount of domestic violence offenders ever receive any judicial
punishment, leaving women with no recourse but to tolerate the mistreatment. The
AIHRC reported that in 2007, there were more reported cases in Kabul or Herat than in
Kandahar, a Taliban stronghold (Afghanistan Online 2007). One can infer that women in
urban areas would be more likely to breach the ―social taboo‖ and report violence than
women in more conservative rural areas. Additionally, UNIFEM (2006) stated that as
women become more conscious of their legal rights, they are more likely to report violent
incidents. Conversely, in conservative Afghanistan, families and communities often shun
women who attempt to seek protection from domestic violence and sexual violence, like
rape.
UNIFEM stated that Afghan women face numerous issues of violence, like forced
marriage, child marriage, domestic violence, sexual harassment, human trafficking, and
even death in honor killings (United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2006).
Despite the fact child marriages are illegal and a criminal offense according to Article
517 of the Afghan Penal Code, Womankind Worldwide reported that over 60 percent of
marriages are forced and 50 percent of Afghan girls are married before the age of 16
(Women for Women International 2009). In forced marriages, women are often treated
as either financial transactions or commodity exchanges for a family to either settle a debt
or resolve a financial hardship (Women for Women International 2009). For instance, in
a Washington Post article, one Afghan father explained that because he could not repay a
$165 loan to buy sheep, he sold his 16-year old daughter (Tang 2007). Some families
trade their daughters as young as six or seven. These young child brides then often are
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victims of sexual abuse not only by the groom but also by older men in the groom‘s
family (United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2006).
The horrific physical and mental hardships women endure from violence also can
lead to self-immolation,55 suicide, prostitution, narcotics addiction, and violent behavior
towards children (United Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2006). In just the
Kandahar province in 2006, at least 64 women attempted to commit suicide and 36
women poisoned themselves with toxic chemicals like rat-poison (CPHD 2007). From
May to July 2006, 106 women and girls in Kabul and Herat set themselves on fire, with
82 percent of the victims in Kabul dying from the self-immolated burns (United Nation‘s
Development Fund for Women 2006). In 2007, the AIHRC reported that 626 women
attempted suicide, through self-immolation, slitting their veins, or drug overdoses, with
130 succeeding in taking their lives (RAWA 2007). In fact, Afghanistan is one of the
only countries where the suicide rate is higher for women than for men.
7.8: Women’s Status in Health
In July, 2009, Dr. S. M. Amin Fatimie, the Afghan Minister of Health, said that,
“the health of Afghan women and children is in a better state today than in 2002 . . . but
much remains to be done,‖ (Fatimie 2009). Afghan women have historically had one of
the lowest health statuses in the world. Despite improvements, women still face many
barriers in improving their health status, especially in reproductive health areas. While
the security situation and lack of education play a huge role in this low status, women
endure other challenges like societal barriers and lack of access. Additionally, the
healthcare facilities lack proper supplies, trained personnel, and trained women.
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Like other concerns, urban women have seen some improvement, especially in
access. While the Ministry of Health reported an increase in overall health facilities,
rural areas still lack facilities, infrastructure, and transportation (Fatimie 2009).
Depending on how distant the rural area is from the province capital, UNIFEM (United
Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007) projected that between 30 percent to 90
percent of rural women cannot access healthcare. For these reasons and the societal
barriers against women‘s health, rural women often are in poorer health than urban
women. For example, the 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report estimated
Afghanistan‘s maternal mortality rate (MMR) as 1600 per 100,000 live births. However,
while Kabul had a lower MMR of 400 per 100,000 live births, Badakhshan, a distant
rural district, had a much higher MMR of 6500 per 100,000 live births (CPHD 2007).
In 2003, the Ministry of Health established the Department of Women and
Reproductive Health. Yet, in 2008, the UN estimated the maternal mortality rate range as
1600 to 1900 out 100,000 women, which was the world‘s second highest maternal
mortality rate. Only Sierra Leone had a higher maternal mortality rate than Afghanistan
(RAWA 2008). In total, approximately, 26,000 Afghan women die from childbirth or
related infections, like hemorrhaging or obstructed labor (Grady 2009). Even if the
mother lives during the childbirth, obstructed labor often kills the infant without a
Caesarean section (Grady 2009). Of these deaths, The Lancet estimated that 78 percent
were preventable (Grady 2009). According to UNIFEM (2007), this tragically equates to
about one woman dying every 29 minutes in childbirth.
In 2007, the fertility rate was 6.6 children (United Nation‘s Development Fund for
Women 2007a), with approximately just 10 percent of Afghan couples reporting using
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contraceptives (Grady 2009). Approximately 80 percent of women gave birth without
skilled medical professionals or midwives. However, this does indicate an increase from
even 2003, where the United Nations (2003) reported that just 5 percent of women gave
birth with trained personnel. Still, just one-third of women received any medical care
during their pregnancy (Grady 2009). Moreover, the 2007 Human Development Report
stated that the infant mortality rate decreased from 165/1,000 to 135/1,000. While
Afghanistan still has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world this decrease
resulted in 40,000 more successful births (CPHD 2007). In 2006, approximately 100,000
Afghan women suffered from untreated fistulas56 (Motherland Afghanistan 2006).
According to the documentary Motherland Afghanistan, the conditions of Afghan
health facilities for women are deplorable and unsanitary. Besides there being a shortage
of basic medical equipment like hospital beds, working bathrooms, IVs, surgical stiching,
pain pills, or anesthetics, hospitals also lacked funds, which required patients to purchase
their own IVs or stitching (Motherland Afghanistan 2006). In a PBS interview, Dr.
Qudrat Mojadidi, an OB/GYN who worked for the United States in training Afghan
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According to the Fistula Foundation, a fistula is defined as a ―hole.‖ While fistulas were generally
eradicated in industrialized countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, women in developing
countries in Africa and Asia still experience fistulas. The Fistula Foundation defines an obstetric fistula as
―a hole between a woman's birth passage and one or more of her internal organs. This hole develops over
many days of obstructed labor, when the pressure of the baby's head against the mother's pelvis cuts off
blood supply to delicate tissues in the region. The dead tissue falls away and the woman is left with a hole
between her vagina and her bladder (called a vesicovaginal fistula or VVF) and sometimes between her
vagina and rectum (rectovaginal fistula, RVF). This hole results in permanent incontinence of urine and/or
feces.‖ Further, due to their infertility and foul odor, many women with untreated fistulas experience
spousal abandonment and isolation from their community. The Fistula Foundation,
http://www.fistulafoundation.org/aboutfistula/faqs.html.
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doctors, believed that the health conditions are not improving for Afghan women
(Motherland Afghanistan 2006).
From 2001 to 2009, the average life expectancy of women has varied from 42 to
44, approximately 20 years shorter than the world average (Library of Parliament 2008;
United Nations Children‘s Fund 2009). Despite the years of war, men still outnumber
women by 104 to 100 (Library of Parliament 2008). In fact, Afghanistan is one of the
only countries where men outlive women. The 2007 Human Development Report
attributed the low life expectancy to the lack of access to health care, poor nutrition, and
the regularity of young marriage (before the age 15) (CPHD 2007). In 2007, women
comprised 83 percent of the 50,000 Afghans who died from tuberculosis (United
Nation‘s Development Fund for Women 2007a). While tuberculosis and malaria cases
have decreased, Afghanistan still ranked 17 out of the 22 countries with the highest
tuberculosis incidents (CDHD 2007). Further, UNIFEM (2007) reported almost half of
Afghan women are iron-deficient.
Despite many potential HIV risk indicators, including the common heroin usage
in Afghanistan, no data showed prevalence of HIV or AIDS existing in Afghanistan as in
other developing countries. For example, in many developing countries, women with
low gender status, high illiteracy, violence, and sexual abuse often are infected with HIV
in higher numbers (Bergenström 2003). Additionally, during the Taliban era, more
women joined the sex trade. These behaviors and the uncommon use of contraceptives
are high-risk habits for a potential HIV epidemic. In neighboring countries, like India
and Bangladesh, there is a higher risk of HIV than in Afghanistan. While Afghan women
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already face many health challenges, many global organizations worry about the potential
HIV/AIDS epidemic that could exist in Afghanistan, especially amongst Afghan women.
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CHAPTER 8: WESTERN FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS‘ CAMPAIGNS
8.1: Introduction to Western Feminist Organizations’ Campaigns
In March 2009, Eleanor Smeal, President of the Feminist Majority Foundation,
spoke on FMF‘s latest campaign, Campaign for Afghan Women and Girls. Smeal said,
―We warned in 1998, and over and over again ever since, the women and girls in
Afghanistan are the canaries in the mine. We cannot forget them if we are ever to gain
peace and global stability‖ (Feminist Majority Foundation 2009). In the same press
release, Dr. Sima Samar, chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, discussed her annoyance with the portrayal of Afghanistan as a fourteenth
century culture and reiterated that she received her medical degree from Kabul
University, which was once a leading medical center in Central Asia (Feminist Majority
Foundation 2009).
This notion of Afghanistan as a fourteenth century culture can be viewed as a
product of cultural essentialism. In some cases, Western feminists and organizations
have engaged in cultural essentialism and the victimization of Afghan women and their
plight. Even prior to 9/11, the oppression of Afghan women was the subject of many
feminist organizations‘ campaigns and online petitions (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:169).
Historically, this would not serve as the first time Western feminists have victimized,
implicitly or explicitly, non-Western women. In fact, this perceived victimization has
been criticized within the feminist discourse. Through both a practical and theoretical
lens, this chapter explores the campaigns and literature produced by Western feminists,
which includes individual scholars and feminist organizations, on Afghan women.
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8.2: Feminist Campaigns in the Three Eras and the Obsession with the Burqa
In Women for Afghan Women, Gloria Steinem briefly discussed her protest to the
U.S. government policy of supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in 1980.
According to Steinem, the United States disregarded her and other feminists‘ protests and
continued to fund $3 billion dollars to ―religious extremists and gender apartheid‖
(Steinem 2002:66). Conversely, Moghadam (2002) shared a different recollection.
Instead, she questioned the ―curious silence of feminists‖ during the civil war and
Mujahideen periods in the 1980‘s and early 1990‘s. Moghadam (2002) said,
One would have thought that feminists around the world, including American
feminists, would have rallied around the idea of equality for Afghan women,
criticized the Mujahidin and even the Kabul government, and come to the aid of
Afghan women, as they did in the mid-1990s in the case of Bosnia. Unfortunately
this did not occur.
Moghadam provided two reasons for the ―curious silence‖ of feminists during the
Mujahideen era. First, she argued that some feminists did not view the Mujahideen as
misogynistic fundamentalists but instead as liberators from the Soviet Union (Moghadam
2002). According to Moghadam, some female journalists and activists wrote books and
literature in support of the Mujahideen. Second, Moghadam argued that in this era,
Western feminists associated ―women‘s rights‖ with Western women, not Eastern
women. Moghadam (2002) believed feminists debated heavily over cultural relativism
and universalism as it pertained to ―women‘s rights.‖
After the Taliban gained control, international and U.S. feminist organizations
started to take notice and formulated several campaigns regarding Afghan women‘s
oppression. Most notably, in 1997, the Feminist Majority Foundation launched the ―Stop
Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan Campaign.‖ Spearheaded by Mavis Leno, this
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campaign was largely successful on a variety of fronts. First, the campaign created
immense public awareness on the human rights violations by the Taliban against Afghan
women. Second, it played a role in pressuring both the United States and the United
Nations in not recognizing the Taliban as an official government (Gallagher 2004).
According to Smeal (2002), the 1997 campaign created more communication to the State
Department and Clinton Administration than any other foreign policy issue in the Clinton
Presidential years. Third, this campaign, along with other protests from mainstream
feminist organizations, was instrumental in precluding the Unocal Corporation from
constructing a pipeline across Afghanistan that would have financially benefited the
Taliban (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:170).
By 2000, over 70 celebrities, Glamour Magazine, and even primetime television
shows like Seventh Heaven focused on the oppression of Afghan Women (Reif 2000).
While these campaigns produced largely successful results in terms of awareness, they
also oversimplified the burqa as the sole visual symbol of oppression. Unfortunately, this
trend of the burqa as the poster-symbol of oppression continued after 9/11 and the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan.
In the 1997 Gender Apartheid Campaign, the Feminist Majority Foundation also
sold tiny particles of mesh cloth, meant to symbolize the eyepiece of the burqa on their
website (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:179). The campaign urged American women to
wear a ―Symbol of Remembrance for Afghan Women‖ that could be purchased in an
individual packet or in packets of 10 or 20 ―eyepieces‖ (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:179).
While the FMF said, ―This swatch of mesh represents the obstructed view of the world
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for an entire nation of women who were once free,‖ Kolhatkar and Ingalls (2006) argued
this wordage instead seemed as if it were a ―tribute to the dead.‖
Although the campaign intended to foster awareness of Afghan women‘s
oppression, it also serves as an example of cultural essentialism within Western feminist
campaigns. First, it created an essentialist image of ―all‖ Afghan women as burqa-clad,
helpless, and needing to be saved. As stated prior, Afghan women are not monolithic and
these marketing tactics reduce them to an ―all.‖ Second, this largely ignored the work of
RAWA and other women or women‘s organizations within Afghanistan. As documented
in Brodsky‘s With All Our Strength, RAWA has been extremely active in promoting
women‘s rights and democracy since the late 1970s. Third, this campaign also insinuated
that women were free prior to the Taliban and ignored the abuses committed by the
Mujahideen, whom the United States financially supported in the 1980‘s (Kolhatkar and
Ingalls 2006:179).
Since the 1990s, many Western feminist organizations and human rights
organizations have utilized images of burqa-clad Afghan women in direct mail and media
campaigns intended to shock and visually appeal to their Western audiences (Reif 2000).
After 9/11 and the fall of the Taliban, veiled images of Afghan women appeared in
greater numbers. According to Kolhatkar and Ingalls (2006:180), ―there was a sudden
proliferation of the ‗Blue Burqa Books‘.‖ Meaning, books written by a Western
feminists with the word ―veil‖ or ―veiled‖ in the title and the cover featuring an Afghan
woman wearing the infamous ―cornflower blue burqa‖ (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:180).
Additionally, networks like CNN and the BBC repeatedly broadcast documentaries like
Beneath the Veil by Saira Shah.
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The focus on the burqa extended far beyond just campaigns and literature. In
fact, the burqa served in key policy discourse regarding Afghan women. For instance,
during an October 2001 Congressional hearing, Smeal provided testimony as the ―voice‖
for Afghan women. In her testimony, she focused part of her statement on the ―burqa‖
and on the public executions committed by the Taliban. However, in her testimony, she
never credited RAWA for videotaping the notorious execution of Zarmeena (Fluri 2008:
148-149). This particular execution marked the first video documentation orchestrated
by RAWA. In other occasions, Smeal failed to recognize RAWA for risking their lives
to document this execution. This is important to note as omitting RAWA‘s work helped
to perpetuate the cultural and gender essentialist image of Afghan women as helpless,
weak, and ―needing to be saved.‖
While one can understand that creating awareness on a complicated topic requires
effective marketing, using the burqa as the single symbol for oppression has created longlasting problems. First, it has continued the age-old essentialist message of ―other
women needing to be saved by Western men and women‖ (Kolhatkar and Ingalls
2006:179). As one critic said in Bleeding Afghanistan (2006),
The Western feminists, human rights, and even the Afghan women‘s groups
unwittingly played to Western stereotypic images of Islam and Afghanistan in
pressing their cases. Many of those sympathetic to Afghan culture and to Islam
worried about the sensationalism surrounding the campaigns. . . . In public
forums, Afghans and other Muslims often raised the issue that anti-gender
apartheid itself was more harmful than beneficial because it was contributing to
widespread negative stereotypes. (Pp. 179-180)
Hence, it continues with the practice of Western cultures engaging in cultural superiority
over Eastern cultures. Second, in reducing Afghan women and their oppression to the
burqa, it ignores the true oppression and violations of human rights that they endured. As
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mentioned, the burqa represents the least of Afghan women‘s problems in any of the eras.
Third, it fails to understand the history or cultural significance behind the burqa (AbuLughod 2003).
While there is arguably a difference between being forced or choosing to wear the
burqa, the Western world defined ―unveiling‖ as the beginning of women‘s liberation in
Afghanistan from the Taliban. Again, this makes the historically inaccurate assumption
that Afghan women‘s oppression began with the Taliban and neglects to discuss the
Mujahideen violations. Once more, as Lila Abu-Lugod (2003) has explained, this also
assumes that the Taliban created the burqa. As discussed in Chapter 6, the burqa
originated from the Pashtun culture, not Islam or the Taliban. Additionally, to some
Afghan women and other women throughout Southwest Asia, the burqa represents
―modesty and respectability,‖ not oppression (Abu-Lughod 2003). In many cases,
Western campaigns fail to understand that some Afghan women view ―unveiling‖ as
giving up their cultural definition of modesty (Abu-Lughod 2003). As Abu-Lughod
acknowledged, Western women also possess ―societal fashion norms.‖ Culturally,
Western women understand the proper dress for certain social and religious occasions.
For example, while many Christian women may attend church wearing informal clothing,
there is a reason for the term ―Sunday‘s best.‖ One might argue this represents a cultural
notion of ―respectability‖ within Western religious customs.
8.3: Saving Afghan Women from What?
Sonali Kolhatkar, Vice President of Afghan Women‘s Mission and co-author of
Bleeding Afghanistan, criticized Smeal and Helen Caldicott, author, journalist, and antinuclear advocate, for incorrectly labeling female genital mutilation (FGM) as a prevalent
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cultural practice in Afghanistan. According to Kolhatkar, during an interview with
Caldicott, she (Caldicott) drilled her with questions about ―all Afghan men as
misogynistic‖ and about the practice of FGM in Afghanistan (Kolhatkar 2002). In
addition, Kolhatkar criticized Smeal over her assumptions that Afghan women
experienced FGM and by implying that their ―oppression stems from not being able to
have an orgasm‖ (Oliver 2007:54). Theoretically, these assumptions reduce Afghan men
to a cultural essentialist ―all,‖ and reduce ―all‖ Afghan women as ―sexually oppressed.‖
As Kelly Oliver (2007:54) questioned, why is the leader of the Feminist Majority
Foundation ―conflating women‘s freedom with sexual freedom?‖ Moreover, FGM is not
even a practice that occurs in Afghanistan nor is it part of their culture (Kolhatkar 2002).
Thus, this questions what these campaigns strive ―to save Afghan women from‖ if they
focus on incorrect practices and essentialist symbolism.
Abu-Lughod argued against using language like ―saving the women of
Afghanistan‖ as it perpetrates a Western image of arrogance (Abu-Lughod 2003:6).
Through this lens of cultural essentialism, U.S. feminists have often framed Islam as the
―single greatest violent threat to women.‖ Therefore, their (U.S. feminist organizations)
actions or campaigns illustrate a sense of ―American women as saviors and rescuers of
oppressed women‖ (Puar 2008:49-50).
In some cases, the Feminist Majority Foundation and other feminist groups used
the same ―liberation rhetoric‖ of ―saving Afghan women‖ as a reason to wage war
(Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:170). For example regarding the invasion, Smeal stated,
―Next time women speak about international issues, they‘ll (the U.S. government will)
listen. . . . Our credibility will have gone up‖ (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:171). Even
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with the best intentions of classifying the U.S. invasion as a ―just war,‖ one would ask
why many Western feminists have not focused more closely on the warlords within the
Afghan government. Specifically, why have Western feminists not questioned the
policies which have granted political power to the Northern Alliance and have negatively
affected Afghan women. For example, rather than focusing on the burqa or the alleged
practice of FGM, Western feminists have often failed to highlight the historical abuses
committed by Mujahideen and the Northern Alliance. As discussed in previous chapters,
the Northern Alliance committed vast atrocities against the population, but especially
against women. Most alarming is that these same warlords hold positions within the
Karzai government, and yet the burqa has remained the central focus within many
campaigns and literature.
In all three eras feminist groups like the Feminist Majority Foundation deserve
praise in creating awareness and, ultimately, shifting certain policies in Afghanistan (i.e.
Unocal). Creating effective awareness campaigns often relies on the utilization of
simplistic messaging. However, the burqa obsession has led to dangerous consequences
and has created historically inaccurate messages. Moreover, these culturally essentialist
positions have reinforced the stereotype of ―Western superiority‖ over ―Eastern
backwardness.‖ Finally, it is important to question why the feminist campaigns fail to
highlight how policy decisions (i.e. Northern Alliance) negatively affect the women in
Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
9.1: Introduction to Findings and Analysis
―Men‘s and women‘s experiences of violence during military conflicts are often
shaped by gender and intersected by race, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, location and/or
dislocation‖ (Fluri 2008:143). In all three eras of this case study, gender and culture have
shaped the status of Afghan women economically, legally, politically, and socially as
well as in their access to education and health. In addition, the location of urban or rural
residency has played a constant role in affecting Afghan women‘s experiences and status
in each era. While statistics were vital to compare Afghan women‘s status in all three
periods, the theories of gender and cultural essentialism helped to demonstrate the
historical continuum of internal and external forces using essentialist stereotypes to
legitimatize their actions. Most notably, these actions included the rationale for violence
and military conflict. Through this theoretical context, gender and cultural essentialism
offered insight on the consistent rhetoric of ―saving‖ Afghan women as well as their low
status in each period. While the internal and external forces in Afghanistan have changed
throughout each era, often these forces implicitly or explicitly applied the same
essentialist attributes. Theoretically, gender and cultural essentialism served as the
groundwork for the continued oppression in the lives of Afghan women.
Gender and cultural essentialism demonstrate how Afghan women have served as
perpetual pawns to Afghan leaders, the PDPA, the Soviet Union, the Mujahideen, the
Taliban, and the United States. While Western feminists have not directly used Afghan
women as pawns in war, one could argue they have served as pawns in their marketing
campaigns. Historically, one understands that use of saving women to justify violence
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follows past patterns. Hence, the three eras of different actors trying ―to save‖ Afghan
women is not new. Despite the rhetoric of policy and action meant to improve the status
of Afghan women, their status in each era has ranked consistently as one of the lowest in
the world. Feminist scholars explain that the use of women to justify violence
marginalizes them both politically and socially. Furthermore, it fails to provide concrete
improvements to the lives of women (Fluri 2008:144-145). Thus, the status of Afghan
women in each era of this case study is consistent with this feminist scholarship.
Besides evaluating the status of Afghan women in each era, the intention of this
thesis was to provide a more holistic perspective through the application of gender and
cultural essentialism. In returning to the four original research questions, the intention
was to explore the following: (1) How have women‘s rights improved in Afghanistan
since the U.S. invasion compared to under the Taliban and before the Taliban? (2) If
―liberating‖ (or saving) Afghan women is important, why do some policies negatively
affect or overlook women? (3) How can the application of gender essentialism and
cultural essentialism provide insights on why policy decisions often negatively affect or
overlook Afghan women? (4) How can the application of gender essentialism and
cultural essentialism provide insights on the justification for war in the name of ―saving‖
Afghan women? The sections of this chapter address these four research questions.
Section 9.2 How Have Women‘s Rights Improved in Afghanistan Since the U.S.
Invasion discusses how and if Afghan women‘s lives have improved since 2001 by
comparing their status in each era. Next, Section 9.3, Theoretical Analysis: Insights from
Gender and Cultural Essentialism, discusses research questions two through four.
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9.2: How Have Women’s Rights Improved in Afghanistan Since the U.S. Invasion?
Introduction. An interesting dichotomy emerges when addressing this first
research question. In the research, some areas observed show that life for Afghan women
has improved compared to the preceding eras while other areas remain relatively the
same or even worse. Despite some true improvements intersected with symbolic
emblems of improvement, Afghan women still had the second to lowest GDI57 in the
world in 2007 (CPHD 2007).
Regarding an improved status for Afghan women, it is important to distinguish
between two categories of improved status: 1) symbolic improvements for Afghan
women and 2) actual improvements for Afghan women. In some areas, it is much easier
to tout the symbolic improvements as actual improvements. For example, since 2001, the
burqa has emerged as the symbolic measurement of ―liberation‖ and freedom for Afghan
women. As discussed in earlier chapters and to be discussed in the proceeding theoretical
analysis, the burqa is not and has never been an indicator of improved or deteriorated
status for Afghan women. Additionally, in many cases, an improvement could be
classified as both a symbolic and as an actual improvement. Education serves as an
example that falls into both classifications. For instance, since 2001, Afghan women
have legally obtained the right to gain an education. Compared to the Taliban era, this
represents an actual improvement by simply granting women and girls the right to attend
school, something forbidden or restricted by the Taliban edicts. Conversely, this also
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As discussed in Chapter 7, the GDI stands for the Gender Development Index and is the UN indicator of
status. The GDI for Afghanistan was .310 with Niger as the only country ranking behind Afghanistan.
This report showed that Afghan women experienced immense barriers in education, employment, and
healthcare. Conversely, the GDI fails to show the barriers regarding human rights violations, political
representation, violence, and lack of access to justice (CPHD 2007).
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represents a symbolic improvement, as even in 2006, the majority of girls did not attend
school for various reasons, most notably due to safety concerns (Human Rights 2006).
As discussed in Chapter 7, the issue of security serves as a major obstacle in any facet of
a woman‘s public life, especially education. In fact, in 2008, the problem of security and
attacks forced about 700 schools to close (RAWA 2009b). Besides security, there is a
huge disparity in access between rural and urban provinces. As mentioned, the 2009 Asia
Foundation Survey of Afghan People labeled education and illiteracy as one of the
biggest problems that Afghan women still face. Thus, while symbolically girls and
women can attend school, in actuality several barriers preclude this right. This section
discusses both classifications of improvements and compares the three eras by examining
the statistical differences in social status presented in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter
7. Last, this section analyzes whether women‘s rights have improved since the U.S.
invasion compared to the preceding eras.
Education and economic status. There have been some improvements since 2001
in the educational status of Afghan women. In comparing literacy, the rate in the first era
ranged from 5 percent in 1979 (EFA 2009) to an increased 14 percent in 1990 (U.S. Dept.
of Commerce 1993). In the Taliban era, literacy reached the lowest point with just 4
percent of Afghan women being literate (Amnesty International 1998). Since 2001, there
has been an increase in literacy compared to the Taliban era and a small increase since
Soviet control. While Isobel Coleman (2004) noted that some disputed the percentage as
too high, UNESCO reported the literacy of Afghan women increasing to 20 percent in
2004. However, other reports, like the 2009 UNESCO report, showed the literacy rate
for women at 18 percent (RAWA 2009b). Nevertheless, despite slight improvements,
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low literacy was a constant in each era, and as of 2009 Afghan women remain one of the
least literate groups in the world (RAWA 2009b).
When comparing school attendance rates for the three eras, this final era has
shown improvements. Despite some rural provinces that reported just 1 percent of girls
attending school (Coleman 2004), this period represents the highest enrollment of girls in
school of any other period in Afghanistan (Human Rights Watch 2006). In fact, in 2009
girls comprised 34 percent of the 6 million students enrolled in Afghan public schools
(RAWA 2009b). However, most improvements are relative to location. As in the
preceding periods, most change has occurred in urban areas, not in rural areas.
Moreover, many of the same issues that plagued the pre-Taliban era are still prevalent. In
addition to security, conservative customs, poverty, shortage of schools, shortage of
women teachers, and insufficient funding are still major barriers. Additionally, early
marriage or forced marriage especially precludes girls from attending secondary school.
Thus, to restate the Human Rights Watch (2006) regarding education, ―the situation is far
from what it could or should have been, particularly for girls.‖
Regarding employment, Afghan women have started to enter the labor force
again, which the Taliban either forbade or limited, as discussed in Chapter 6. In some
respects, Afghan women have seen improvements regarding their labor force
participation. For example, in 2005, women represented 11 percent of business owners in
Afghanistan and represented 85 percent of the micro-finance recipients (GEM 2007).
While this shows signs of progress, employment and shortage of job opportunities is a
huge concern for women (Women for Women International 2009). In 2007, some reports
indicated that just one in seven women held a job, representing 14 percent of the female
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population (Charney and Coleman 2007). Like the pre-Taliban era, much of the formal
employment occurs in the urban areas, especially for professional women and the
majority of women are employed in the informal sector. While there is an improvement
compared to the Taliban era, it is hard to distinguish if women fared better in the preTaliban era or since 2001. First, in many cases, many of the pre-Taliban era professional
women fled the country during the years of war. Second, while education was limited in
the pre-Taliban era, the Taliban prohibited education for careers like education, law, or
medicine, contributing to the shortage of women in these needed professions.
In comparing different professional careers, some areas show higher percentages
of women‘s participation in the pre-Taliban era. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s,
women comprised 70 percent of the teachers (Human Rights Watch 2006), while in 2007
women comprised just one quarter of the teachers (United Nation‘s Development Fund
for Women 2007a). While in the pre-Taliban era, women represented 50 percent of the
civil servants (Human Rights Watch 2006), in 2009 women comprised just 22 percent of
government employees. In both eras, only small numbers of women held decisionmaking roles. Moreover, Afghan women still earn significantly lower pay than Afghan
men earn, in some cases earning up to only one-third of what a man earns (Women for
Women International 2009). Finally, like the pre-Taliban era, security barriers, low
literacy, low education attainment, high fertility rates, and societal norms preclude more
women from participating in the workforce.
From a holistic perspective, education and literacy are paramount in improving
the status of Afghan women as a whole. First, increasing the number of literate women
helps to increase the number of women teachers, and therefore girl students. Second,
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improving other status areas is contingent on improving education & literacy levels.
Lack of education limits their access to the economic sphere; it also limits their access to
health and improving their health. For instance, one can infer that educating more
women then increases the number of women employed in healthcare, and thus increases
the number of women who seek medical care. Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 7,
Human Rights Watch (2006) reported that increasing girls‘ education by just one year
would result in a 5 percent to 10 percent reduction in infant mortality. Likewise,
education is also vital to advance Afghan women‘s legal, political, and social status. For
example, as mentioned, women largely have no recourse for legal grievances due to their
low presence in the judicial arena. Again, education is the only way to increase the
number of women in the judicial, legal, and political spheres.
Constitutional and political status. Categorically, the constitutional rights given
to women in the 2004 Afghanistan Constitution represent both a symbolic and an actual
improvement. In comparing women‘s constitutional rights since 2001 to the Taliban era,
their constitutional rights immediately changed symbolically by simply granting women a
legal status. As mentioned, under both the Mujahideen and the Taliban, women had no
rights or legal status. Like the 1964, 1976, 1987 and 1990 Constitutions, the 2004
Constitution promises equality to women and men. While the language differed in each
constitution, the written guarantee of equality has been consistent. Unlike the earlier
constitutions, the 2004 Constitution includes articles that specifically aim to combat the
literacy disparity between Afghan women and men (Article 44) as well as to abolish
traditional customs and mistaken interpretations of Islam that often precluded their rights
in previous periods (Article 54). Moreover, the 2004 Constitution instituted the
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Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to protect women from
human rights violations and discrimination. Regarding political representation, the 2004
Constitution also included a quota that grants women 25 percent of the lower-house seats
and 17 percent of the upper-house seats. In these regards, the 2004 Constitution provides
women with more rights, freedoms, and opportunities than in any other era and thus is an
improvement, albeit symbolically.
Yet, despite several accolades given to the 2004 Constitution by foreign
governments, institutions, and organizations, in actuality many of the rights are largely
ignored or enforced. This echoes the earlier constitution‘s failure to follow through on
the promise of equality for Afghan women, especially in rural Afghanistan. For example,
in 2008, a commissioner for the AIHRC, Suraya Subhrang, said that, ―Our findings
clearly indicate that despite over six years of international rhetoric about Afghan
women‘s emancipation and development, a real and tangible change has not touched the
lives of millions of women in this country‖ (RAWA 2008). While the written freedoms
and rights serve as an improvement, they are largely just symbolic if women do not
experience these freedoms in their daily lives.
Likewise, after the 2004 elections, the Bush Administration claimed the elections
to be successful, especially for women who used their ―new freedom‖ to vote. While
women did represent over 43 of the total voters, urban women comprised the vast
majority of this percentage. In the 2009 elections, women‘s turnout dropped to 38.7
percent due to the greater risks to their security. Besides the fears of security and threats,
illiteracy and low education attainment, also factor in their low political participation. As
the Library of Parliament (2008) labeled it, women lack in ―citizenship education.‖
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While the percentages of women voting show signs of progress, these percentages also
falsify the reality of an equal democracy for both women and men. Largely, these
percentages are symbolic and not reflective of the women‘s population on a whole.
Additionally, since 2001, more women have run for political office. However, these
women candidates risk their lives by facing death threats and intimidation for
campaigning, something that their male counterparts do not experience.
While the constitutional quotas require that women represent at least 24 percent of
the National Assembly, women actually exceeded that quota by 3 percent and in 2007
comprised 27 percent of the National Assembly. This is an actual improvement in
political representation compared to the pre-Taliban era. For example, while women did
hold political positions in the pre-Taliban era, they were largely restricted to women
affiliated with the WDOA or sympathetic to communist goals. However, even though
women hold a higher percentage in political representation than in any other era, many
female Parliamentarians report that they are powerless and that many male politicians,
especially the warlords, do not support them and hold the power. For instance, the case
of Malalai Joya illustrates this reality. After she spoke out against the warlords in the
Afghan government, the National Assembly suspended her (Library of Parliament 2008).
Thus, while the increased number of women in politics represents a sign of progress, it is
only symbolic if they hold no real power. Like education and the constitution, political
representation counts as both an actual improvement and a symbolic improvement.
Violence. Comparing the amount of violence in each era is difficult. First, as
mentioned, statistics on violence are often inaccurate and vastly underreported.
Furthermore, in both the pre-Taliban era and the Taliban era, no specific data on the
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number of violent incidents were collected. According to Elaheh Rostami-Povey
(2007:26), many sources consider the civil war era more violent for women than the
Taliban era, largely due to the high numbers of rapes and murders by the Mujahideen.
Prior to the civil war, both the Soviet Union and the Soviet resistance fighters used rape
and violence as a method to seek information, revenge, or reward soldiers (Amnesty
International 2005). Since 2001, more data is available on the number of violent
incidents and rape. However, even that is presumed to be a low estimation of the true
number of violent incidents that Afghan women endure. In 2007, it was reported that one
in three women experienced physical, psychological, or sexual violence (RAWA 2008).
From March 2007 to March 2008, the number of reported domestic violence incidents
increased by 40 percent (RAWA 2008). As stated earlier, the 2007 Afghanistan Human
Development Report reported that, ―violence against women in Afghanistan has reached
‗epidemic proportions‘‖ (CPHD 2007).
The types of violence that Afghan women have experienced in all three eras
includes forced marriages, child marriages, domestic violence, sexual harassment, human
trafficking, and even death in honor killings. In 2009, Womankind Worldwide reported
that over 60 percent of marriages were forced (Women for Women International 2009).
Oftentimes, in forced marriage, families regard women as financial transactions or
commodity exchanges to pay off a debt or resolve a financial hardship (Women for
Women International 2009).
As in the preceding eras, Afghan women still experience a life of systemic sexual,
psychological, and physical violence. While the research cannot conclude that women
experience more violence since 2001, it also cannot conclude that women experience
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less. Perhaps one can infer that the increased numbers of reports do offer some sign of
progress in women rejecting the social taboo of not reporting violence. However, since
2001, the research can conclude that women still live in a violent climate and that
violence is inflicted upon them from family and external sources, with very little or no
legal recourse. Furthermore, women that attempt to lead a more public life, through
education or politics, are oftentimes more at risk.
Health. In all three eras, Afghan women have maintained one of the lowest health
statuses in the world. As in prior eras, men continue to outlive women, an opposite to
most countries in the world (Library of Parliament 2008). From 2001 to 2009, the
average life span of women has varied from 42 to 44, which is 20 years lower than the
global average (Library of Parliament 2008; United Nations Children‘s Fund 2009). This
is consistent with the preceding eras, which shared the same life expectancy ranges.
However, in this study, the pre-Taliban period marked the lowest recorded life
expectancy of 37 in 1975 (Moghadam 2002).
While the Taliban completely restricted and sometimes, banned women‘s access
to healthcare, rural Afghan women in all three eras experienced huge disparity in access
compared to urban Afghan women. Since 2001, the access issue is still a major issue,
and often rural women have an even lower health status than urban women. As
indicated, between 30 to 90 percent of rural women cannot access healthcare, depending
on their proximity to Kabul (UNIFEM 2007). In all three eras, infant mortality and
maternal mortality ranked as one of the worst in the world. According to the UN, the
maternal mortality rate in Afghanistan was the second to highest in the world in 2008
(RAWA 2008). Even though it still maintains one of the highest infant mortality rates in
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the world, the 2007 Human Development Report stated that the infant mortality rate
decreased from 165 per 1,000 to 135 per 1,000, which resulted in 40,000 successful births
(CPHD 2007). The fertility rate has been consistently high in Afghanistan, and in 2007
the average fertility rate was 6.6 children (UNIFEM 2007a). According to the Library of
Parliament (2008), this was the highest fertility rate in the world.
While there have been some improvements to healthcare for women since 2001, it
is hard to distinguish healthcare as measurably better than the pre-Taliban era. Like the
pre-Taliban era, the lack of access to healthcare, lack of education, societal barriers,
insufficient funding, insufficient supplies, and shortage of trained women in the medical
profession negatively affect healthcare. Dr. S. M. Amin Fatimie, the Afghan Minister of
Health, said that, “the health of Afghan women and children is in a better state today than
in 2002 . . . but much remains to be done,‖ (Fatimie 2009).
Concluding discussion. In 2009, Women for Women International reported that
women respondents ―felt optimistic‖ regarding their future. While the feeling of
optimism cannot be compared to the other eras statistically, these sorts of survey
questions should not be dismissed. From a symbolic sense, women‘s rights have
drastically improved in Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion compared to both preceding
eras. Beyond being granted a legal status, Afghan women theoretically possess more
rights than ever before. However, in their daily lives, women still suffer constant abuses
domestically, sexually, and socially, and maintain one of the lowest social statuses in all
areas. Thus, in actuality, not much has changed for women, especially compared to the
promises guaranteed by the international community. Additionally, much of the funding
promised to Afghan women or their needs is either non-existent or insufficient. For
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example, consider the $2.5 million allocated to the U.S.-Afghan Women‘s Council
(UAWC) to create 14 provincial Women‘s Resource Centers. Despite the hype of this
allocation, it is insignificant compared to the funds that that aid military projects
(Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:175-177). Moreover, while the UAWA is a public-private
alliance and has received positive press regarding its success, the organization receives
no formal budget and according to Kolhatkar and Ingalls (2006:177), ―makes no
negligible difference,‖ to the life of Afghan women. Since 2001, the lack of funding to
strengthen women‘s programs and improve their status has been consistently
problematic. Despite the increased funding for military projects, security still is one of
the biggest concerns for women.
While time certainly is needed to improve Afghan women‘s status, there is not
much statistically that shows that their status has improved much more than symbolically
compared to the two preceding eras. It is difficult to define an improved status as
actuality when the same barriers and horrific security conditions comprise the everyday
lives of Afghan women. An improved status would signify far beyond just small
increases in literacy, the number of women parliamentarians who hold little (or no)
power, and millions of Afghan women voting on election days. At the same time, it is
important to point out that some improvements have occurred in all realms. Yet, in many
cases, the same pattern of change solely reaching the urban areas is repeating itself in this
era. Thus, this research concludes that little measurable change has occurred since 2001
for women. Moreover, all factors of social status are deeply connected. Until security
and education improve, the other factors will not improve significantly either.
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9.3: Theoretical Analysis: Insights from Gender and Cultural Essentialism
Introduction. The application of gender and cultural essentialism showed
similarities in rhetoric and promises that emerged from the various actors in the three
eras. The actors discussed in the research included the Daoud Administration, the PDPA,
the Soviet Union, and the Mujahideen in the first era, the Taliban in the second era, and
the United States in the third era. Additionally, some women‘s organizations and
Western feminists, especially in the Taliban era and since 2001, serve as implicit or
explicit actors in using gender or cultural essentialism in their campaigns and literature.
Without the use of gender and cultural essentialism in this thesis, these commonalities
might not be as evident among these different groups. Thus, gender and culture
essentialism provide valuable insights on the historic and contemporary use of ―saving
Afghan women.‖
Moreover, the commonality of war and conflict itself adds to the reinforcement of
gender essentialism in each era. Besides the exaggerated essentialist traits that war often
assigns to women and men, ―wartime femininity‖ also strengthens the need ―to save‖
Afghan women (Fluri 2008:144). According to Jennifer Fluri, feminist scholar,
(2008:144), wartime femininity ―requires the protective force of violent masculinity to
secure its fragility and feminine representation of the homeland/motherland.‖ In this
aspect, gender and cultural essentialism then defines Afghanistan itself as
―metaphorically feminized‖ and needing to be saved or liberated by the United States (or
in the first era, the Soviet Union), who are ―metaphorically masculinized‖ as the protector
(Oliver 2007:43).
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This section focuses on the final three research questions. These questions
included: (2) If ―liberating‖ (or saving) Afghan women is important, why do some
policies negatively affect or overlook women? (3) How can the application of gender
essentialism and cultural essentialism provide insights on why policy decisions often
negatively affect or overlook Afghan women? (4) How can the application of gender
essentialism and cultural essentialism provide insights on the justification for war in the
name of ―saving‖ Afghan women? Throughout this section, these questions are central to
the analysis. Additionally, this section examines portions of Section 9.2 through a
theoretical view.
Same Rhetoric, Different Era. Consistently, in all three eras, the different regimes
portrayed Afghan women as victims that needed ―to be saved,‖ in order to justify war,
violent conflict, and military action. For the Soviet Union and the United States, this
cultural essentialist justification served as a ―noble ideal‖ and ―civilizing mission‖ that
rationalized the destruction of Afghanistan and its infrastructure (Kumar and Stabile
2005). As discussed earlier, gendered stereotypes are often amplified during war and
conflict situations. Beyond just the exaggeration of gendered stereotypes, Fluri
(2008:143-144) suggests that gendered stereotypes are also ―altered for the purpose of
powerful political actors.‖ Meaning that besides ―saving Afghan women‖ serving as the
―moral rationale‖ for war, it simultaneously marginalizes women as weak, helpless, and
oppressed in both their political and social worlds (Fluri 2008:143-144). Through this
lens of exaggerated gender essentialism, men and war serve as both the ―protectors‖ of
Afghan women, while simultaneously serving as the ―perpetrators‖ against Afghan
women (Fluri 2008:143).
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In each era, Afghan women have served at the center of the rationale used by each
regime to legitimize their actions. While each group engaged in gender essentialism,
cultural essentialism was often utilized in consistent pushback between the external
actors (Soviet Union and United States) and the internal actors (Mujahideen, Taliban, and
conservative rural leaders/warlords). For example, to all actors, Afghan women are
helpless victims who need to be saved (gender essentialism). However, to the PDPA,
Soviet Union, and United States, Afghan women are helpless and oppressed victims due
to the backwards culture of Afghan men and Islam (cultural essentialism). Meanwhile, to
the Mujahideen and Taliban, Afghan women are the ―receptacles of honor‖ (AhmedGosh 2003:3) whom they must rescue from the immoral cultural influence of the West
(or in the first era, the Soviet Union). Additionally, in some cases, the use of cultural
essentialism then inflated gender essentialist stereotypes of Afghan women to both the
external and internal forces. Afghan women symbolize an exaggerated sense of
oppression due to their culture (the culture of being Third World, Islam, and backwards),
while simultaneously symbolizing an exaggerated sense of purity to retain culture against
foreign influence (reverse cultural essentialism).
In all three periods, men served as the ―protectors‖ of Afghan women as well as
the ―perpetrators‖ against Afghan women. Metaphorically, protector is understood in the
essentialist context of women as helpless victims who need to be ―saved.‖ However, the
term perpetrator extends beyond the violent and criminal context of the word. First, the
term perpetrator includes the multitudes of violent incidents, rapes, and assaults against
Afghan women by soldiers and guards. As discussed, in war, women often symbolize
―weapons of war‖ (Amnesty International 1998) and sadly, Afghan women‘s bodies
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served as ―another battleground for belligerent parties‖ (RAWA 2005). To the soldiers
and guards, women‘s bodies became political tools used to reward their own soldiers or
to shame the other side in their lack of ―protection‖ of ―their‖ women. The use of rape
and sexual assault reduces the capacity of people to resist military advances and serves as
a means of dishonoring the community (Amnesty International 1998). Metaphorically,
the dishonored women and men in the community are feminized as weak, while the male
perpetrators are masculinized warriors (Eisenstein 2008:37).
Second, ―perpetrator‖ also means the retention of Afghan women in a low social
status by the different actors‘ or regimes‘ policy decisions (or lack thereof). For example,
the Daoud Administration and the PDPA both pledged their policies would improve the
status of Afghan women or ―protect Afghan women.‖ While the Daoud Administration
implemented some policies that benefitted women, they also failed to offer any women
positions in their cabinet. In response, members of the PDPA and the WDOA attacked
the Daoud Administration for not following through on their promises. After the PDPA
overthrew Daoud in a coup, the PDPA, as the ―protector of Afghan women‖ touted the
―emancipation of women‖ as one of their chief aspirations (Emadi 2002:100). Yet, the
PDPA as the ―perpetrator‖ continued to engage in essentialism in what emancipation
should like for women and often women worked in positions that were stereotypical
female (Brodsky 2004:45). Both the Daoud Administration and the PDPA promised
increased freedoms to women as a method to rally support for their own political goals
without providing substantial changes. Simply, as in the proceeding eras, their rhetoric
did not match their policy.
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When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, their rationale included ―discourses
of ‗saving‘ Afghan women from Afghanistan‘s patriarchal social structures‖ (Fluri
2008:144) and thus, they also promised ―to protect‖ Afghan women. From a gender and
cultural essentialist view, the Soviets cast Afghan women as needing protected from
Afghan men, who were misogynist and backwards (unless they were members of the
PDPA or sympathetic with the Communists). Yet, while the Soviet Union did include
some literacy programs and increased the number of women in the workforce, it was
solely in tandem with their goals. Arguably, the Soviet Union used education for women
as a façade to indoctrinate women with communism, not to improve their social status.
Thus, to the Soviets, Afghan women just served as political pawns in the Soviet‘s broader
scheme. As the perpetrators, the Soviets also retained women in the same social status
and engaged in violence and sexual assault against Afghan women who did not agree
with their policies or Communism.
In response to the Soviet Union, the Mujahideen also promised to save and protect
Afghan women, from the ―military and ideological invasions of the Soviets‖ (Fluri
2008:144). The Mujahideen connected with many Afghans by framing themselves as the
―icon of warriors engaged in jihad58 against kafir59 invaders‖ (Ask 1998). In this context,
the Mujahideen serve as the ―protectors‖ of Afghan women and as the preservationists of
women‘s values (Ask 1998). As discussed in Chapter 5 and earlier in this chapter, many
sources said it was the Mujahideen who committed the most human rights atrocities
against women, and offered no status to women at all.

58

Holy War.

59

Infidel.
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In fact, the Taliban also promised to protect Afghan women from the human
rights crimes, rapes, and lawlessness perpetrated by the Mujahideen (Fluri 2008:144).
Moreover, the Taliban‘s promises to protect and save women served as one paramount
reason for their early support in recruiting more Afghan men to join the Taliban and
increased their power in the province of Kandahar (Fluri 2008:149). Yet, while the
Taliban promised peace and to ―save Afghan women,‖ they instilled the most
misogynistic policies of all eras, denying women all liberties and freedoms. In that
context, the Taliban was the worst of all the perpetrators.
In the post-Taliban era, the United States built the case as the ―protector‖ for
invading Afghanistan by ―saving women‖ from the ―misogynistic Taliban.‖ Through a
cultural essentialist lens, it is important to consider the political framing of the war. For
example, consider Karen Hughes, a counselor to President George W. Bush and
Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, and how she indirectly stated that they
(Bush Administration) aimed to capitalize on the oppression and suffering of Afghan
women to indirectly legitimatize war (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:171). Regarding
Afghan women, Hughes said, ―I thought focusing on the plight of Afghan women and
girls was a way to highlight the cruel nature of the people we were up against‖ (Kolkatkar
and Ingalls 2006:171). This political framing paints Afghan women as ALL oppressed
while painting Afghan men as ALL misogynistic. Through both a gender and cultural
essentialist lens, the United States framed the burqa and the Taliban as the chief sources
of Afghan women‘s oppression. As discussed, both of these testaments are historically
inaccurate and riddled in both gender and cultural essentialism. Additionally, it fails to
mention the United States‘ role in funding the Mujahideen and indirectly helping the
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Taliban rise to power. Thus, in this theoretical context, the United States reversed its
roles. First, the United States acted as the silent perpetrator by funding misogynistic
groups and second, as the protector of oppressed women from misogynistic groups.
After 9/11, the United States portrayed itself as the protector of Afghan women by
invading Afghanistan and rescuing them from the Taliban. While certainly no one would
argue against the Taliban being removed from power, the United States chose to align
with the Northern Alliance, a group which shares parallel views with the Taliban
regarding Afghan women and that is equally undemocratic and misogynistic. In the
theoretical context, the United States acts again as the silent perpetrator by the policy
choice of aligning with the Northern Alliance. Instilling power in the Northern Alliance
contradicted the rationale for war and serves as the reason for the retention of the
women‘s low social status since 2001. As in the preceding eras, the protector was also
the perpetrator.
Women’s rights defined by dress. As discussed, the veil and burqa
simultaneously symbolize the oppression and the purity of Afghan women. In this
essentialist context, the burqa symbolizes women‘s oppressed sexuality and forced
seclusion. Theoretically, the burqa and the importance placed on Afghan women‘s dress
highlights the cultural essentialism ping-pong used to stereotype Afghan/Islam culture as
backwards and oppressive or as ―traditional against modernization and Westernization‖
(Oliver 2007:51).
While the Taliban forcibly made Afghan women wear the burqa and restricted
their appearance, the Taliban also forced men to dress in Islamic clothes and a cap,
maintain their beard at a certain length, and forced boys to wear turbans if they desired to
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attend school (RAWA 2009a). After the fall of the Taliban, men cutting their beards or
boy students relinquishing their turbans were not indicators of liberation. However,
through the lens of gender essentialism, Afghan women‘s freedom is associated with
dress and ―the freedom to reveal their bodies in public‖ (Oliver 2007:51). The symbol of
the burqa strongly contrasts with how the West defines ―women‘s independence and
liberation‖ (Fluri 2008:148).
Thus, in many ways, the burqa was both a cultural and political tool to garner
public support for the war in Afghanistan (Fluri 2008:145-152). For example, in a U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee60 meeting, Senator Barbara Boxer depicted the
burqa as one of the vital things ―to rally public opinion against the Taliban‖ (Fluri
2008:147). Besides the unfortunate distraction of this symbolism, it also continues the
age-old essentialist image of defining women by their appearance. Perhaps, most
importantly, as Fluri stated, ―bombs do not distinguish by gender.‖
Same Rhetoric, Same Status. Throughout the three eras, the rhetoric of ―saving
Afghan women‖ remained the same, while their status also remained the same. From a
theoretical viewpoint, this notion of ―saving Afghan women‖ hinders their progress,
rather than improving their status. Moreover, the constant cultural essentialist pushback
and figurative ping-pong metaphor offers insights on Afghan women‘s low status in each
era. Even before the first era, any initiatives for education or other modern progressions
were viewed by rural Afghanistan as being foreign values and not of Afghan values.
Historically, this traces back to colonialism and is consistent with other colonized and
60

Senator Barbara Boxer said this in response to Karl Inderfurth, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of South
Asian Affairs, in the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2000, ―The Taliban: engagement or
confrontation?‖ Hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, July 20.
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conflict nations. In this context, Afghan women symbolize the ―emblems of cultural
integrity‖ (Jaggar 2001:1). Thus, Afghan women become the keepers of ―moral order‖
(Jaggar 2001:1) and represent purity in the cultural norms of Afghanistan (in comparison
to the West). Simultaneously, this pushback against modernizations in the name of the
purity of women then denies them an improved status.
For example, rural Afghanistan leaders project themselves as the moral fiber of
the country, and even in 2004 viewed Kabul and other urban areas as ―potential cultural
and moral degradation‖ (Mitchell 2004). Thus, the conservative or reformists groups
portray attempts to improve women‘s status as un-Islamic and as reflective of foreign
values, not Afghan ones. Conservative or reformists groups then utilize women as their
response to the foreign occupation and vow to protect women‘s honor and purity in all
public and private areas (Oliver 2007:50-51).
This pushback only harms women as it retains their low status through the
essentialist attributes assigned to Afghan women in both gender and culture. It also
allows the same patriarchal control over aspects of women‘s‘ lives. For example, it
maintains the acceptance of women as ―uneducated‖ and views education as
―unimportant in their struggle for survival,‖ compared to Afghan families and society
viewing education as more important for boys (Emadi 2002:74). It also maintains the
patriarchal dominance of women viewed as economic exchanges in marriage and human
trafficking, outlets for reproduction, and property exchanged for debts or family crimes.
Most importantly, the use of women as victims only marginalizes them into a
more gender essentialist image of persons weak, helpless, and needing to be saved by
men (domestic or foreign). Thus, after the ―rescue,‖ Afghan women retain the same
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image as oppressed. For example, Fluri (2008:147) argues that by the United States
using Afghan women as a ―political tool‖ to gain public support for the war, Afghan
women then become ―marginalized victims in need of saving from an outside power,
rather than addressing and celebrating the agency, resilience, and resistance of Afghan
women‘s and feminist organizations prior to and during the Taliban regime.‖
In that aspect, gender essentialism offers a rationale for why the different regimes
forced RAWA to work in secrecy, discredited their organization, or ignored their efforts.
Since Afghan women are cast in essentialist language of being burqa-clad, helpless,
oppressed, and needing to be saved, the strength and endurance of RAWA members does
not fit the image. For example, if the PDPA and the Soviet Union both wished to
―emancipate women,‖ RAWA should have served as a partner, not as a group whose
members they jailed. To the Mujahideen and Taliban, RAWA were emblematic of
representing foreign values and seen as corrupt. Moreover, these groups believed that
RAWA would force them to lose their patriarchal power and control over Afghan
women. Finally, the United States and Western organizations largely ignore the work of
RAWA in empowering Afghan women.
One could argue that RAWA is dismissed as their accomplishments and longevity
challenge the essentialist portrayal of Afghan women. As one young RAWA member
said, ―RAWA is a candle in the dark night. We follow but there is always a wind that is
trying to blow it out‖ (Brodsky 2004:269). Theoretically, RAWA should be an
organization that works in tandem with the Afghan government, Western feminist
organizations, and the United States to implement the new democratic objectives.
Instead, RAWA is largely ignored, discredited, and receives little funding from U.S.-
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based organizations (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006:191-195). RAWA‘s ability to withstand
over 30 years of conflict shows the strength of their organization, while also showing the
strength in gender and cultural essentialism. RAWA collided with the essentialist
rhetoric of the internal and external regimes and does not fit the image of Afghan women
as helpless, oppressed, or needing to be saved.
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
10.1: Conclusions
This case study shows that Afghan women have been continuous pawns in each
era. In all three eras of this case study, women have served as the rationale for war or
violence by the different actors discussed. From the Soviet Union to the Mujahideen to
the Taliban and the United States, Afghan women have been touted as the moral
justification for war and violence. As stated by First Lady Laura Bush in November
2001, ―the fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women‖
(American Presidency Project 2001). Similar to this example, Afghan women have been
used as the moral justifications by each regime in this case study. These moral
justifications of war or violence have included the promise of improving the lives of
Afghan women. The case of ―saving‖ Afghan women is not unique and instead, much of
the rationale and victimization of Afghan women has been consistent in each era. Thus,
history has repeated itself from both a theoretical and practical standpoint.
From a theoretical standpoint, this case study showed the dangers in gender and
cultural essentialism. In each era, the gender and cultural essentialist attributes assigned
to Afghan women remained relatively unchanged. As warned by Fuss (1989:3), an
essentialist vision is an ―unbroken continuum that transports across cultures and times.‖
Through this lens, essentialism explains the continued historical discrimination and
oppression of Afghan women. Furthermore, the perpetual essentialist pushback has
precluded much social change for Afghan women as it has been labeled an immoral
Western influence.
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From a practical standpoint, despite all the rhetoric by the different regimes to
improve the lives of Afghan women, their status has remained relatively unchanged and
consistently one of the lowest in the world. While Afghan women have been at the
center of each conflict as the rationale, improving their status has not served at the
forefront of any regime or policy. As stated by the Governor of Kandahar Province in an
interview with Amnesty International (2005) in 2004, ―At the moment, there are more
pressing issues . . . a civil servant has too much on his mind to deal with women‘s rights.
It‘s a matter of priorities.‖ This quote embodies much of the reality experienced by
Afghan women in each era. Simply, Afghan women have been perpetual political pawns
while never serving as a policy priority.
10.2: Limitations to the Study
First, the war and unrest in Afghanistan served as a limitation in the research
regarding the data collection. It is impossible for all data to be reported and likely that
some data regarding women is not available or included in the primary and secondary
sources chosen. Second, the case study as the research design itself also served as a
potential limitation, since no causal effects or hypothesis testing could be implemented.
Third, defining the status of Afghan women came from a Western and First World
perspective. This could limit the study as what I, a Western female researcher, defines,
as a ―better status‖ may be defined differently from an Eastern and Third World
researcher. The fourth limitation specifically pertains to the third period of the U.S
invasion. While the United States led the coalition, this study did not explore the policies
of NATO or any of the other countries in the alliance. This limitation is important as
reviewing the literature and policy regarding NATO or the alliance countries could
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corroborate or discount some conclusions. Fifth, I, the researcher, speak English and not
any native Afghan language. Any research conducted in a native Afghan language and
translated into English may have lost its part of its original meaning. Sixth, this research
dealt exclusively with the discrimination and the status of women, not with religious or
ethnic minorities within Afghanistan. Further research on the role ethnicity might play
would be useful. This is important to consider as Afghanistan is a country with
incredible diversity of ethnicities that include Pashtun (the plurality), Tajiks, Hazaras,
Uzbecks, and other tribal/community ethnicities. The theory of cultural essentialism
could offer greater insight when applied to relations between the Afghan ethnicities.
10.3: Concluding Discussion
Despite the tremendous obstacles that Afghan women face in each aspect of their
life, there are reasons to be optimistic regarding a better future and better status for
Afghan women. This optimism is beyond Western media reports and organizational
surveys that indicate Afghan women respondents ―feel optimistic‖ regarding their future
(Women for Women International 2009). Instead, the optimism is because of the
strength of Afghan women. This strength is evident in Afghan women such as the
members of RAWA or Parliamentarian Malalai Joya. These strengths are revealed by
removing the essentialist attributes often assigned to Afghan women.
The goal of this research is to show a holistic perspective by using feminist theory
and to dig deeper into the historical and theoretical context of the three eras. As stated
earlier, Angela Y. Davis (2008:20) explains that feminist methodology forces one to
explore associations not necessarily visible and to connect items together that appear
separate. By applying gender and cultural essentialism, organizations and regimes that
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seem opposite instead show similarities. Without the use of gender and cultural
essentialism, these commonalities might not be as evident among these different groups.
From a historical and theoretical perspective, gender and cultural essentialism help to
identify the similarities in rhetoric by each regime with the similarities in outcome of
continued low status. Through feminist theory, the lens shows that using women or
―trying to save them,‖ instead only marginalizes their political and social worlds, without
ameliorating their lives (Fluri 2008:144-145).
The theories of gender and cultural essentialism provide insights to the
perplexities of Afghanistan‘s history since 1973. While much mainstream literature
discusses the conflict and war in Afghanistan for over 30 years, the common thread of
Afghan women as the rationale is not always at the forefront of that discussion. By
examining each period through this theoretical lens, the similarities in each regime
emerge and reveal the same essentialist pattern. History repeats itself and gender and
cultural essentialism continue to be utilized, in an implicit or explicit cyclical manner.
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APPENDIX 1: MAP OF AFGHANISTAN

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan

TALIBAN ERA
TALIBAN ERA
TALIBAN ERA

Source: CIA World Fact Book,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html
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APPENDIX 2: AFGHAN WOMEN‘S LITERACY RATES IN THE THREE
ERAS
Table 1: Lowest and Highest Literacy Rates in the Three Eras
ERA

PRE-TALIBAN ERA

TALIBAN ERA

LOWEST
LITERACY
YEAR
SOURCE**

5 percent

4 percent

1979
UNESCO

1998
Amnesty International

HIGHEST
LITERACY
YEAR
SOURCE**

14 percent

Data not found

POST TALIBAN
ERA
4 percent
2001
United Nations
(Amiri et al.)
18 percent*

1990
-2009
U.S. Department of
-UNESCO
Commerce
(RAWA)
*
While 20 percent literacy rate was also reported in the Post-Taliban era, this number was
also disputed as too high. For this reason, this table uses the 18 percent literacy rate as it
was more current and without dispute at the time of research completion.
**

See References section for further information on the sources.
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APPENDIX 3: ACCESS TO SCHOOLS FOR AFGHAN GIRLS

Figure 2: Percentage of Schools Available to Afghan Girls
Percentage of Schools Available to Afghan Girls

Percentage

100.00%

50.00%

0.00%

Percentage of Schools
Available to Girls
1978

13.10%
Percentage of
Schools Available
to Girls

1990

1993

2006

20%

13.20%

49%

Year

Sources: Hafizullah Emadi, Education for All, and Human Rights Watch.
See References section for further information on the sources.
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APPENDIX 4: AFGHAN WOMEN‘S LABOR FORCE STATISTICS IN THE THREE
ERAS
Table 2: Women’s Labor Force Statistics in the Three Eras

ERA

PERCENTAGE OF
AFGHAN WOMEN
IN LABOR FORCE

PRETALIBAN
ERA

34 Percent
(1990)

TALIBAN
ERA

POST-TALIBAN ERA

--

35.8 percent
(2007)

SOURCE:

Amiri et al.
2004

--

Gender Entreprenuership
Markets (GEM)

PERCENTAGE OF
AFGHAN WOMEN
TEACHERS

70 percent

--

25 percent

SOURCE:

Human Rights
Watch 2006

--

United Nation‘s
Development Fund for
Women

PERCENTAGE OF
AFGHAN WOMEN
CIVIL SERVANTS

50 percent

--

22 percent

SOURCE:

Human Rights
Watch 2006

--

Women for Women
International 2009

See References section for further information on the sources.
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APPENDIX 5: AFGHAN WOMEN‘S LIFE EXPECTANCY IN THE THREE ERAS

Table 3: Afghan Women’s Life Expectancy in the Three Eras

ERA

PRE-TALIBAN ERA

TALIBAN
ERA

POST-TALIBAN
ERA

YEAR
1975

YEAR
1979

YEAR
1995

YEAR
1998

YEAR
2001-2007

LIFE
EXPECTANCY

37

40

42

44

Ranged from 42 to 44

SOURCE:

Mogdaham

Ask

U.S. Dept of
Commerce

Rasekh et
al

Library of Parliament;
United Nations
Children‘s Fund

See References section for further information on the sources.
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APPENDIX 6: AFGHAN WOMEN‘S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INDICATORS IN
THE THREE ERAS
Table 4: Afghan Women’s Fertility Rate in the Three Eras

ERA

PRE-TALIBAN ERA

YEAR

YEAR

YEAR

1975

1979

1992

FERTILITY
RATE

8

6.9

6.4

SOURCE:

Mogdaham

Emadi

U.S. Dept.
of
Commerce

TALIBAN
ERA

POST-TALIBAN
ERA

YEAR

YEAR
2007

--

6.6
United Nation‘s
Development Fund for
Women

See References section for further information on the sources.

Table 5: Infant Mortality Rate in the Three Eras

ERA

PRE-TALIBAN
ERA

TALIBAN
ERA

POST-TALIBAN
ERA

YEAR

1975

1998

2007

INFANT
MORTALITY
RATE

135 per 1000

152 per 1000

135 per 1000

SOURCE:

Mogdaham

Rasekh et al.

2007 Afghanistan
Human Development
Report

See References section for further information on the sources.
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